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Abstract: 
This thesis argues that Heidegger’s existential analytic of human existence challenges 
the traditional understanding of responsibility as lying in the power or mastery of the 
subject. In contrast to secondary literature that attempts to read Heidegger as showing 
that we take responsibility through some kind of self-determination or control, I argue 
that Heidegger’s account of our thrownness, and its first-personal manifestation in our 
attunement, contests such understandings and points to an account of responsibility 
that does not find its locus in the power of the subject. In light of this, I argue that 
taking responsibility for our being-in-the-world should be understood as becoming 
attentive.  
By emphasizing the ‘movement’ of thrownness and the meaning of this as finding 
ourselves always already gripped by way of being attuned, my analysis demonstrates 
the pervasive power of that which is beyond the subject. I show that we must always 
already find ourselves submitted to particular possibilities and, more fundamentally, 
to the enigma of being Dasein. From this analysis, and via the work of Harry 
Frankfurt, I demonstrate how our thrownness speaks against seeing responsibility for 
our being-in-the-world in terms of choice, rational judgement, or wholeheartedness. 
A further analysis of anxiety, contrasting with accounts which read it as manifesting a 
privileged space for freedom and self-determination, emphasizes the revelation of the 
‘I’ as essentially bound to what is beyond it. I then argue that a Heideggerian account 
of responsibility should be understood in terms of attention or attentiveness, a notion 
that is developed through phenomenological analysis, and in dialogue with the work 
of Iris Murdoch.  Through the use of examples, I propose that attentiveness, with its 
accent on that which is beyond the subject, is a more appropriate way of conceiving 
responsibility on a Heideggerian account. 1
                                                        
1 I would like to warmly thank my supervisor Irene McMullin for the insight, guidance, and 
encouragement given throughout the project. I would also like to give great thanks to Simon 
Thornton for his multifaceted contribution, and to Marta Kowalewska for her patience and 
kindness in proof-reading the work. Thanks also to Béatrice Han-Pile for assistance at the 
earliest stages of the project.  
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Abbreviations for Works by Heidegger 
 
With the exception of Being and Time where the German abbreviation and pagination 
will be used (as is customary), all other references to works by Heidegger will use the 
English pagination. 
 
BCAP - Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, trans. R. Metcalf & M. Tanzer, 
Indiana University Press 2009 
 
BPP - The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. A. Hofstadter, Indiana 
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2011 
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ET - The Essence of Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theatetus, trans. T. Sadler, 
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FCM - The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. 
W. McNeill & N. Walker, Indiana University Press 1995 
 
HCT - History of the Concept of Time, trans. T. Kisiel, Indiana University Press 1985 
 
LH - ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Basic Writings, Ed. D.F. Krell, Harper Perennial 
Modern Thought 2008 
 
MFL - The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. M. Heim, Indiana University 
Press 1984 
 
PIA - Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, trans. R. Rojcewicz, Indiana 
University Press 2001 
 
PRL - The Phenomenology of Religious Life, trans. M. Fritsch & J.A. Gosetti-
Ferencei, Indiana University Press 2004 
 
SZ - Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Blackwell Publishing 
1962 
 
TE – The Event, trans. R. Rojcewicz, Indiana University Press 2012 
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For a little longer they waited, until the Forest had become so still that it almost 
frightened them, and then Rabbit got up and stretched himself. […] 
"Come on," said Rabbit. "I know it's this way."  
They went on. Ten minutes later they stopped again.  
"It's very silly," said Rabbit, "but just for the moment I-- Ah, of course. Come 
on.". . .  
 "Here we are," said Rabbit ten minutes later. "No, we're not.". . .  
"Now," said Rabbit ten minutes later, "I think we ought to be getting--or are we 
a little bit more to the right than I thought?". . .  
"It's a funny thing," said Rabbit ten minutes later, "how everything looks the 
same in a mist. Have you noticed it, Pooh?"  
 Pooh said that he had.  
"Lucky we know the Forest so well, or we might get lost," said Rabbit half an 
hour later, and he gave the careless laugh which you give when you know the 
Forest so well that you can't get lost.  
                                                              - A.A. Milne, The House at Pooh Corner  
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Introduction 
 
Aim of the Thesis 
 
Responsibility has long been identified with that which is ‘up to us’ in some sense. 
As Raffoul (2010) shows in his study The Origins of Responsibility, Western thought 
has been dominated by this conception from its origins in a certain reading of 
Aristotle, where ‘[r]esponsibility becomes understood in terms of both voluntariness 
and reason (through the notions of decision and deliberation) and as the indication of 
power over our actions’ (Raffoul 2010 p26). Since its emergence in Aristotle and 
influential development in Kant, responsibility has been associated with concepts of 
control, power, and sovereignty. 
The idea that we are responsible for that which we have control over, whether 
this control is conceived in terms of being able to deliberate, judge, choose, or decide 
upon, is a familiar one both within philosophy and in our everyday lives. 
Notwithstanding the Strawsonian ‘turn’ that sought to move away from identifying 
moral responsibility with free will in the face of the threat of determinism, the so-
called ‘analytic’ debate about moral responsibility remains largely centred on some 
idea of control or power.1 Within the continental tradition, we can think of Sartre’s 
equation of our radical freedom with an equally radical responsibility.2 In our 
everyday lives, we can think of the way someone whose life is ‘out of control’ might 
be called irresponsible, or the way that children are deemed responsible depending on 
their ability to judge (or ‘know better’) and their powers to act accordingly. 
With his existential analytic of human being in Being and Time, Heidegger 
can be seen to challenge this traditional model by challenging the ontology it relies 
upon. The use of the term ‘Dasein’ to designate human existence signals immediately 
Heidegger’s departure from previous understandings of our being as ‘subject’, 
                                                        
1 This is true of those arguing against the idea of responsibility on this basis (e.g. Galen 
Strawson’s critique of ‘Freedom and Resentment’ in McKenna & Russell 2008), or those seeking 
to nuance the way this control or power is understood (e.g. not as volitional control or choice, 
but through evaluative judgements e.g. Smith 2005). For an overview of such debates see 
McKenna & Russell 2008, and the introduction to Shoemaker 2013. 
2 E.g. ‘Thus, the first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as 
he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders.’ 
‘Existentialism is a Humanism p349 in Kaufman 1956) 
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‘consciousness’ or ‘rational animal’ for example. Heidegger’s phenomenological 
analysis attempts to characterize the constitutive features of Dasein, asking what it 
means to be Dasein as a step towards the more general question of the meaning of 
being. The radicalism of Heidegger’s analysis results in a discourse far removed from 
traditional analyses that sought the ‘essence’ of man in consciousness or rationality. 
For example, the hyphenated expression ‘being-in-the-world’ seeks to illustrate the 
fundamental idea that rather than being two discrete entities that simply causally 
interact with and affect each other, Dasein and the world instead constitute an original 
ontological unity that ultimately cannot be separated (SZ e.g. §12). 
One particularly important aspect of Heidegger’s account of human existence 
in relation to this traditional model of responsibility is what he calls our ‘thrownness’ 
(Geworfenheit). This is one of three central aspects of human being for Heidegger, 
one of three fundamental existential structures of Dasein (SZ 284). By saying that we 
are ‘thrown’, Heidegger is attempting to capture something essential and important 
about the human condition. From the term itself, we can begin to get some sense of 
what he might be attempting to bring to light. To say that we are ‘thrown into 
existence’ (SZ 276) seems to point some kind of passivity at the heart or foundation 
of our lives. This ‘throw’ is not something that we have done but something that we 
find done to us; we are not the agents but the recipients, those affected by it; it is 
something that has ‘already’ happened in some sense, something we did not choose 
and could not choose. A throw suggests a momentum to our lives that we did not 
engender and perhaps are unable to stop. 
With this general sense of the idea of finding oneself ‘thrown’ into existence, 
we can begin to see the concept’s relevance for the question of responsibility. If the 
concept of responsibility is identified with being able to control or determine, then we 
can see how some kind of essential lack of control or power indicated by our 
‘thrownness’ is particularly relevant as potentially threatening this traditional model 
of responsibility. 
However the idea of responsibility seems nonetheless to be found within 
Heidegger’s analysis. In his analysis of our existence, Heidegger puts forward the 
idea that we can exist as Dasein authentically as well as inauthentically (e.g. SZ 53)3. 
                                                        
3 As well as at times suggesting we can also exist in neither way, but rather as ‘undifferentiated’ 
(e.g. SZ 232) 
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Inauthentic existence for Heidegger means existing in a way that forgets, conceals, or 
covers over certain features of the being of Dasein (e.g.SZ 44). This can happen in a 
number of ways. On Heidegger’s analysis, a tendency to fall away from our existence 
is in fact constitutive of our being, and is one of the aforementioned three key 
structural features that Heidegger calls ‘falling’. This can take the form of a tendency 
to ‘forget’ in some sense; the more ‘active’ sounding ‘fleeing of Dasein in the face of 
itself’ (SZ 184); as well as other varieties of ‘concealing’, obscuring, and ‘disguising’ 
its being from itself (SZ 129). This ‘falling’ from our own being for Heidegger can 
often take the form of falling into ‘das Man’4, a way of existing as ‘the crowd’ that 
facilitates this turning away from our own being in its various forms. Importantly, this 
way of losing touch with our being is described by Heidegger as taking away our 
responsibility (translated here by Macquarrie and Robinson as ‘answerability’): 
‘because the “they” presents every judgement and decision as its own, it deprives the 
particular Dasein of its answerability [Verantwortlichkeit]’ (SZ 127). This suggests 
that authentic Dasein, in contrast, at least has the possibility of being responsible. 
While existing inauthentically involves some kind of concealing or turning 
away from our own being, authenticity for Heidegger involves something like the 
opposite. This is sometimes characterized as ‘transparency’ with respect to our 
own being in its various structural moments (SZ 297, 299). We can relate to the 
human condition by ‘authentically revealing it or inauthentically covering it up’ 
(SZ 340). Exactly what this means, unsurprisingly, is subject to a wide number of 
interpretations of Heidegger’s work. But there seems to be widespread agreement 
that whatever this authentic existence amounts to, it includes something like being 
responsible, or taking responsibility. 
Beyond describing falling as a loss of responsibility,  Heidegger himself 
rarely explicitly characterizes authenticity in terms of responsibility – although 
noteworthy here is the discussion of the call of conscience (e.g. SZ 288), and an 
apparent identification of authenticity (and then resoluteness) with responsibility in 
The Concept of Time p45-47.5 Yet such is the nature of Heidegger’s discussion of 
                                                        
4 I will hereafter follow the increasingly common practice of leaving das Man untranslated, given 
the difficulty of capturing its ‘everyone, anyone, and no-one’ character with a single English term.  
5 In The Concept of Time (Dilthey Review)  authenticity is distinguished from inauthenticity by an 
assumption of responsibility in the former:  
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topics related to authenticity such as death, anxiety, the call of conscience, guilt 
etc. that seeing authenticity as being equivalent to, or including, some idea of 
responsibility is ubiquitous among the secondary literature.6 Whether as a 
necessary or sufficient condition, what it means to be authentic means to be 
responsible. 
  Given that Heidegger’s aim is explicitly ontological, aiming at the mode 
of being of human existence as such, any Heideggerian understanding of 
responsibility is not conceived in any specific moral or legal sense, which would 
seek to understand the particular conditions for attributing praise or blame, or 
allocating punishments. Rather, it is responsibility as a way of being-in-the-world, 
as a general way of relating to one’s life and possibilities. This responsibility is 
identified with our being authentic and not just our being as such, and therefore 
being responsible is understood here in the sense of something that one becomes, 
not simply what one is. Becoming authentic is seen as what might be called ‘taking 
responsibility’, a way of becoming responsible for our existence. 
While Heidegger’s existential analytic, and in particular the concept of 
thrownness, looked as if it might threaten the idea of responsibility by threatening 
                                                        
‘[T]hat which may be chosen: Dasein in the form of its ownmost possibility: either to be itself 
through the ‘How’ of assuming its self-responsibility [Selbstverantwortung], or to be in the form 
of being lived by whatever it happens to be occupied with.’ (CT(D) p45) 
Two pages after, a subsequent note made by Heidegger to the idea of Dasein’s authentic 
disclosure as ‘resoluteness’ (translated as ‘resolve’ there) begins simply with ‘responsibility’ - 
see p47   
 
6 For just a small sample:  
‘conscience calls upon  dasein in each case to take over responsibility for its whole life’ (Haugeland  
2013 p209)  
‘the ability to take responsibility for choosing our own way to be, that is, the ability to be 
authentic’ (Wrathall 2005 p61) 
‘the issue of its ownmost Being is its own responsibility’ (Mulhall 1996 p119)  
‘The retrieved self now lives as personally responsible for its own engagement with meaning in 
light of its mortality and thus lives authentically as the “author” of its actions.’ (Sheehan 2014 
p168) 
‘It does not have to become but to come to be in the very act of taking the responsibility for an 
essential non-essence whose meaning is the being-ahead-of-itself, the being-exposed, and hence 
at issue.’ (Nancy 2008 p114) 
‘One has rightfully seen in these passages [about thrownness] the basis for a Heideggerian ethics 
of responsibility.’ (Visker 2008 p180) 
 ‘Dasein must take over “ground”, must take over the project of normativity and self-
responsibility’ (Golob 2016 p243-244) 
‘We will see how Heidegger’s [sic]characterizes Dasein’s authenticity in terms of responsibility.’ 
(Raffoul 2010 p224) 
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the control or power we have over our existence, the consensus seems to be that 
with the idea of authenticity, responsibility is restored. Denis McManus’ recent 
introduction to Heidegger, Authenticity and the Self captures this well. 
Acknowledging that this thrown aspect of our existence, which seems to capture in 
part the way we find ourselves ‘thrown’ into a particular socio-historic situation, 
comes into conflict with the type of power and control of responsibility, McManus 
asks: 
What can self-possession and self-determination be for the essentially socially, 
historically and culturally embedded creature that Division One has convinced 
us we ourselves are?’ (McManus 2015 p6) 
Our thrownness poses a question about the kind of self-possession and self-
determination that are possible. Yet with the idea of authenticity, which McManus 
translates below as ‘owned-ness’, it is taken that such self-determination and 
therefore taking responsibility are possible, as several essays in the collection 
attest: 
Heidegger’s ‘owned-ness’ points us to the possibility of owning oneself and 
one’s life in the sense of taking responsibility for oneself and one’s life. In 
many of the chapters that follow, we see the exploration of ways in which 
taking responsibility for oneself and one’s thoughts, feelings and actions might 
be understood.’ (McManus 2015 p5-6) 
As this recent collection illustrates, the consensus in the secondary literature is that 
while our thrownness might appear to raise an issue for the kind of self-
determination constitutive of taking responsibility as traditionally understood, the 
concept of authenticity shows how some such self-determination or ‘ownership’, 
and therefore taking responsibility, is nonetheless possible for the thrown beings 
that we are.  
In this thesis, I will agree with the vast secondary literature on Heidegger’s 
existential analytic that sees the possibility of authenticity as the possibility of 
taking responsibility for our being-in-the-world. However, against this literature 
that views responsibility as some kind ‘self-possession and self-determination’ as 
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per the traditional model , I will argue that with the concept of thrownness, 
Heidegger’s analytic shows that taking responsibility cannot be conceived on this 
traditional model. Through an analysis of thrownness and its first-personal 
manifestation in attunement, I will argue that this lack of control and power is so 
pervasive as to prohibit the kind of mastery that responsibility is thought to consist 
in, and thus taking responsibility should not be understood to lie in the power, 
control, or self-determination of the subject.  
Unlike accounts of responsibility like the one that Raffoul (2010) himself 
goes on to develop after identifying this traditional model of responsibility, 
however, I will not challenge this model by abandoning the first-person 
perspective of Dasein, the ‘mineness’ of existence. In reading Heidegger as 
breaking with ‘subject-based metaphysics’ and ‘an anthropological way of 
thinking’ (Raffoul 2010 p239), for Raffoul responsibility is not ‘a human 
characteristic, but is instead a phenomenon that belongs to being itself’ (ibid. 
p238-239) - responsibility is ‘that event by which being “enowns” humans’ (p36). 
By following Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein and its commitment to arise from and 
return to the level of existence, I shall retain a focus on the question of taking 
responsibility for our lives, a question which must also arise and return to first-
personal existence.  I will propose that in light of the challenges that our 
thrownness poses to the traditional model of responsibility, taking responsibility 
for our being-in-the-world should be understood be understood in terms of being 
attentive. 
 
Methodology 
 
Given that I will be analyzing this kind of first-personal responsibility for our being-
in-the-world in the light of our thrownness, my investigation will focus on 
Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein as found in Being and Time, with support at times 
taken from relevant lecture courses in the 1920s.  
In order to show how thrownness challenges the traditional conception of 
responsibility, it will first be necessary to provide a picture of our thrownness which 
will be taken from Heidegger’s analysis in Being and Time and related texts. This will 
involve looking at what Heidegger calls our ‘attunement’, the affective dimension of 
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our lives, through which our thrownness is revealed to us in a privileged way, as well 
as analyzing the ‘fundamental’ attunement of anxiety. Heidegger’s analysis of these 
aspects of our being are chiefly to be found in Division One of Being and Time. But 
while this text will be foundational for our explication of Heidegger’s analysis of our 
thrownness and our attunement that will undermine the traditional account, the case is 
less straightforward when looking to put forward a new account of responsibility in 
the light of this.  
As mentioned, it is in Heidegger’s analysis of authenticity in Division II that 
the possibility of such an account of responsibility seems to lie. The story of this 
Division’s rushed composition that seems to result in a ‘less polished text’ than 
Division One (McManus 2015 p3) means that extracting an account of authenticity, 
and from this an account of responsibility, from Division Two is an extremely 
difficult task. In addition, Heidegger’s analysis of authenticity comprises a huge 
number of moments – death, guilt, conscience, resoluteness, the ‘moment of vision’, 
repetition, fate, destiny, reticence, etc. Due to their number alone, the possibility of an 
adequate analysis of each of these moments is precluded by the size of this study. But 
there are also methodological reasons to be wary of Heidegger’s analysis in Division 
Two for the purposes of this study. Certain aspects of authenticity that might be 
particularly relevant to a Heideggerian conception of responsibility are analyzed in a 
way that seems importantly out of keeping with the analysis that led to that point. For 
example, while understanding thrownness arises from a phenomenological analysis of 
the experience of attunement, the characterization of ‘taking over’ (SZ 284) that 
thrownness as manifest in guilt arises not from a phenomenological analysis of the 
feeling of guilt as might be expected, but from a formal analysis of the meaning of the 
concept. 
As a result of these issues, my construction of a positive interpretation of 
taking responsibility will not be based primarily on an interpretation of Division Two 
of Being and Time. Instead, my account will be based on the phenomenological 
analysis of thrownness, attunement, and anxiety that I will develop from Heidegger, 
along with the idea that authenticity –  and so responsibility – must be in some way 
‘expressive’ of or transparent with respect to our being. Thus, my positive account of 
responsibility aims to be not so much an account of what Heidegger himself says but 
Heideggerian: a compelling story that emerges from the most important aspect of 
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Heidegger’s thought with respect to the question of responsibility – namely, our 
thrownness. 
This positive account will also importantly appeal to our everyday 
intimations of what being responsible means. This relation to everyday 
appearances will be an important methodological principle throughout. At first 
sight, this is perhaps controversial. Heidegger’s strange new terms and apparently 
radical use of familiar terms seems to suggest that our everyday understanding is 
of no consequence to Heidegger’s thought. Some of Heidegger’s own statements 
suggest his stance to be even stronger than this, and imply that our everyday 
understanding is not only irrelevant to an appropriate philosophical understanding, 
but is positively detrimental to such understanding. A philosophical (that is, for 
Heidegger, an ontological) understanding: 
should capture the being of this entity, in spite of this entity’s own tendency to 
cover things up. Existential analysis, therefore, constantly has the character of 
doing violence, whether to the claims of the everyday interpretation, or to its 
complacency and its tranquillized obviousness.’ (SZ 311) 
The tendency mentioned for Dasein to fall away from its being in its various ways 
(which is typical of our ‘everyday’ existing for Heidegger) means that our mode of 
being is generally covered over or obscured by this fallen way of existing. Any appeal 
at all to this everyday understanding for insight seems completely misguided for an 
account that aims to be ‘Heideggerian’. 
 However, I take it to be fundamental to Heidegger’s phenomenological 
approach that despite this tendency to cover over our own being, this being is 
nonetheless manifest even in the fallen way of existing typical of everydayness. 
While the ‘phenomena’ of Heideggerian phenomenology is the being of entities - the 
ontological structures constitutive of what it is to ‘be’ a certain kind of entity - this 
being is not something distinct from the way the entity ‘appears’ to us. It is ‘that 
which already shows itself in the appearance […] as it is ordinarily understood and as 
accompanying it in every case’ (SZ 31), with the task of phenomenology being to 
make these ontological structures explicit and thematic (ibid.).  
Heidegger’s own procedure bears this out as his analysis begins precisely 
from this everyday, fallen way of existing. The existential analytic begins by 
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analyzing Dasein in its ‘average everydayness’ (SZ 16). Heidegger isolates moments 
of our everyday experience, before attempting to show how these experiences contain 
within themselves insight into the kind of beings that we are. What is of ontological 
significance is always visible within our everyday experience, belonging to everyday 
appearance ‘so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground’ (SZ 35). But 
with this, we can see everyday experience not only as a starting point but as a 
touchstone for Heidegger’s account, insofar as the analysis at the ontological level 
should be shown to constitute the sense of our everyday understanding: 
If existential analysis has laid bare the phenomenon […] in its ontological roots, 
then precisely in terms of this analysis the ordinary interpretations must become 
intelligible. (SZ 290)7 
I take it to be in accordance with Heidegger’s methodology then to use our 
everyday understanding of taking responsibility as a criterion in this sense: if an 
account is to ‘lay bare the phenomenon’ of taking responsibility for our being-in-
the-world, then precisely in terms of this account our everyday understanding of 
taking responsibility ‘must become intelligible’. If an account of taking 
responsibility at the level of our being cannot be shown to constitute the sense of 
our everyday understanding, it should be rejected. As well as arguing on the basis 
of the phenomenological analyses of thrownness and attunement then, my positive 
account will be demonstrated by its explanatory power to capture examples of 
what would, on our everyday understanding, show up to us as examples of taking 
responsibility. 
 
Outline of the Thesis 
 
In chapter one, I will begin my interpretation of thrownness by first looking at the 
closely related concept with which it is often identified, the concept of ‘facticity’ as 
the ‘fact’ of our existence. While it may appear that this fact captures the specific, 
concrete particulars of our existence, I shall argue that facticity pertains more 
                                                        
7 This quote is taken specifically with reference to the phenomenon of conscience, but equally 
applies to Heidegger’s whole analysis given the phenomenological principles outlined above. 
14 
 
fundamentally to the ‘fact’ of our being Dasein, the ‘fact’ of our existence as such. 
This captures the fact of existing in some way as an ‘I’ in relation to a world and 
others, and importantly captures the ‘enigma’ of being that lies beyond our grasp at 
the bottom of this existence. I will then show how thrownness, while also capturing in 
some sense this ‘fact’ of our existence, importantly adds to this the idea of a 
‘movement’. This will be explicated in terms of the way the ‘throw’ into existence 
shapes possibilities into which we project, whilst also imparting the momentum with 
which they are taken up. Thus, the passivity and entanglement of our existence will 
be emphasized, and I will begin to show specifically how this ‘movement’ threatens 
the traditional model. While this thrownness is into particular concrete possibilities, 
as with facticity it will be shown that more fundamentally thrownness captures the 
throw into our being as such.  The enigma revealed ‘beneath’ this existence will be 
shown to lie ‘ahead’ of this existence as that which we ineluctably aim at. 
Chapter two will flesh out this picture of thrownness by turning to its 
privileged first-personal manifestation in what Heidegger calls our ‘attunement’. I 
will begin by arguing that attunement captures a wide range of affective phenomena, 
from explicit emotions to the important, largely inexplicit way we find that things 
‘matter to us’. I will explain how attunement discloses our thrownness, typically pre-
reflectively, through the way we find ourselves solicited and summoned by 
possibilities. I will show how this attunement, importantly shaped by das Man, is 
constitutive for our particular identities, thus revealing our thrownness into a 
particular world as a particular person. I will interpret how our thrownness into 
Dasein as such can also be seen in our attunement, before showing how the enigma of 
our thrownness is revealed in the way we are gripped by that which always remains 
beyond us.  I will suggest that this is experienced as the grip of what’s meaningful, 
good, or true. 
In chapter three, I will turn to the question of responsibility in the face of 
thrownness, by looking to how we might be considered responsible in relation to our 
attunement. I will show how the model of gaining control through choice and 
decision (based in rational judgement or otherwise) cannot be the right way of 
conceiving of responsibility in light of our thrownness. In elucidating this point I will 
turn to Harry Frankfurt, whose later work bears a strong resemblance to important 
aspects of Heidegger’s thought bearing on this question of taking responsibility. After 
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using Frankfurt to draw out certain implications of our Heideggerian account, we will 
then look to Frankfurt’s own answer to the issue of taking responsibility. For 
Frankfurt, this amounts to a kind of wholeheartedness that he describes as ‘clarity and 
confidence’ with respect to what we care about. In showing the problems with 
Frankfurt’s account, certain objections to interpretations of Heidegger’s thought itself 
as pointing to something like ‘wholeheartedness’ will be foreshadowed. Ultimately, 
the attunement of anxiety will come to the fore as disrupting Frankfurt’s account from 
within, which will point to the importance of Heidegger’s ontology in understanding 
responsibility. In so doing, the distinctive and compelling nature of Heidegger’s 
account will be shown. 
In chapter four, I will focus on the attunement of anxiety. I will criticize 
Heidegger’s presentation of the idea on the basis of his own methodological 
commitments, showing that contrary to Heidegger’s exposition, there is a kind of 
continuity between the everyday understanding of anxiety and his own ontological 
analysis. In bringing out this continuity through the idea of the ‘threatening’, I will 
argue that the experience of anxiety does not represent a kind of ‘space’ in which the 
‘I’ can gain power to choose or determine itself, as some accounts suggest. Instead, I 
argue that retaining fidelity to the experience of anxiety reveals the grip of 
thrownness - into a particular world as a particular person, but more importantly 
bringing us face to face with our thrownness into Dasein as such as this has been 
characterized in the preceding analysis. 
In chapter five, I will look to four interpretations of taking responsibility in 
the secondary literature on Heidegger that I take to be representative of the traditional 
understanding of responsibility. Using the foregoing analysis and with appeal to our 
everyday understanding of responsibility, I will show that while each captures 
something important, accounts that explain responsibility with an appeal to reflective 
judgement (Crowell), choice (Han-Pile), wholeheartedness (McManus), or 
independence from das Man (Withy) fall short. I will argue that Blattner’s account of 
‘responsiveness’ is most promising, yet is underdeveloped and crucially misses an 
important aspect of our thrownness. 
In chapter six, I will propose that taking responsibility for our being-in-the-
world is to be understood as being attentive, an account I will develop in dialogue 
with Iris Murdoch’s work on the idea of attention. After showing the important 
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connections between Heidegger’s and Murdoch’s work that allow for such an 
undertaking, I will engage in a phenomenology of attention to show that it is a kind of 
comportment that is sensitive to our thrownness and that therefore avoids the 
problems of the accounts seen in the previous chapter. I will argue that attention in 
fact explains and underlies the appearances captured by the traditional accounts of 
responsibility examined in the previous chapter. I will argue that responsibility 
specifically means attending to that to which we’re attuned most deeply, which means 
attending to the solicitation from the enigmatic beyond that we shall show can be 
called what is good, true, or meaningful. Finally, I will show how it is this 
attentiveness that is able to make intelligible the ways in which the protagonists of the 
film Locke and the novel Disgrace appear to take responsibility or not.
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Chapter One - Moved by an Enigma: Facticity and Thrownness 
 
As discussed in the introduction, I will argue that Heidegger’s concept of thrownness 
challenges the concept of responsibility as traditionally understood: namely, the idea 
that responsibility is to be identified with the power or mastery of the subject. This 
chapter will explicate this distinctive Heideggerian concept with the ultimate aim of 
showing how Heidegger’s compelling analysis challenges the traditional model of 
responsibility.  
Beginning with the closely related concept of facticity, and arguing that it 
primarily points to the fact of existence as such and not the particularities of my 
existence, I will highlight that it is the idea of ‘movement’ that is definitive of our 
thrownness. I will begin to show how this movement is important to challenging the 
traditional mode of responsibility, before showing how this movement of thrownness 
pertains to the particular world I find myself in as a particular person, and to the level 
of our being Dasein as such.  
 
The Fact That I am 
 
The concept of thrownness, first appearing in Being and Time, is closely related in 
that work to the concept of facticity, which had featured in Heidegger’s thought since 
the early 1920s.1 The terms are frequently used in the same passages, apparently 
interchangeably (e.g. SZ 179, 348), and both seem to capture the same moment of the 
tripartite care structure: ‘Dasein’s Being is care. It comprises in itself facticity 
(thrownness), existence (projection), and falling.’ (SZ 284) As we shall see, this is the 
aspect of care indexed to the temporal moment of the past, the ‘having-been’. As a 
result, facticity and thrownness are generally not distinguished in the secondary 
                                                        
1 As Kisiel (2008) points out, the philosophical imagination as concretized in philosophical 
language dictionaries commonly credits Heidegger with the introduction of the term into 
philosophical parlance. Against this misconception, Kisiel (1993, 2008), Raffoul & Nelson (2008), 
and Carvalho (2010) among others have made clear that the concept plays an important role in 
the middle and late Fichte, and had also come back into use in the neo-Kantian circles in which 
Heidegger worked. Interestingly, the concept of facticity fades from Heidegger’s work at the end 
of the 1920s, while the concept of thrownness persists into his later thought. As we shall see, it is 
hoped that the picture of responsibility given by focusing on the concept of thrownness is more 
consonant with Heidegger’s later thought than is the traditional picture of responsibility. 
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literature.2 While there is obviously an important affinity between these two terms, I 
think that our grasp of thrownness will benefit by delineating between the two 
concepts and taking each in turn, enabling us to see what is distinctive about 
thrownness.  
The concept of facticity is introduced as we are told: ‘‘Whenever Dasein is, it 
is as a Fact; and the factuality of such a Fact is what we shall call Dasein’s 
“facticity”.’ (SZ 56) The facticity of Dasein is meant to capture the ‘fact’ of our 
existence: ‘that’ we are.  What exactly this means is not immediately clear. And for 
Heidegger, precisely this lack of clarity can be seen as expressive of the concerns 
motivating the project of Being and Time.  When we say that something is a ‘fact’, we 
typically mean that it is actually the case, that it ‘obtains’, that it is true, or simply that 
it ‘is’. But this ‘is’ is the very question that Being and Time is trying to raise and that 
Heidegger believes has been forgotten or covered over in Western thought since 
antiquity.3 
For Heidegger, what it means for something to be, what it means to say that 
something ‘is’, has been dominated in Western thought by the conception derived from 
a particular way of seeing objects in the world. That something ‘is’, including that 
human existence ‘is’, has been understood to mean that it is present-at-hand 
(Vorhandenheit). To say that a human ‘is’ has, according to Heidegger, wrongly been 
conceived in the same way as we might say a stone ‘is’. With his existential analytic of 
Dasein, Heidegger seeks to show that what it means to say that human existence ‘is’ is 
in fact radically different to saying that a stone ‘is’. Heidegger aims to give an account 
of the unique being of Dasein as ‘existence’ in contrast to the modes of being of 
presence-at-hand and ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) of objects within the world. I take 
the question of what it means for Dasein to ‘be’ as a fact – Dasein’s facticity – to be 
central to Heidegger’s project of explicating the particular mode of being of Dasein, 
                                                        
2 For a small sample, see: ‘To be thrown (facticity) means to be called’ (Raffoul & Nelson 2008, 
p9); ‘[T]his is the […] phenomenon of facticity or thrownness’ (Blattner 1999 p76);  
‘[T]he facticity of Dasein, its being thrown into the world (Geworfenheit) in some way’ (Padui 
2013, p53) 
3 The term ‘fact’ comes from the Latin factum meaning ‘an act’, the neuter past participle of the 
verb facere meaning to do, to make.’ (OED Online, accessed January 2014). The general 
application of the  term to all things that ‘are’ stems from the medieval period in which all that ‘is’ 
was understood to be made, created by God. The ubiquity of the use of the term ‘fact’ in everyday 
discourse can be seen to not only conceal our current understanding of being, but that 
understanding of being as ens creatum from which we departed (SZ 24-25) 
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the particular way that humans ‘are’ or exist in contrast to other things. The facticity of 
Dasein then, is to be contrasted with the fact of other entities, as shown by Heidegger’s 
use of Faktizität (translated as ‘facticity’) to capture the fact of Dasein, while using 
‘Tatsächlichkeit’ (translated as ‘factuality’) to refer to the fact of non-Dasein entities 
(SZ 56). 
As we saw in the introduction, what it means to be Dasein is constituted by 
‘mineness’ – to exist as Dasein is to be as an ‘I’. Accordingly, the fact of being 
Dasein is a fact that I am (and importantly, in the sense of ‘I am in a world’ cf. SZ 
2114). As put in The Concept of Time, ‘‘Let us call this presence, possessed by each 
individual Dasein –one is it, or I am it – facticity.’ (CT(D) p 35) That is, human 
existence is first-personal, and the fact of Dasein is disclosed to us – our ‘presence’ is 
revealed - first-personally, as we shall explore in greater detail shortly.  
Given that this fact is a fact that ‘I am’, that it involves a presence to myself, 
facticity is not something extraneous to my existence: 
Facticity is not the factuality of the factum brutum of something present-at-
hand, but a characteristic of Dasein’s being – one which has been taken up 
into existence (SZ 135, emphasis mine) 
In contrast to occurrent objects like stones, this fact that I am is taken up into my 
existence in one way or another. As we shall see, this will not just be as an ‘event’ in 
the past in which I came into being, but rather throughout my entire existence. Part of 
what it is to be Dasein is to relate to its own ‘thatness’ in one way or another. In 
further characterizing the way that the fact that ‘I am’ is disclosed through affective 
experience, we shall see that I cannot be indifferent to the fact that I am. My facticity 
cannot fail to matter to me. 
We have seen that facticity captures the fact that I am, a fact that is to be 
qualitatively distinguished from the ‘fact’ that other things are. Additionally, we have 
seen that this fact that I am must be taken up into existence in some way or other. But 
what it is that is to be taken up into existence is not clear. 
                                                        
4 As the section title in which ‘facticity’ is introduced makes clear: ‘Being-in-the-world in General 
as the Basic State of Dasein’ (SZ 52) 
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The particular fact of who I am and the fact of a ‘who’ as such 
 
What is this fact of my existence? Given the distinction between the fact of my 
existence and the fact of the existence of things in the world, we might legitimately 
phrase the question as ‘who’ is it that I am: 
Existentialia and categories are the two basic possibilities for characters of 
Being. The entities which correspond to them require different kinds of primary 
interrogation respectively: any entity is either a “who” (existence) or a “what” 
(presence-at-hand in the broadest sense). (SZ 45) 
If asked about the ‘fact’ of who I am, it might perhaps be natural to think of those 
particular aspects of my identity that I find myself with, perhaps aspects that I have 
found myself with since birth. We might think of our gender, or our race. We might 
think of our physical characteristics: it is a fact that I am so tall, or that I look a 
certain way, have a certain hereditary medical condition perhaps. We might think of 
certain dispositions or character traits – it is a fact that I am a quiet person, or I am an 
extrovert. We might think of the things that begin to go beyond the confines of the 
self as narrowly conceived but that nonetheless might be part of the fact of who we 
are: I am one of a certain number of siblings, I am adopted. I was raised in a family of 
a certain class, I had a privileged upbringing or otherwise. I was born in this country, 
or I am a certain nationality. I am of a certain cultural era, of a certain time and place 
in history, with all the significance that might bring. These, we might intuitively say, 
are the facts of who I am.  
There are perhaps good reasons to think that Heidegger is aiming primarily to 
capture these particularities of our existence with the idea of ‘facticity’ in Being and 
Time.5 The first is the identification of facticity with the aspect of Dasein’s 
temporality associated with the ‘past’, or with the ‘already’: ‘The primary existential 
meaning of facticity lies in the character of “having been” [Gewesenheit].’ (SZ 328) 
                                                        
5 There are reasons to think that Heidegger’s use of the term changes from its earliest occurences 
in his work, so this analysis will apply only to Being and Time and its so called ‘drafts’ (Kisiel 
1993), namely those lecture courses on time from the two years preceding Being and Time. 
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This might make one think that ‘facticity’ captures those things that chronologically 
pre-exist us but nonetheless shape us. This seems to map on nicely to those particular 
aspects of who we are suggested above. Facticity captures the particularities of my 
body, disposition, socio-cultural and historical situation, as these can all be seen to 
constitute me in a way that is chronologically prior to finding myself in existence. 
This is the fact of me that I find determined before me, but which is nonetheless 
constitutive of the fact that I am. 
Additionally, we might think that such an identification of facticity with the 
particularities of our existence can clearly be seen in the text. Based on Macquarrie 
and Robinson’s identification of ‘faktisch’ with ‘Faktizität’ (footnote ii to SZ 7), if 
the ‘factical’ aims at the particularities of our existence then this is what ‘facticity’ is 
trying primarily to capture. And it seems that the factical very clearly does aim at the 
particularities of existence. We are told, for example, that Dasein ‘can project itself 
only upon definite factical possibilities.’ (SZ 299) and that Heidegger starts from the 
‘concretion’ of factically thrown existence (SZ 495).  In further support the factical is 
often contrasted with the ontological level of analysis, which aims not at capturing 
particularities of individuals but at the mode of being of Dasein as such. For example, 
we are told that Heidegger’s analysis cannot, in virtue of its ontological aim, 
prescribe particular, definite possibilities: ‘In the existential analysis we cannot, in 
principle, discuss what Dasein factically resolves in any particular case.’ (SZ 384, 
emphasis Heidegger’s) In contrast with the ontological, the factical is variously linked 
with the ontical (SZ 65) and the ‘existentiell’ (SZ 395). Both the existentiell and the 
ontical on Heidegger’s analysis capture the particular, in contrast to the existential 
and the ontological which aim at the essential being of types of entities. With the 
‘factical’, and so it seems with ‘facticity’, Heidegger himself seems to confirm the 
intuition that the fact of who I am is constituted by the particularities of my existence, 
as suggested above. 
And indeed, these particular features have been taken by some in the literature 
to be what Heidegger was aiming to capture with the idea of ‘facticity’.6 This 
                                                        
6 See, for example, ‘Dasein, as my Dasein and this Dasein, is already in a definite world and 
amidst a definite range of definite intraworldly entities” [SZ 221]. This content constitutes 
Dasein’s facticity.’ (Dreyfus 1991 p300) ‘Of course, as we shall see, what it means to be a 
concrete particular differs fundamentally for human and nonhuman entities. So, for example, 
Dasein is concrete not by being usable or objective but by finding itself in its “facticity” 
(Faktizität), that is, in a given, externally determined practical situation.’ (Carman 2003 p36) 
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particularity is the fact that I am, it is primarily this that must be ‘taken up’ in some 
way or another into existence. Ultimately as we shall see, it is in some way of relating 
to this fact of existence that authenticity (and by inclusion responsibility) is to be 
understood. Therefore what authenticity and responsibility mean can depend on how 
this fact is understood. However, in seeing this ‘fact’ as capturing primarily the 
particularities of existence, I believe this reading misses what Heidegger is expressing 
with the idea of facticity. 
As we saw above, one reason to think that facticity captures these particular 
aspects of our existence is the identification of facticity with our ‘having been’. It 
captures those things in the past that go to constitute what or who we are. This surely 
refers to those particular determinants given above, such as those of our social 
situation or those arising from our parentage. It must be remembered, however, that a 
significant aspect of Heidegger’s project in Being and Time is to challenge the idea 
that time is only (or primarily) to be understood as a sequence of ‘past, present, 
future’ as a linear series of ‘now’ points7. For Heidegger, originary temporality (from 
which our everyday engagement with time and time as conceptually understood 
derive) is not to be understood as a ‘succession’: ‘The future is not later than having 
been, and having been is not earlier than the Present.’ (SZ 350) In accordance with 
Heidegger’s analysis of temporality then, the ‘having been’ of facticity is not to be 
understood as that which is chronologically prior. As Sheehan (1996) convincingly 
argues through semantic analysis, ‘having been’ in Heidegger’s meaning of the term 
is designed not to pick out a tense in a linear temporal sense, as modern languages 
suggest. Influenced by the ancient Greek sense, the ‘already’ for Heidegger is 
intended to capture the idea of the a priori of Dasein’s being. As we shall see in 
greater detail, this is prior in the sense of being a constitutive condition of the 
possibility of. Facticity is the ‘having been’ in the sense that it must necessarily 
always ‘already’ be there to allow our experience to be as it is.8 While conceiving 
facticity as the chronologically prior seems to point exclusively to the particularities 
                                                        
‘Facticity is intimately tied to thrownness, and especially to the determinateness of being 
situated.’ (Withy 2011 footnote 9, p80). 
7 See Blattner (1999) for extensive analysis of this idea. My understanding of temporality here 
will largely follow that proposed by Blattner. 
8 A similar argument against reading facticity as capturing history as the ‘prior’ in a chronological 
sense can be found in Crowell 2002, specifically in arguing against a narrativist reading of 
Heidegger. 
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of our existence, by seeing that Heidegger instead means an a priori, a different 
reading of facticity is suggested: 
[I]t is the existentially apriori [...], that which in each case is always already 
ontologically operative in Dasein: das schon voraus Wesende, as he says, and 
“nicht ein ontisch Vergangenes9,” (SZ 85, marginalium).’ (Sheehan 1996 p28) 
Here, using Heidegger’s own marginal notes for support, Sheehan points to this a 
priori as capturing the essential being of Dasein – its mode of being. And while we 
might think that perhaps Heidegger is attempting to shift our conception of the a 
priori to include the particularities of our situation, it seems clear that, in contrast to 
the reading of facticity above, at least part of what Heidegger is attempting to capture 
is the being of Dasein10. We are told that ‘the structure of existentiality lies a priori’ 
(SZ 44), that ‘this structure is something ‘a priori’ (SZ 41), and that Dasein’s 
‘primordial structural totality, lies ‘before’ every factical ‘attitude’ and ‘situation’ of 
Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori’(SZ 193 This suggests that with the 
concept of facticity Heidegger is primarily interested in capturing the fact of our 
mode of being, rather than aiming at the particularity of our chronological past. 
But we also saw clearly that the factical captured the particular, concrete 
aspects of our existence, which further suggested that the fact that I am aims only at 
the particularities of my existence. This conclusion, however, depends upon an 
identification of the ‘factical’ with ‘facticity’ that I believe is questionable. While 
Macquarrie and Robinson are keen to preserve the connection between the ‘factical’ 
and ‘facticity’ as distinct from the ‘factuality’ (or actuality, Wirklichkeit) of non-
Dasein entities (footnote ii, SZ 7), this connection is not an identification. While both 
ideas pertain to Dasein as opposed to non-Dasein entities, just like the distinction 
between existential and existentiell (which both also apply only to Dasein), ‘facticity’ 
aims primarily at the mode of being of human existence and the structures that are 
constitutive of this, while ‘factical’ applies to the particular, concrete ways in which 
                                                        
9 This translates roughly to an already ‘essencing’, not an ontical past. Vergangen is the word that 
Heidegger uses for the sequential past, in contrast to the ‘having been’ of originary temporality: 
‘As long as’ Dasein factically exists, it is never past [vergangen], but it always is indeed as already 
having been, in the sense of the “I am-as-having-been” [ich bin gewesen]. (SZ 328) 
10 See Carmen 2003 footnote 8, p214 for this view. 
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this is. This is attested to in various places throughout the text, perhaps most clearly 
in the following: 
Is it not an attribute of the a priori character of the factical subject (that is, an 
attribute of Dasein’s facticity) that it is in the truth and in untruth 
equiprimordially? (SZ 229)11 
While the factical captures those particularities that are constitutive of what I am, 
facticity can be seen to refer to the mode of being of Dasein. 
If we were in any doubt, confirmation that facticity aims at this structural, 
ontological level is found in the History of the Concept of Time lecture course of 
1925. Anxiety, which as we shall see reveals the being of Dasein, is described as an 
experience in which ‘being-in-the-world as such discloses itself, and that not as this 
definite fact but in its facticity.’ (HCT p290-291) And this idea is perhaps given its 
clearest expression of all as Heidegger uses the term to characterize the structure of 
existence:  
The authentic correlation of world and Dasein (if we can speak here of 
correlation at all, which is not my opinion) is care and meaningfulness. 12 This 
correlation is the basic structure of life, a structure which I also call facticity. 
(HCT p221) 
This is not to say that the particularities we initially began with are not, in an 
important sense, constitutive of what or who I am. Just as the existential and the 
existentiell are both part of existence, so too facticity and the factical are both part of 
the fact that I am. But the existentiell is to be understood on the basis of the 
existential. The ontical is to be understood on the basis of the ontological. So too with 
                                                        
11The way that factical and facticity track the distinction between existentiell and existential is 
also clear in the following: 
‘is it not quite appropriate to the phenomenon to leave unasked the question of what the 
caller [of conscience] is? Yes indeed, when it comes to listening to the factical call of 
conscience in an existentiell way, but not when it comes to analyzing existentially the facticity 
of the calling’ (SZ 274-275) 
See also SZ 120 where the factical and facticity come apart, as differences at the level of the 
‘factical’ have no bearing on Dasein’s ‘facticity’ with respect to ‘Being-with’ 
12‘Bedeutsamkeit.’ This is translated as ‘significance’ in Being and Time. 
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the ideas of temporality, conscience, guilt, understanding: Heidegger’s analyses 
capture in some sense our everyday, ‘ontical’ interpretations of them, but he aims to 
show that they must ultimately be understood on their ontological basis, that which 
constitutes the meaning and the ground of these everyday understandings (SZ 35). 
While the fact of ‘who’ I am might naturally be answered by the particular aspects of 
our identity, this fact is to be understood through the idea that I am a being that is 
capable of being a ‘who’ in the first place. My particularities must be understood 
through the fact that I am a ‘who’ at all. To understand our facticity, and through this 
our thrownness, it is with reference to this foundational level that we must look if we 
are to benefit from Heidegger’s insight. In thinking through our facticity (and as we 
shall see, our thrownness) in relation to responsibility, this fundamental sense must 
perpetually be borne in mind. 
 
The fact of the enigma of being Dasein  
 
What is this basic structure of life that is constitutive of the fact that I am? What is it 
that enables me to be a ‘who’ at all? These questions are in some sense the questions 
of the whole existential analytic – however for our purposes here, I shall focus on 
some key features. One ‘plane’ on which to view this structure concerns the way that 
Dasein is fundamentally being-in-the-world and being-with others. In characterizing 
the idea of our ‘transparency’ with respect to the mode of being of Dasein, Heidegger 
tells us that entities with the mode of being of Dasein ‘see’ themselves: 
only in so far as they have become transparent to themselves with equal 
primordiality in those items which are constitutive for their existence: their 
Being-alongside the world and their Being-with Others. (SZ 146) 
Here, recognizing the world and other people as constitutive of this self’s existence is 
essential to the self becoming transparent.  
The idea that the ‘I’ exists essentially as a relation to that which is beyond it, 
which allows anything that ‘is’ to appear, is essential to Heidegger’s entire 
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philosophical project.13While human existence is necessary as the ‘site’ or ‘clearing’ 
of what ‘is’, being does not come from human existence. Only with human existence 
‘is there’ [gibt es] being, but, as the translation note to SZ 212 points out, it is 
necessary that being ‘gives’ [gibt] itself to human existence. Human existence is an 
openness to being that is in some way beyond it. Being, what ‘is’, is simultaneously 
revealed and concealed in the face of human existence14. In the existential analytic of 
Being and Time, this relation of the human to being that is beyond it is captured by 
Heidegger’s characterization of Dasein as fundamentally being-in-the-world. Our 
existence is constitutively bound to that which is beyond us. 
As we saw, to exist as Dasein is to exist as an ‘I’, to exist first-personally. 
However, in contrast to Cartesian philosophies that start with the certainty of the ‘I’ 
before then establishing a relation to that which is beyond the ‘I’, as Dasein we are 
fundamentally connected to the world and other people. Existence can never be 
understood to be emerging from one ‘pole,’ the subject. The ‘subject’ is always and 
essentially already related to the ‘poles’ of the world and other people – to be the 
entity that I am is to necessarily have some relation to the world and other people. 
This is constitutive for being a ‘who’ at all, and is therefore constitutive of the fact 
that I am. 
While these ‘poles’ of existence constitute one aspect of Dasein’s being, there 
is another aspect to this structure that tells us more about the kind of being we are, 
about what it means to exist as an ‘I’ in relation to a world and others. We have 
already noted that Dasein is constituted by its facticity, projection (sometimes 
‘existence’ or ‘existentiality’ (e.g. SZ 191)), and falling.  In the introduction, prior to 
our analysis of facticity, falling was briefly outlined. A short explanation of 
‘existence’ as projection remains, however. Our understanding of this aspect of our 
being, like the others, should improve as the analysis proceeds.  
                                                        
13See, for example, the descriptions of the ‘necessary correlation of being and man’ Sheehan 
(2014 p133) and ‘the co-belonging of being and Dasein’ (Raffoul 2010 p239), or the ‘interplay 
between being and beings (specifically human beings)’ O Brien (2011 p2) that are shown to 
characterize Heidegger’s thought in these investigations that seek to examine Heidegger’s 
thought as a whole. 
14 ‘Being-in-the-world is characterized by ‘truth’ and ‘untruth’’ (SZ 223) 
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For Heidegger, what it means to be Dasein is different to being another type of 
object in the world as we saw. This can be captured in the following way: 
we cannot define Dasein’s essence by citing a “what” of the kind that pertains 
to a subject-matter, […] its essence lies rather in the fact that in each case it has 
its being to be, and has it as its own. (SZ 12) 
Importantly, while other entities can be characterized by a current state of ‘what’ they 
are, for Dasein ‘the essence of this entity is existence’ (SZ 133). What we are is in 
some sense what we do. Dasein is not to be thought of as a kind of substance with 
properties, but rather as an ‘ability to be’ that is constituted by taking up possibilities. 
This taking up of possibilities is constitutive of our self-understanding, and thus 
Dasein is what (or who) it understands itself to be by taking up possibilities15.  
On the everyday sense of temporality, this existing through possibilities 
can be seen as the way we are always oriented to the future – we exist as taking up 
particular projects, aims, goals. Just as my particular day is constituted by the 
particular things I aim to do within it, so more broadly I am what I understand 
myself to be aiming towards16. And just like my particular day, what I aim towards 
is just one possible thing I might aim towards. It is by aiming or ‘projecting’ into 
these possible ways to be that human existence is: ‘The ‘essence’ of this entity lies 
in its “to be”. (SZ 42)  Just like the temporality of facticity as ‘having been’ was 
revealed to not be the sequential temporality we are used to, so fundamentally this 
projection ‘ahead’ of ourselves is not simply in order to ‘achieve’ a state that we 
currently are not. This ‘to be’ is not something that is not yet actual but will be in 
the future. For example, to say that I project into the possibility of being a medical 
doctor, or a socialist, or a friend to someone is not to say that I aim at something 
that I am currently not but that one day I will achieve and so can stop aiming 
toward, but rather it is to say that being a doctor, for example, is something that 
shapes the things I do and that constitutes my self-understanding. It is the point on 
the horizon that gives me the particular direction I take. But just like the point on 
the horizon, we never ‘reach’ it. Being a doctor, or a socialist, or a friend, is not 
                                                        
15 ‘Understands’ here is not to be equated with explicit cognitive awareness, as we shall see. 
16 Again, this ‘aiming’ is not to be understood as a kind of consciously directing oneself towards. 
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something I can ‘complete’, but is that point on the horizon at which I aim that 
makes sense of what stands before me. 
That at which I aim is always only a possibility that I am projecting into, a 
possible way to be. I may stop projecting into that possibility; I may no longer 
understand myself as being a doctor or a socialist or a friend to someone. For 
Heidegger, our entire existence has this character of possibility – everything that 
we are is only a possible way to be: ‘Dasein is in every case what it can be, and in 
the way in which it is its possibility.’ (SZ 143) This means that there is no fixed, 
predetermined essence that tells us what, or who, we are. Our being is possibility, 
a constant journey aimed at a point on a horizon that can always change. 
To say that Dasein is an ‘I’ that must relate to the world and others must be 
understood through this lens of Dasein’s being as existence. While I must relate to the 
world and others, the particular way I do this is not determined by any kind of 
essence. Any relation is only a possible way of relating, a possible way of being. 
Some such relation is necessary however. While I need not aim at being a doctor who 
relates to medical science and to people as patients, I do need to aim at being 
someone, relating to something, and to people somehow.  
So the fact that I am, that which enables me to be a who, is to be a being that 
projects into possibilities and, as we saw in the introduction, has a tendency to 
conceal or fall away from its own being. To be a ‘who’ is also necessarily to project 
and fall in relation to the world and others. This is the ‘fact that I am’, and it must in 
some way be taken up into existence. 
One more crucial aspect of facticity (and we shall see, of thrownness too) is 
yet to be raised. We have seen that facticity captures the a priori mode of being of 
Dasein that in some sense, we might think, stands as the ‘ground’ underlying the 
particularities of my existence. Yet there is something important about this ‘ground’ 
that is Dasein’s facticity. The fact that I am is ultimately an enigma for Heidegger: 
‘the “that-it-is” […] stares it [Dasein] in the face with the inexorability of an enigma.’  
(SZ 136) While it is revealed that I am as a projection into possibilities in relation to 
the world and others, there is something enigmatic about this ‘who’ that I am. 
Importantly, this enigma is not just something contingently mysterious that might one 
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day relent in its enigmatic character: ‘It is by no means just a kind of ignorance 
factually subsisting; it is constitutive for Dasein’s facticity.’ (SZ 348) 
At this stage, we might start to think of a kind of enigma when asking the 
question of why I am this particular person, in this particular socio-historical 
situation, in this particular time. Or perhaps, in thinking about the fundamental level 
of facticity, why I am at all, or what it means that I am at all. Why is it that there is 
something rather than nothing, in the form of an ‘I’ and being that is manifest to it?  
What it means for the fact that ‘I am’ to be an enigma is something that will 
become clearer as we proceed. The quote in which this enigma is introduced above 
importantly involves the idea of thrownness and attunement, and an explication of 
these will be required to give some elucidation to this idea of an enigma. For now, we 
can think that it is that which is in some way resistant to being ‘solved’ – something 
that in some way remains beyond our grasp.  
We have seen how facticity, while in some sense capturing those particular 
facts that are constitutive of who I am, must be understood as fundamentally 
capturing the being of Dasein that constitutes what it is to be a ‘who’ in the first 
place. The particular ‘facts’ constitutive of who I am must be understood in light of 
the ontological structure that grounds them and gives them meaning. This ‘fact’ of 
finding oneself as a ‘who’ at all can be characterized as finding oneself as a being that 
projects into possibilities in relation to a world and others, with a tendency to fall 
away from or cover over this very fact. Importantly, this fact that I am is ultimately 
enigmatic in some sense; what it means to be a who is in some sense beyond our 
grasp. 
In briefly stepping back to the issue of taking responsibility, we can see how 
Dasein’s facticity might bear on the traditional model. As the ‘already’ conceived as 
the a priori of Dasein, facticity in the strict sense seems to lie outside or ‘before’ its 
power or control. I find myself always ‘already’ as a ‘who’, and taking control or 
power requires already finding myself as a who; that is, as Dasein. I do not have 
control or power over being Dasein, as such power or control presupposes being 
Dasein. Thus, it seems we might not be able to be responsible in the traditional sense 
for the fact of our being. We might think though, that in seeing that part of the 
ultimate ‘fact’ of Dasein’s being is its existence as possibility, there is room for us to 
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have power or control over these particular facts that constitute who we are. Given 
that I ‘am’ something only insofar as I project into the possibility of being it, room is 
in principle left for us to change the possibility into which we project. I might be able 
to change, and thus have power and responsibility in a traditional sense, over being a 
certain gender, nationality, class etc. if ‘being’ this is just projecting into it as a 
possibility. If this is just a possible self-understanding, there seems to be room to 
have responsibility, in the sense of power to change, who we are, even if being a 
‘who’ at all is beyond our power and thus not something we can take responsibility 
with respect to. 
However, I will argue that by understanding thrownness, we can see why this 
traditional sense of responsibility over who we are cannot hold. We will now turn to 
look to what thrownness as a concept adds to the idea of facticity that so threatens the 
traditional concept of responsibility. 
 
Thrownness  
 
Facilitating the traditional model of responsibility 
 
As the close linking of the ideas in Being and Time show, and their identification in 
the literature suggests, facticity and thrownness are intimately connected ideas. 
Thrownness, like facticity, captures ‘that’ I am, or Dasein’s ‘that it is’: ‘the pure 
“that-it-is” of one’s ownmost individualized thrownness.’(SZ 343)17  
As with facticity, thrownness is also identified with that aspect of the temporal 
structure of Dasein of the ‘having been’. Thrownness captures the ‘already’ of 
Dasein, as the conjugation of the concept attests: the throw has already happened, we 
are already ‘thrown’. But just as we saw with facticity, thrownness as this ‘already’ is 
not to be conceived on the everyday temporal model as something which happened 
sequentially before: 
Thrownness, however, does not lie behind it as some event which has happened 
to Dasein, which has factually befallen and fallen loose from Dasein again; on 
                                                        
17 See also SZ 134, 276 etc.  
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the contrary, as long as Dasein is, Dasein as care, is constantly its ‘that-it-is. 
(SZ 284) 
That ‘fact’ of Dasein, its ‘that-it-is’, has been shown to pertain most fundamentally to 
the ontological mode of being of Dasein. Given that thrownness also captures this 
‘that it is’, it will presumably also capture our thrownness into human existence, into 
being a ‘who’, as such. Thus ‘taking over thrownness’ as a constitutive aspect of 
authenticity, and thus responsibility, will mean existing in a way that is expressive of 
the ontological mode of being of Dasein, given that ‘taking over thrownness signifies 
being Dasein authentically as it already was’ (SZ 325). The fact that I am, while 
fundamentally capturing the fact that I am Dasein, is also to be understood as 
capturing the particulars of who I am  (the factical), albeit these particulars 
understood in the light of the fundamental fact of being a ‘who’ at all. So too 
thrownness will also capture the particular aspects of my existence that I am thrown 
into, however these must be understood on the basis of my being thrown into 
existence as such. Additionally, as we saw through our analysis of facticity, this ‘fact’ 
that I am is one that is not extraneous to the way I exist, but must be taken up one 
way or another: ‘But neither does thrownness adhere to Dasein as an inaccessible 
characteristic which is of no importance for its existence. ‘(SZ 276) 
But if facticity and thrownness are united in capturing all of the above, we 
might question what differentiates them, and ask what thrownness ‘adds’ to facticity 
to warrant its introduction into Heidegger’s thought. The text alone is not 
immediately helpful in this regard. Of the relation between the two concepts, we are 
told only that: ‘The expression “thrownness” is meant to suggest the facticity of its 
being delivered over.’ (SZ 135), and that thrownness is that ‘in which facticity lets 
itself be seen phenomenally.’ (SZ 179)18  
To understand that which thrownness ‘adds’ to the concept of facticity, it is 
more helpful to look to its close relation to the idea of projection, seen in the way that 
care is described as ‘a single basic state in its essentially twofold structure of thrown 
projection.’ (SZ 199) The connection between these two aspects of Dasein, 
                                                        
18 As the following chapter will demonstrate, this does not mean that thrownness is the way in 
which facticity is experienced – thrownness is not a mode of disclosure. In Being and Time and 
the lectures around it, facticity and thrownness are experienced through the mode of disclosure 
of Befindlichkeit.  
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corresponding to the originary past and originary future, is emphasized in German by 
the common root of werfen (to throw) in Geworfenheit (thrownness) and Entwurf 
(projection). In the latter case we might think of something being thrown ahead of us, 
namely the possibility we aim at by projecting into. 
As a first pass, we might say that this means that what I aim at is aimed at on 
the basis of what I already am. My projection into future possibilities depends upon 
what or who I already am (if we remember that this ‘I am’ must be understood as 
being-in-the-world). Projection is not ‘free-floating’ but ‘its character is determined 
by thrownness’ (SZ 276). In contrast to this ‘free-floating’ idea, we might say that our 
thrownness limits our projection, in that our project remains tied to or grounded in it. 
We already find ourselves in a particular way, and this in some way determines the 
possibilities we project into, the possibilities that we are. We can understand this with 
reference to the double meaning of the English word ‘before’. Thrownness, as 
capturing the fact that I am, can be seen as that which is ‘before’ in the sense of prior 
to us. Yet it also ‘before’ in the sense of that which ‘stands before me’, that which is 
ahead or in front of me, as if a light from behind us were to illuminate that which is in 
front of us. Who we find ourselves to be shapes the possible paths open to us.  
One way in which thrownness ‘adds’ to facticity then is it brings out the idea 
that the fact that we ‘already’ are in some way determines that which is ahead of us, 
determines in some way the possibilities that we project into. In one of very few 
articles which takes ‘thrownness’ as its explicit theme, Withy (2011) interprets this in 
a way that I take to be typical. Withy identifies two ‘levels’ of thrownness which we 
can see as corresponding to the distinction revealed above between the factical and 
facticity: thrownness into the particular aspects of our existence (which she calls our 
‘situatedness’) and our thrownness into being Dasein as such (which she characterizes 
as thrownness into ‘sense-making’). In Withy’s first sense of thrownness as 
‘situatedness’, which I shall focus on for now, thrownness is depicted as providing 
the determinate content of Dasein’s projection. Thrownness is presented as being the 
material content that both constrains and opens possibilities, just as the content of a 
cook’s larder both constrains and allows which possible meals could be made (Withy 
2011 p65). So while I exist by projecting into possibilities, the scope of these 
possibilities is limited by the particular facts I already find as constituting my self and 
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my world. My projection is ‘thrown’ in that the possibilities I project into are limited 
by the particular facts about my body, race, gender, class, socio-historical situation.  
Here, thrownness is presented as determining the scope or range of the 
possibilities ahead of me. Just like the cook’s larder, only a limited range of 
possibilities are open to me in virtue of the particularities of who I am and the world I 
find myself in. The larder analogy suggests, however, a certain way of ‘relating’ to 
these. Cooks stand at a remove from the contents of the larder: they are able to step 
back and survey the contents, before choosing which to take up. The contents 
themselves stand ahead of us, but they do so as inert, as brute givens. 
A similar understanding of our thrownness (and facticity) can be found in 
Sartre’s work. In a section in Being and Nothingness entitled ‘The Facticity of the 
For-itself’ we read that this for-itself, consciousness, is:  
in so far as it appears in a condition which it has not chosen, as Pierre is a 
French bourgeois in 1942, as Schmitt was a Berlin worker in 1870; it is in so far 
as it is thrown into a world and abandoned in a “situation” (Sartre 2003 p103) 
As Raffoul notes (2010 p138), Sartre seems to understand (and perhaps even 
translates) thrownness in terms of ‘abandonment’ (déréliction)19. This might be 
understood to capture one resonance the idea of being ‘thrown’ has. To find oneself 
thrown might suggest a lack of orientation, perhaps a lack of any guidance – in 
contrast to finding oneself ‘placed in’ or even ‘given’ to the world, ‘thrown’ perhaps 
suggests a lack of any guiding hand, any structure, plan, or answers to that with 
which we’re confronted. This might be taken, as it is by Sartre, to mean a lack of 
connection to that into which we’re thrown, as the nothingness between the for-itself 
and the in-itself, the radical discontinuity between consciousness and the world, 
suggests. 
This ‘remove’ from the particularities into which we’re thrown that is 
suggested by our ‘abandonment’, resembles the interpretation of thrownness given by 
Withy through the larder example. And famously for Sartre, this ‘abandonment’ is no 
threat to our responsibility. This distance of the ‘I’ from all particularities of its 
                                                        
19 ‘And when we speak of “abandonment” – a favourite word of Heidegger’ (Sartre 1975 p352) 
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situation means it is radically free to choose between them, because it is not bound to 
any of them: ‘“abandonment” implies, that we ourselves decide our being (Sartre 
1975 p357). For Sartre, this radical ability to decide our being, in line with the 
traditional identification of responsibility with control or power, results in radical 
responsibility. Thrownness, so conceived, remains consistent with the traditional 
model of responsibility and, in this Sartrean interpretation, pushes it to a radical 
extreme. 
Following the above quote, we read: ‘And with this abandonment goes 
anguish.’(ibid.) Sartre here links abandonment and the subsequent choice of our own 
being to the experience of anguish, in which he argues our radical freedom is shown. 
This kind of reading of thrownness and a certain kind of ‘distance’ from that into 
which we’re thrown could be seen to follow from Heidegger’s own treatment of the 
same experience, translated as ‘anxiety’. Here, it is revealed that Dasein: 
 has in each case already been thrown into a world. The abandonment 
[Überlassenheit] of Dasein to itself is shown with primordial concreteness in 
anxiety. (SZ 192) 
In anxiety a certain kind of ‘distancing’ from the particularities of our existence 
occurs, which in fact reveals our being to be possibility, as ‘ability-to-be 
[Seinkönnen]’ (SZ 188). With Heidegger’s linking of thrownness and 
abandonment in connection with an experience of anxiety that distances us from 
particularities and shows our way of being fundamentally to be possibility, a 
reading of thrownness like that illustrated by Withy’s seems reasonable.20While 
thrownness determines projection by constituting the scope of the possibilities that 
lie ahead of us, we can nonetheless step back from these possibilities. Here, the 
space of freedom, of self-determination, and hence of responsibility on the 
traditional model can be found.21  
                                                        
20 Arguably, Sartre’s own work derives from reading Heidegger in this way. 
21 We can see how thrownness into Dasein as such, the other ‘level’ of thrownness Withy 
identified, might also fit this model: these particularities get their meaning from the structure 
of Dasein insofar as they are particularities of a self that must relate to the world and others 
in some undetermined way. Crucially, they are particularities that are only possibilities for us, 
given Dasein’s being as projection. 
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I think that thrownness does shape the scope of possibilities ahead of us. 
However, something important is missing from the kind of account of thrownness 
represented by Withy. The particularities of our thrownness, the possibilities we 
are thrown into, I shall argue, are not like ingredients of a larder that we stand at a 
remove from, that we are able to survey. We don’t stand before that into which 
we’re thrown as before brute, inert givens. We are thrown into a world but do not 
then find ourselves set apart from it, with room to breathe. We always already find 
ourselves in the midst of existence, always underway and entangled in particular 
possibilities of existence.  
The key to beginning to understand this lies in seeing what I will call the 
movement of thrownness. As the reference to anxiety above shows, this will also 
mean a reading of this experience that differs importantly from the kind of analysis 
that sees such a radical disconnect from our particular possibilities. This will be 
presented in chapter four. Now, though, I will turn to the ‘movement’ of 
thrownness that I take to be important in differentiating my account from those 
like Withy’s, and for ultimately challenging the traditional understanding of 
responsibility. 
 
Movement 
 
As discussed in the introduction, to say that we are ‘thrown’ suggests a passivity. It is 
something that has already been done, and something of which we are the recipients, 
rather than the agents. However, in contrast to the idea of a ‘fact’, it also suggests a 
movement. To be thrown into existence suggests a momentum or a force that is 
beyond our control because it comes before our doing, before our being.22  
We might take being thrown into existence to mean that ‘existence’ is where we 
land, where we have to take stock and try and orient ourselves. This would be to take 
                                                        
22 The idea of ‘movement’ (die Bewegung) or ‘movedness’ (die Bewegheit) arises explicitly as a 
central idea in Heidegger’s engagement with Aristotle in the twenties. See, for example: 
 ‘It is therefore a matter of pressing on interpretively to a movement which constitutes a 
genuine movedness of life, in which and through which life exists, and from which, accordingly, 
life is determinable in its own sense of Being.’ (PIA p 87) 
Or: ‘movement itself is a mode of the being-there of the world. (BCAP p206) 
 
36 
 
the ‘already’ of thrownness, the ‘already’ of its force and movement, on the everyday 
sense of ‘already’ as something that has previously happened, that once was but now 
is no longer. The throw has happened, and we must now deal with the consequences – 
the particular cupboard of possibilities ahead of us. But as we have seen, this 
‘already’ of thrownness ‘does not lie behind it as some event which has happened to 
Dasein’ (SZ 284): 
the “throw” of Dasein’s Being-thrown into the world is one that does not 
authentically get “caught”. The ‘movement’ which such a “throw” implies does 
not come to ‘a stop’ because Dasein now ‘is there’. (SZ 348) 
Rather, our thrownness continues to affect us. And as the quote shows, it does so as a 
movement: 
[T]he thrownness which can obtrude itself upon Dasein in its Befindlichkeit, has 
the character of throwing and of movement. Thrownness is neither a ‘fact that is 
finished’ nor a Fact that is settled. Dasein’s facticity is such that as long as it is 
what it is, Dasein remains in the throw. (SZ 179) 
Thrownness adds to facticity the idea that what we are shapes that which lies ahead of 
us; that our ‘whence’ is constitutive for our ‘whither’ (and that both are constitutive 
for what I am). But it also crucially captures the idea of the movement or momentum 
that always already takes us toward that which lies ahead.23 It suggests that there is no 
‘time’ to stop and survey those possibilities that lie ahead, as we are always already 
moving into them, always already underway in taking them up. 24  
We can see this movement that comes ‘before’ us, whose momentum carries 
us into possibilities, as something like the way possibilities have a hold on us, that we 
                                                        
23 The introduction of ‘thrownness’ into Heidegger’s work is not to say that this was a ‘new’ idea, 
but rather that which brings out clearly what was perhaps already contained implicitly within 
Heidegger’s thinking of facticity, as statements like the following seem to show: ‘Facticity (sense 
of Being of life) is also determined in terms of movements’ (PIA p85) 
24 In accordance with the larder reading given above, Withy posits in a footnote that ‘movement’ 
is a metaphor to merely reflect that thrownness is a dative term, capturing the idea that 
thrownness has a ‘whence’ and ‘whither’ (2011 footnote 5, p80). I hope the discussion above will 
show why this is not the case. 
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are taken by them. Heidegger characterizes our being thrown as finding ourselves 
‘submitted [angewiesenen] to a ‘world’’ (SZ 161), as existing in a way that is not 
‘indifferent’ but ‘absorbed [aufgegangen] in the world of its concern’ (SZ 192), 
‘surrendered [ausgeliefert] to the world of its concern (thrownness)’ (SZ 199). 
To be thrown is to already find oneself moved by different possibilities, to be 
already taking up possibilities that have a hold on us. It is worth remembering here 
that thrownness, as the quotes above suggest, captures the same ‘that I am’ as 
facticity; it is an ‘I’ that always is in relation to a world and others. Our submission is 
experienced as a submission to the world and others, to the possibilities that relate to 
them: 
As thrown, Dasein has indeed been delivered over to itself and to its ability-to-
be, but as Being-in-the-world. As thrown, it has been submitted to a ‘world’ and 
exists factically with Others (SZ 384) 
I take it that this idea of the ‘movement’ of thrownness, the force of the throw into 
possibilities such that we are ‘submitted’ or ‘surrendered’ to them, is part of what 
makes this Heideggerian category so compelling. As long as I am at all, I always find 
myself in the grip of certain possibilities, I always already find myself moved by 
existence in various ways. Part of finding ourselves ‘thrown’ into existence captures 
the way that we don’t just find ourselves in existence, but find ourselves embroiled in 
existence, absorbed in a situation. We are always already entangled and bound up 
with particular aims, people, and things in the world. But as I shall argue, it is this 
submission to existence that this category brings out so well that will force us to 
rethink the traditional model of responsibility. 
 
Moved in a Particular Way as Dasein 
 
Just as the fact of what I am might be thought to include the particularities of my self 
and my world – the ‘factical’ – so too does thrownness. We always find ourselves 
thrown into particular possibilities: ‘as something thrown, [Dasein] can project itself 
only upon definite factical possibilities.’ (SZ 299) More explicitly than with facticity, 
38 
 
we are told that being thrown into particular possibilities is constitutive of the 
meaning of thrownness: 
Dasein is […] in such a manner that it understands itself in terms of 
possibilities, and, as so understanding itself, is that entity which has been 
thrown. But this implies that as ability-to-be it always stands in one possibility 
or another: it constantly is not other possibilities, and it has waived these in its 
existentiell projection (SZ 285, translation modified)25 
I take this to be an important and compelling part of Heidegger’s account of what 
it means to be thrown. I always find myself as a particular self in relation to 
particular people in particular circumstances, already with certain commitments 
and values that I am tied to. And the fact that I am this and not that, this way and 
not another, is of striking importance. To find myself as male or female, white or 
non-white, able-bodied or not, in economic deprivation or with assured affluence, 
in our current society makes a huge different to the person I am able to be. 
Equally, this is true for one’s socio-historical situation, and that in conjunction 
with the self (as Dasein is being-in-the-world). Whether I find myself as a black 
woman born into slavery in 19th century USA, a Russian proletariat at the turn of 
the 20th century, or a member of the nobility of the Ottoman empire in the 16th 
century, makes a decisive difference to who I am, conceived as the possibilities I 
am caught up in and moved by.  More locally, whether I had an abusive 
upbringing, whether I find myself with a chronic illness, whether I am a twin, 
along with the socio-historical situation that are constitutive of the meaning of 
these, all make a huge difference to who I am. 
And it is here that the question of responsibility for our being-in-the-world 
typically arises for us. How can I be responsible when so much that is constitutive 
of what I am is beyond my control? Sometimes we might look to others and see 
how thoroughly it can seem that their path through life is set by their upbringing, 
                                                        
25 This is one aspect of the ‘not’ or the ‘nullity’ that Heidegger says ‘belongs to the existential 
meaning of “thrownness”.’ (SZ 285) As well as having to project into this and ‘not that’, this 
nullity also captures Dasein’s ‘not’ having power over our own being from the ground up. While 
the thesis will engage with both of these important aspects of thrownness, I will not do so 
through the lens of ‘nullity’. This nullity, and Dasein’s thrownness in general, could also be 
pursued through the lens of ‘finitude’ but again, while this can be seen as implicit in the thesis, I 
will not approach thrownness from this conceptual angle. 
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their physical constitution, their social context. Their values, goals, aims, 
relationships that take them through life can seem to arise wholly from where they 
happen to have found themselves thrown into the world. There but for the grace of 
God go I. If it is the enigmatic hand of something beyond that seems to determine 
who we are so thoroughly, how can I possibly become responsible in the face of 
this? If my own movement through life is shaped so pervasively by that which lies 
outside of my power, what could it mean to take responsibility for my existence?  
Our thrownness is commonly identified with this thrownness into the 
particularity: the particular ‘who’ that we are, which is inextricably linked to a 
particular world and particular others. I take Wrathall’s definition to be 
paradigmatic of this understanding: 
‘Thrownness’ is Heidegger’s name for the way that we always find ourselves 
‘thrown’ into or ‘delivered over’ to circumstances that are beyond our control 
[…]who our parents are, where and when we live, what colour our skin or our 
eyes are, what kind of natural resources or other people are to be found in our 
environs. We also find ourselves submitted to a certain set of possible ways to 
live our lives – today we can be auto mechanics or journalists, but we can’t be 
druids or pharaohs. (Wrathall 2005 p35-36) 
And while we find the word ‘submitted’, I take the general tenor of the description 
with its talk of circumstances, with the limitation pertaining to the scope of all the 
possibilities ahead of me in such an extreme way, to point to a reading like that 
represented by Withy which sees thrownness only as limiting the range of possible 
options ahead of me. 
But, as Withy recognizes, and as our analysis of facticity as the fact of Dasein 
shows, we are thrown at the more fundamental level of being Dasein, at the level of 
being a ‘who’, as such: 
This belongs to Dasein’s essential thrownness into the world. Has Dasein as 
itself ever decided freely whether it wants to come into ‘Dasein’ or not, and will 
it ever be able to much such a decision? ‘In itself’ it is quite incomprehensible 
why entities are to be uncovered, why truth and Dasein must be. (SZ 228) 
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We find ourselves ‘thrown into existence’ (SZ 276), the very mode of being of 
Dasein. 
As we saw, the idea that we are ‘thrown’ adds to facticity the idea that the 
‘already’ determines that into which we project ‘ahead’. Not only that, but 
thrownness adds the movement of this projection: the way we find ourselves moved 
by possibilities, already in their grip. We have seen that with regards to the 
particularities of the fact that I am, the ‘already’ determines in some way the 
particular possibilities that I find myself submitted to. We have seen however, that 
‘beneath’ these particular facts as their condition of their possibility lays the fact of 
being a who as such, the fact of being Dasein. Part of the structure of Dasein is to be 
an I in relation to a world and others. To be thrown into Dasein in this sense means 
then that this fact of being Dasein determines the possibilities ahead of me and also  
moves us with respect to them – we are already submitted as an I to the world and 
others. In some way or other, we must be gripped by, absorbed in, or submitted to the 
world and others. The meaning of the particular possibilities we project into find their 
constitutive basis in our fundamentally being moved by possibilities of an I existing 
in relation to the world and others as such. 
Crucially though, we saw that the fact of Dasein was in some important, 
essential sense an ‘enigma’. This captures something about the ‘already’ of Dasein 
that is beyond our grasp, something that is resistant to being ‘solved’. With the 
introduction of thrownness, this can be grasped in a new light. 
This enigma that is outside of our grasp at our basis, in accordance with the 
structure of thrownness, is determinative of that towards which we project. If, 
ultimately, our ‘already’ or our ‘whence’ is beyond our grasp, then the ‘ahead’ or the 
‘whither’ too will be beyond our grasp. That towards which we project must remain 
beyond us, as an open question. Heidegger tells us that the structure of Dasein, the 
fact of being a ‘who’ can present itself. However, ultimately the question of what it 
means to be this ‘who’ remains enigmatic:  
the Being of Dasein can burst forth as a naked ‘that it is and has to be’. The 
pure ‘that it is’ shows itself, but the “whence” and the “whither” remain in 
darkness. (SZ 134) 
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Lying ‘beneath’ the particularities of who I am, and thus ‘beyond’ the particular 
possibilities I project into, this enigma can be seen to be constitutive in some way of 
these possibilities we are gripped by. We shall explore this in more detail in the next 
chapter. For now, however, we can see in some sense how this enigma can be 
understood to be constitutive of the way that Dasein ‘is’. Given the structure of the 
‘already’ as determining the ‘ahead’ of Dasein, this enigma constitutive of the 
‘already’ at the deepest level will also be constitutive of the ‘ahead’. This ahead is 
that which Dasein projects into, or ‘aims at’. But as we saw, given that Dasein ‘is’ 
existence, this projection is always only a projection into a possibility. That which we 
‘are’ is only ever a possibility that we project into, and not a fixed property. Given 
that they are only possibilities, they essentially remain open to change.  While we 
must be Dasein in some particular way or other, it remains open which particular 
possibility we will be and how we will be it: ‘It is essential to the basic constitution of 
Dasein that there is constantly something still to be settled [eine ständige 
Unabgeschlossenheit].’ (SZ 236) Given that we exist as possibilities, that which we 
project into is never settled. Who I am is never completed, but always remains open 
(as the word Unabgeschlossenheit suggests)26, and thus this ‘ahead’ is never fully to 
be grasped by us given that it is a possibility that can always change. This never being 
settled, this never being able to be decided, completed, and so never fully grasped, is 
that which characterizes an enigma. 
However, we have seen that thrownness does not just throw something 
‘ahead’ of us, but already moves us towards it – we are already submitted to that 
which is ahead of us. This movement, as I have argued, is crucial to understanding 
our thrownness as distinct from facticity. And this movement contributes significantly 
to understanding this enigma. To really be an enigma, and not just a curiosity for 
example, is not only for something to be beyond us, or remaining open. For 
something to be enigmatic for us, we need to be drawn to trying to grasp it, trying to 
comprehend it. It needs to matter to us, it needs to be an issue for us; it needs to move 
us. The movement of thrownness means we are submitted to this enigma, absorbed in 
this enigma, surrendered to this enigma. We are already moved by it, in its grip 
                                                        
26 Further evidence for the link between the enigma and this openness can be seen in the way 
that Heidegger describes the enigma that is constitutive of our thrownness as being 
‘determinative for the ecstatical character’ of existence (SZ 348). 
42 
 
This enigma of the ‘I am’ can be understood as a question that is posed to us 
that we are drawn to trying to answer – the question of who I am, or what it means to 
be, or how should I exist. Through my thrownness, I find myself submitted to this 
question of my existence as such. It grips me, it matters to me in one way or another. 
And here we can begin to see how we ‘aim’ at this enigma, and how this enigma at 
the base of our existence is that which is constitutive of the meaning of the particular 
possibilities we are moved by and take up. The question is posed to me such that the 
particular possibilities I take up can be seen as attempts to answer it. Their meaning 
and sense comes from their character as attempts to answer this question that will 
always remain open to us.  
Put another way, for Heidegger, all our particular possibilities are taken up 
‘for-the-sake-of’ something. Just as the meaning of a particular tool comes from the 
particular task it is aimed at completing, so particular possibilities ultimately get their 
meaning from that for-the sake-of-which they aim at.  Heidegger is clear that 
fundamentally possibilities are taken up for the sake of Dasein (SZ 123). But if 
ultimately Dasein is an enigma, then possibilities are taken up for the sake of this 
enigma – ultimately, particular possibilities get their meaning from aiming at this for-
the-sake-of-which that is the enigma of Dasein. As Heidegger puts it, ‘everything is 
haunted by the enigma of Being, and, as has now been made plain, by that of motion.’ 
(SZ 392) 
To be thrown into existence then, is to find ourselves, as an I in relation to the 
world and others, submitted to this enigma. This enigma, this question of our 
existence, is a question that once opened, cannot be closed, and thus always keeps us 
in the pursuit of a response. We find ourselves submitted already to this question that 
we have to answer, and the particular possibilities we project into are constitutive of 
this response we are always making. I am submitted to this question, and to be Dasein 
is to fundamentally find myself moved by it. 
 
The Movement of Falling 
 
So far in our examination of thrownness, we have seen in various ways how it relates 
to other aspects of Dasein’s mode of being. We have seen that we are thrown as an I 
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that must relate to a world and others, and this as a projection into possibilities by 
which we are always already moved. However, we have not yet seen how thrownness 
relates to falling, that other fundamental aspect of Dasein constitutive of the care 
structure. 
We saw briefly in the introduction that ‘falling’ captures Dasein’s tendency to 
fall away from its own being in some sense, whether by covering it over, forgetting it, 
or fleeing from it. In Being and Time, the chief way this happens is through our 
falling into ‘the crowd’ or ‘the public’, covering over our being through das Man. 
Part of what it means to exist as being-in-the-world and being-with-others is to find 
oneself existing as das Man. Das Man is characterized by its ‘averageness’ (SZ 127), 
a kind of existing where we do ‘as they do’ and ‘act as one acts’. This averageness 
characteristic of the neuter, impersonal das Man, while dangerous as Heidegger 
shows, is vitally important. Such averageness allows the shared societal meaning 
through which we understand ourselves, the world, and other people, as well as other 
entities within the world. Our actions, discourse, and understanding all depend on a 
shared intelligibility of existence. In using words, roads, clocks we depend on doing it 
as ‘they’ do it – a shared, publicly availability is necessary in each case. And this kind 
of realm of shared intelligibility is that in which all particular meaning arises. Even a 
narrowly conceived self-understanding is mediated by finding shared norms, values, 
or roles with which I identify, and requires a kind of recognition from others that I 
embody these norms or values. Finding myself as a certain race, gender, class, 
disposition etc. depends upon these categories existing and having a certain meaning 
in my society, and it depends upon my society recognizing me as being this race, 
gender, class, character in various ways. 
Given that we are thrown into being Dasein, and that part of being Dasein means 
finding oneself as das Man, part of being thrown is being thrown into das Man: ‘Is 
not Dasein, as thrown Being-in-the-world, thrown proximally right into the 
publicness of the das Man?’ (SZ 167) To be thrown into das Man means that this 
shared intelligibility stands as constitutive of the ‘already’, which shapes that which 
is ‘ahead’. At the level of particulars, this is to say that we find ourselves already 
within a particular society, with particular meanings, practices, and values, that shape 
the possibilities that lie ahead of us. More than this, as we have seen with the 
movement of thrownness, we are already submitted to these societal meanings, and 
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find ourselves moved by them. They are constitutive of the particular self-
understanding that I project into, as for example what it means to be a doctor, 
socialist, or friend is constituted by the shared intelligibility of what it means to be in 
this particular way. However, we might also think that above and beyond these, we 
are submitted to societal possibilities that extend beyond us as individuals to the 
societal level itself – moved by possibilities that in some way aim at justice, or 
rationality, or perhaps profit, in our modern Western society for example. At the level 
of our being as such, to be thrown into das Man is to say that in some way or another, 
we must have some kind of shared understanding with others that is constitutive of 
the significance of the world, and that we are drawn and moved to the possibilities 
that this shared understanding makes manifest. 
In Being and Time Heidegger chiefly associates falling from our being with 
falling into das Man, where this latter aspect of our existence provokes, facilitates, 
or accelerates our tendency to fall. This falling in relation to das Man is explicitly 
linked with thrownness as §38’s title, ‘Falling and Thrownness’, suggests. It seems 
that the idea of ‘movement’ is common to both as the terms, and Heidegger’s 
description of the ‘movement of falling’ (SZ 180) and its conception ‘ontologically 
as a kind of motion’ (ibid.), attest.27It is reasonable to suppose then, that it is in the 
motion of thrownness that its relation to falling is to be found.  
As we saw, this motion can be seen in the way that we find ourselves already 
moved by or submitted to possibilities. And it is in this ‘submission’ to das Man 
that falling finds its hold, as we get ‘sucked’ into the crowd in an ‘inauthentic’ 
way: ‘as long as it is what it is, Dasein remains in the throw, and is sucked into the 
turbulence of the das Man’s inauthenticity.’ (SZ 179) While the shared, public 
understanding of das Man is constitutive for the meaning of possibilities, falling 
into das Man can be conceived as being submitted to this public understanding in a 
way that covers or avoids some other aspect of Dasein’s being. Like falling in 
general, this can take many forms and has many different aspects, as Heidegger’s 
analysis of phenomena like curiosity, idle talk, and ambiguity make clear. But 
whether it is Dasein’s ‘mineness’ that is lost as we simply do as ‘they’ do; whether 
                                                        
27 This has led to their apparent identification by some in the secondary literature i.e. Padui 
(2013): ‘The manner in which Dasein “falls” into the world (Geworfenheit, Verfallenheit) is not 
the manner in which stones fall (Zufälligkeit).’(Padui 2013 p53) 
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our being as possibility is covered over by seeing the self-understandings or ‘roles’ 
that are publicly available as essential to who we are; or whether the enigma of our 
being is concealed as publicly available understandings are treated as complete and 
final, falling into das Man involves being moved by das Man at the expense of 
other constitutive aspects of Dasein’s being.  
While falling into das Man is one way in which we can fall away from our 
being, there are surely many more. Heidegger himself briefly links several others 
directly with our thrownness, as addiction [Hang] and urge [Drang] are described 
as being possibilities ‘rooted in the thrownness of Dasein’ (SZ 196), and wishing 
and ‘hankering [Nachhängen]’ (in which possibilities are closed off) are described 
as having ‘fallen forfeit to thrownness’ (SZ 195). A full analysis of these ways of 
being would take us too far afield from our question. However, I take it that 
understanding thrownness through the idea of finding ourselves moved into 
possibilities allows us to understand this connection with these varieties of falling, 
where perhaps mere wishing and hankering point to a deficiency of this movement 
into possibilities, and addiction and urge to an excess (or excessively focused) 
force to a possibility. I take this to further support my interpretation of thrownness. 
 
Conclusion 
This interpretation began by analyzing the concept of facticity with which thrownness 
is intimately linked. I attempted to show how facticity, while in some sense capturing 
the particularities of myself and my situation that constitute ‘who I am’, more 
fundamentally captures the fact of being a who at all. This fact of my mode of being, 
the ‘already’ of Dasein, is that which serves as the ‘meaning and ground’ of the 
particularities of who I am. I showed how this ‘already’ is to find oneself as a being 
that projects into possibilities as an I in relation to a world and other people, but that 
this ‘already’ is importantly enigmatic and remains beyond our grasp. Having 
analyzed facticity, I showed that the concept of thrownness builds on this ‘already’ of 
Dasein by making manifest that this ‘already’ determines the ‘ahead’, conceived as 
that which we ‘aim at’ in projection. I contended that while this is part of what is 
meant by thrownness, the concept importantly involves the idea of ‘movement’, 
conceived as finding oneself submitted to, in the grip of, i.e. moved by possibilities. 
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Crucially, in contrast to accounts that present thrownness as determining only 
the scope of possibilities, acknowledging this movement of existence emphasizes that 
we are always already thoroughly entangled and bound up with particular aims, 
people, and things in the world. There is no ‘space’ to step back from that into which 
we’re thrown, which the traditional model of responsibility can use as the site of 
control or self-determination. There is no disconnect: the ‘givens’ are not inert but 
rather already take and move us. We saw that while we are thrown and submitted to 
particular possibilities, ultimately we are submitted to the enigma of Dasein. We are 
submitted to the enigma of being, and this constitutes the meaning and ground of 
particular possibilities insofar as particular possibilities that are taken up are 
attempted answers to this question that moves us. Ultimately, we aim at that which is 
beyond our grasp, as the answer is always ‘beyond’ us, and is never settled. 
Nonetheless, as thrown into Dasein, we are always moved by this beyond. 
In the next chapter, we shall look to the way in which thrownness is disclosed 
in the affective dimension of our existence. This will reveal the nature of this 
movement more clearly, and will further exemplify and intensify the challenge that 
Heidegger’s account poses to the traditional picture of responsibility.
 Chapter Two - Finding Ourselves Moved: Thrownness as 
Attunement 
 
In the Western philosophical traditional, affective experiences have often been treated 
as accompanying phenomena that at best irrelevantly adorn, and at worst obscure and 
confuse, the important issues of epistemology, ethics, and ontology. Given the 
prevailing assumption that what we know, what is good, and what ‘is’ at all are to be 
realized through our powers of rationality or judgement, affective experiences have 
been seen to be things to ignore, suppress, or dismiss. For Heidegger, as we shall see, 
affective experience is an essential aspect of our being, and an essential way that 
being is manifest to us. Far from being irrelevant, affective experience makes 
existence what it is, and reveals to us the meaning of existence – it reveals what it 
means to be. In particular, affective experiences reveal our being as thrown. 
In the previous chapter, we began to see how thrownness threatens the 
traditional picture of responsibility. In particular, we started to see how the 
‘movement’ of thrownness deprives us of a significant kind of space or distance from 
that into which we’re thrown, a space where the possibility of power, control, or self-
determination might lie. In this chapter, we will see how this condition is disclosed to 
us in our affective experience. In doing so, our grasp of thrownness, and our 
understanding of the threat to the traditional idea of responsibility will be deepened. If 
we are to understand what it means for Dasein to be thrown, and ultimately to 
understand what it would mean for Dasein to be responsible in the face of this, our 
being thrown (and ultimately our being responsible) should be looked at first-
personally given that what it means for Dasein to be as such is to be as an ‘I’ who 
experiences itself as such. In what follows, we shall examine how thrownness – when 
experienced first-personally as Dasein – means to be affected, or as Heidegger has it, 
to be ‘attuned’. 
I will begin by very briefly outlining some important aspects of Heidegger’s 
notion of disclosure, in particular the way that disclosure can be, and for the most part 
is, pre-reflective. We will then look to the affective mode of disclosure. I will argue in 
contrast to some interpretations, that Heidegger’s understanding of attunement 
captures our everyday feelings, moods, and emotions, before showing how these 
feelings, moods, and emotions are just particularly intense and explicit forms of our 
48 
 
constant attunement. I will show that the passivity characteristic of our attunement 
reveals our submission to a particular word as a particular self, and how ultimately 
our attunement reveals our submission to the world and others as such, and to the 
enigma of being Dasein. In showing how thrownness is that which always already 
grips and moves us first-personally, the nature and extent of its hold on us will be 
made manifest, and in so doing, the pressure placed on the traditional concept of 
responsibility will increase. 
 
Disclosure 
 
For Heidegger, Dasein is distinctive in that its being is an issue for it (SZ 12). We 
have some kind of relationship to our own existence, some grasp of what it means to 
be. Heidegger calls this relationship to being ‘disclosure’, and it is constitutive of 
Dasein that being is disclosed to it: Dasein is its disclosedness’ (SZ 133). Existence is 
always manifest to us in some sense, it always has ‘the character of having been laid 
open’ (SZ 75) to Dasein, as Heidegger describes disclosure. If we think back to the 
characterization of our facticity and thrownness, this element of disclosure was 
already included – ‘I find myself’ as thrown into a certain race, gender, in a certain 
social historical situation etc.; ‘I find myself’ as Dasein. Our existence is always 
manifest to us in some sense. While the idea of disclosure is a lens through which 
Heidegger’s whole thought could be discussed and debated at length, for the purposes 
of this investigation it is sufficient to note three key features of disclosure. 
Firstly, as we saw earlier, Dasein is a being that is characterized by 
‘mineness’, it is the being that ‘I am’. As the examples of finding oneself thrown 
above show in keeping with this, disclosure is first-personal. Being is an issue for me, 
it is as an ‘I’ that I have a relationship to being. ‘Dasein is revealed to itself’ (SZ 307), 
existence is manifest to me first-personally.  
As we also saw previously, this ‘I’ is not a self-subsisting subject, but is 
being-in-the-world and being-with-others. The world and my place within it, is an 
issue for me. The existence of the ‘I’ cannot be manifest without the manifestation of 
a world and others that the ‘I’ must necessarily find itself amongst. It might seem that 
our existence is only manifest to us in a piecemeal fashion – that what is manifest to 
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me at any particular moment depends upon what I am doing, where at times perhaps a 
particular entity is manifest to me, at other times a particular person, at others a 
particular project. For Heidegger however, disclosure always applies to the whole. 
Dasein ‘has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and 
makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something.’ (SZ 137) In order 
for a particular thing to show up to us, in order for it to ‘be’ for us in this particular 
way, we need some sense or grasp of how it relates to being as a whole. Particular 
things, people, projects, show up on the basis of our sense of ‘what it all means’, a 
general sense of what it means to exist. The possibility of existence we project into in 
relation to a world and others, our understanding of what it means to be, we saw 
serves as the horizon for any particular thing to show up.  
A third feature of disclosure can be seen in the way that the whole is disclosed 
despite our typically only being explicitly aware of some specific part of existence. 
On our everyday understanding, we might take something’s being ‘disclosed’ as 
meaning that it has become known, or seen, or in some way become the subject of 
explicit awareness. For Heidegger though, disclosure is not limited to what we are 
explicitly aware of. A fundamental and groundbreaking aspect of Heidegger’s 
existential analytic is that the way being is manifest to us need not be, and typically 
isn’t, in the form of explicit awareness. Famously for Heidegger, being is manifest to 
us through our existing more broadly conceived, such as in our unreflective practical 
engagement in the world.  
In Being and Time, there are (up to) four different ways in which being is 
disclosed to us, in which existence is made manifest for Heidegger: understanding, 
attunement, falling, and discourse.1 With the exception of falling which does not tend 
to figure in our everyday language, these modes of disclosure all include the explicit, 
reflective forms that we normally understand these terms to capture. Understanding, 
for example, does capture the everyday meaning of a kind of reflective, cognitive 
activity. Yet for Heidegger, this explicit kind of disclosure is ‘founded’ (SZ 71) on a 
                                                        
1 There is some ambiguity as to whether discourse should be included here, and Heidegger is 
inconsistent. At times discourse is included in the list of modes of disclosure (e.g. SZ 335), and 
some commentators (e.g. Crowell, McMullin) take it to have a central role in Heidegger’s analytic. 
At other times discourse does not feature in the list of modes of disclosure, and other 
commentators (e.g. Blattner) see its failure to factor in any significant way into the discussion of 
temporality (given its tripartite nature) as reason to see it was not of central importance for 
Heidegger’s analytic. 
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more basic type. Understanding at a more basic level captures the  typically 
unreflective way we project into possibilities, the sense we have for things, for others, 
for the world that is shown in the way we go about our lives, for example in 
navigating our daily practical tasks. As we will see in looking specifically at the mode 
of disclosure of attunement, Heidegger is quite clear on this point: 
Phenomenally, we would wholly fail to recognize both what attunement 
discloses and how it discloses, if that which is disclosed were to be compared 
with what Dasein is acquainted with, knows, and believes ‘at the same time’ 
when it is attuned. (SZ 135-136) 
While the disclosure of existence is not to be acquainted with any kind of explicit 
knowledge or awareness, this is not to say it is a kind of ‘unconscious’ activity that 
remains closed off to us; after all, it is still in some sense disclosed, it has been ‘laid 
open’. This points to a kind of awareness of being that can be designated as ‘pre-
reflective’2.  
Pre-reflective awareness is a kind of awareness that doesn’t involve explicit, 
conscious, or thematic apprehension at the moment of awareness – one does not need 
to be ‘thinking about’ something to be pre-reflectively aware of that thing. However, 
there is a kind of awareness or ‘grasp’ there that is in principle open to being made 
explicit retrospectively. As Sartre’s famous example has it (Sartre 2003 p9), we may 
be counting cigarettes while our mind wanders to think about any number of other 
things. But even if we are not reflectively aware of our activity of counting cigarettes 
at the time, if we were asked what we were doing, we would immediately be able to 
reply that we were counting cigarettes. This is taken to display that a kind of self-
awareness was always there that was not reflective, but ‘pre-reflective’.  
Unlike Sartre, Heidegger himself does not use the term ‘pre-reflective’ to 
describe awareness or understanding of being. However, his description of our 
understanding of being as typically ‘pre-ontological – that is to say, not conceived 
theoretically or thematically’ (SZ 312) seems to fit this model, which importantly 
                                                        
2 See Zahavi (2008) for a much fuller discussion and justification of the idea of pre-reflective self-
awareness. See also Hatzimoysis 2010, Elkholy 2011, Kompridis 2011, A. Elpidorou & L. Freeman 
2015, Han-Pile 2013, as a sample of others who specifically characterize Heideggerian disclosure 
as pre-reflective.   
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explains how being (as a whole) is always disclosed to us without our being explicitly 
aware of it. As we typically navigate existence unreflectively, existence is 
nonetheless still manifest to us pre-reflectively. The way we exist, our understanding 
of our selves, the world, and others, is open in principle to being made explicit, even 
if for the most part it is not the object of our explicit awareness. But to say that 
disclosure is not to be equated with our explicit awareness, and even to say that such 
explicit awareness is ‘founded’ upon the unreflective way we typically exist, is not to 
say that disclosure cannot be explicit and reflective. 
Typically, our relation to our own being remains at the existentiell level, the 
level of the factic, as our being that is an issue for us is typically conceived in the way 
we care about our particular lives. Our awareness of our existence is at the level of 
the particular ‘who’ that I am and the particular world in which I find myself. While 
for the most part remaining pre-reflective, it seems clear that this way my particular 
being is an issue - my self-understanding as bound up with an understanding of the 
world and others - can at times be explicit, and reflective, as in a ‘deep’ conversation 
with a friend perhaps. It might require work to unearth, but it seems that it is in 
principle open to being made explicit. It seems that the same must true for the 
disclosure of our being as such, the disclosure of existence as the mode of being of 
Dasein, given Heidegger’s work itself.  
Through the phenomenological analysis of our experience, Heidegger shows 
how our mode of being is always already manifest to us in that experience:  
Like any ontological Interpretation whatsoever, this analytic can only, so to 
speak, “listen in” to some previously disclosed entity as regards its being. 
[…]Phenomenological Interpretation must make it possible for Dasein itself to 
disclose things primordially; it must, as it were, let Dasein interpret itself. Such 
Interpretation takes part in this disclosure only in order to raise to a conceptual 
level the phenomenal content of what has been disclosed, and to do so 
existentially. (SZ 139-140) 
Most of us are surely not constantly aware of our mode of being of Dasein, and so the 
disclosure of our existence as such is surely nearly always pre-reflective. Yet this is 
manifest ‘explicitly or not’. Phenomenology raises ‘to a conceptual level’, and so to 
explicit reflective awareness, what is disclosed. Thus it seems that Heidegger’s 
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project relies on the idea that disclosure can in some sense take an explicit, reflective 
form because the project of the existential analytic is precisely to make manifest 
explicitly and conceptually our being that we typically grasp pre-reflectively and 
unthematically.3 
Disclosure for Heidegger then is first-personal, pertains to existence as a 
whole, and is typically pre-reflective, however can also be explicit and reflective. 
Given that disclosure applies to existence as a whole, each mode of disclosure reveals 
the structure of Dasein in its entirety. However it is the affective mode of disclosure, 
which we shall see Heidegger captures with Befindlichkeit or ‘attunement’, that has a 
privileged relation to thrownness: 
Being attuned brings Dasein face to face with its thrownness […]  Existentially, 
“being-thrown” means4 finding oneself in one way or other [sich so oder so 
befinden]. One’s Befindlichkeit is therefore based upon thrownness. My 
attunement represents whatever may be the way in which I am primarily the 
entity that has been thrown. (SZ 340)5 
For Heidegger what it ‘means’ to be thrown ‘existentially’ (SZ 340), from the first-
person point of view of existence, just is to be affected. To understand exactly what 
being thrown means, and subsequently what it means to be responsible first-
personally in the light of this, will mean looking to how we are affected and what it 
means to take responsibility in the face of finding ourselves so affected.  
Before we can understand how our thrownness is disclosed in our affective 
experience, it is necessary to understand what is meant by affective experience for 
Heidegger. In the next section, I will outline my interpretation of affective experience 
in Heidegger’s existential analytic.  
                                                        
3 On this particular point I follow Golob (2013). However, in exactly what sense explicit, 
reflective work discloses being, is a question I must leave. Whether pre-reflective disclosure is in 
some sense better, and so whether explicit reflection and conceptualization are only partial, 
stunted, or skewed versions of this more ‘primordial disclosure’, is a question that cannot be 
discussed here. 
4 ‘besagt’ 
5 As we see elsewhere, ‘Because [auf Grund] Dasein essentially has Befindlichkeit belonging to it, 
Dasein has a kind of Being in which it is brought before itself and becomes disclosed to itself in 
its thrownness.’ (SZ 181) 
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Attunement 
 
Heidegger can be seen to use two terms in Being and Time to capture something like 
the affective aspect of our existence: Befindlichkeit and Stimmung6. The term 
Stimmung captures the particular ontical form that the mode of disclosure of 
Befindlichkeit must take. The import of this distinction is difficult to grasp however. 
Both are said to disclose our thrownness (e.g. SZ 136, 270), and shortly after Being 
and Time Heidegger replaces instances where he once used Befindlichkeit with the 
term Stimmung with no apparent change of meaning.7 Accordingly, for simplicity I 
will hereafter use only Stimmung (which I translate as ‘attunement’), unless quoting 
from the text, in which case I will leave Befindlichkeit untranslated as has become 
commonplace due to difficulties with finding an adequate translation.8  
The translation chosen for the term Stimmung, is obviously bound up with the 
scope of what one thinks Heidegger is attempting to capture. Stimmung’s meaning in 
everyday German is something like our ‘mood’, as in the ‘mood’ of a party or being 
in a good mood. And this is how many commentators, and Macquarrie & Robinson, 
translate the term, delineating this in more or less strict ways. The most common is to 
characterize ‘Heideggerian moods’ in contrast to emotions, feelings, and even what 
we capture with the term ‘mood’ in our everyday usage: for example, Ratcliffe (2013) 
claims that a ‘bad mood’ is not a mood in Heidegger’s sense, but is an ‘emotional 
                                                        
6 Along with variants of Stimmung e.g. ‘das Gestimmtsein’ (SZ 270). 
7 For example, where Heidegger talked of anxiety as a ‘Grundbefindlichkeit’ (SZ 182) in Being and 
Time, he talks of it as a ‘Grundstimmung’ in What is Metaphysics? (1929), and in a similar vein 
talks about boredom as a ‘Grundstimmung’ in Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929). 
Staehler (2007) sees this as one reason not to give too much heed to the distinction between the 
two terms (see footnote 14). Cf. also Cf. Elpidorou & Freeman (2015) who assess the terms as 
pertaining to the same phenomena. 
8 The Macquarrie and Robinson translation ‘state-of-mind’, with seemingly unanimous 
agreement in the secondary literature, is misleading insofar as Heidegger is aiming not at a ‘state’ 
but a way to be, and not something ‘internal’ or cognitive that the term ‘mind’ narrowly suggests 
today. ‘Situatedness’ and ‘findingness’ capture the element of finding and orienting oneself, but I 
think fail to capture the crucial way that this is specifically affective. Conversely, ‘affectedness’ 
capture this, but not the idea of finding oneself and orienting oneself. I think that while the links 
‘disposedness’ has  to the idea of ‘a disposition’ or a ‘pre-disposition’ are not wrong, as a 
translation it risks becoming too subject-centered and losing the important receptive element of 
finding oneself. Here my discussion is indebted too, but departs from, Elpidorou & Freeman 
(2015), footnote 4. 
 
54 
 
state’ (2013 p159). Moods in Heidegger’s sense are to be distinguished from 
‘occurrent emotions’ (Elpidorou & Freeman 2015 p13), or ‘object specific emotions’ 
(Weberman 1996 p386). A mood for Heidegger, these commentators contend, is 
rather that which makes such emotions or states possible. Heideggerian moods do not 
have specific intentional objects like feelings or some emotions, nor are they transient 
or intense in the manner of feelings, emotions, or our more everyday use of ‘moods’. 
Rather, they are the constant affective background which reveals the world in such a 
way that makes these specific intentional states possible. 
However, such a reading of ‘Stimmung’ as capturing only this background 
revelation of the world, in contrast to more specific feelings or emotions, runs into 
problems. Firstly, Heidegger makes no such distinction between ‘Stimmung’ and 
‘emotions’ or ‘object-specific emotions’, a fact that both Ratcliffe and Weberman 
concede. Secondly, this distinction does not seem to fit some of Heidegger’s 
descriptions or examples of Stimmung, such as fear and some varieties of fear (SZ 
142), ‘elation’ (SZ 135) and ‘joy’ (SZ 310) which seem to be fleeting states with 
intentional objects.9 Thirdly, as Ratcliffe acknowledges, there seem to be emotions 
directed at specific objects that come to take on the background world-disclosing 
character of Stimmung, thus questioning any kind of hard separation between them – 
for example, grief or despair can be transient emotional states intentionally directed at 
specific entities in the world that are also, or become, background Stimmung that 
reveal the whole world to us in a new way. Finally, and importantly, this conception 
of ‘Heideggerian moods’ that excludes occurrent affective states such as emotions or 
being in a ‘bad mood’ seems to fall foul of the only explicit descriptive guidance we 
get on what exactly Stimmungen are: ‘What we indicate ontologically by the term 
Befindlichkeit is ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing: die Stimmung, 
das Gestimmtsein.’ (SZ 134) To specify Heideggerian moods to be only a kind of 
general, constant, background state that allows things to appear, in which specific 
                                                        
9The same is true of FCM where a mixture of feelings, moods, and emotions like grief (p66), joy 
(p68) love (p89), and boredom are all characterized as ‘Stimmung’ or ways of finding oneself 
(sich befindet). See also Heidegger’s via Aristotle in BCAP, in which the same ‘pathé’ that are 
described as ‘affects’ such as anxiety and joy, are also that which determine being-in-the-world 
and being-with-others (p82-83), that are the basis of logos (p119) : as ‘the ground out of which 
speaking arises, and which what is expressed grows back into, the pathé, for their part, are the 
basic possibilities in which being-there itself is primarily oriented toward itself, finds itself.’ (p176) 
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feelings such as ‘fear’ are excluded (on the basis of a distinction that Heidegger 
himself doesn’t make), appears to stand in problematic contrast to Stimmung as ‘the 
most familiar and everyday sort of thing’. 
In addition, I think there is strong textual support to show positively that 
Heidegger doesn’t want to limit his thought to a kind of affective background, but 
instead wants to include affective states that have specific intentional objects. In 
the early stages of his discussion on Befindlichkeit, Heidegger highlights the 
question of the different modes of Befindlichkeit and their interconnection, before 
saying that ‘the phenomena have long been well-known ontically and the terms 
“affects” and “feelings” [Affekte und Gefühle]’ (SZ 138). The connection of 
feelings and emotions with his understanding of affective disclosure is affirmed 
more positively in the History of the Concept of Time lecture course, as Heidegger 
describes what he’s doing as ‘coordinating the phenomena of feelings and 
emotions [Gefühle and Affekten]to the structure of Befindlichkeit’ (HCT p256), and 
pronounces that ‘emotions and ways of feeling in fact have the possibility of 
uncovering Dasein itself in its being.’ (ibid.)10  I think that with Stimmung then, we 
can see Heidegger as capturing a very broad range of affective phenomena that 
includes our everyday understanding of feelings, moods, and emotions.11  
                                                        
10 Further support for the connection between disposedness and emotions can be found in 
CT(D): 
‘What one thinks of as affects [Affekte] […] must be understood via discoverture as Befindlichkeit. 
When analyzing affects our primary and consistent source of direction must come from our 
exploration of Dasein with respect to its being.’ (p27) 
11 The question of whether bodily ‘feelings’ are included, and the role of the body in general in 
Heidegger’s understanding of attunement, is one that exceeds the boundaries of this dissertation. 
Freeman (2015) argues that Heidegger works on an incorrect assumption that the existential 
situation can be separated and understood independently from our lived bodies. My sense is that 
our lived bodies can be seen to be included in the scope of Heidegger’s analysis, as his discussion 
of affects in relation to Aristotle (where, as usual, Heidegger appears to be expounding his own 
thought, or thinking as such, through a figure from the tradition, rather than expounding this 
figure’s views in the way we might normally think of this). See, for example: 
‘Insofar as [noesis] is the highest possibility for the being of human beings, the entire being of 
human beings is determined so that I must be apprehended as the bodily being-in-the-world of 
human beings. 
What was, here, provided by Aristotle, is still not taken advantage of today. Only in 
phenomenology has this begun. No division between “psychic” and “bodily acts”! […] One must 
note that the primary being-there-function of bodiliness secures the ground for the full being of 
human beings.’ (BCAP p134) 
‘There is nothing like a pure fear in the sense of an abstract comporting-oneself toward 
something. In itself, it is a comporting of the full human being in its corporeality.’ (BCAP p139) 
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This broad range is one reason why I reject the translation ‘mood’. The 
reasons why I take ‘attunement’ to be more fitting should become clearer as we go 
on. For now though, two points can be made. The first is that the word Stimmung 
contains within itself this resonance of tuning: it is etymologically connected to the 
verb stimmen – to tune or attune. The second is that attunement consists 
necessarily of a relation between two ‘poles’: to tune or attune requires a relation 
between something that is attempting to respond to and bring itself in harmony 
with something else, as one attempts to bring a musical instrument into harmony 
with a certain note. I take it that in this respect ‘attunement’ ensures that our 
existence as fundamentally being-in-the-world remains in focus, in contrast to 
thinking of a Cartesian subject with affects as an ‘interior’ mental occurrence. 
With an eye to grasping our thrownness more clearly, we have looked to the 
way that this thrownness is manifest or ‘disclosed’ through our affective experience. 
We have seen that this disclosure is first-personal, applies to existence as a whole, 
and is typically pre-reflective while admitting of a reflective, explicit form. In 
contrast to some interpretations in the secondary literature, it has become clear that 
with the mode disclosure of ‘attunement’, part of what Heidegger aims to capture is 
our feelings, moods, and emotions. Given that these are the most familiar (and as we 
shall see, most explicit) kinds of affective experience, we shall begin by outlining 
how thrownness is disclosed in this kind of attunement that we can see most clearly.  
 
Making Thrownness Manifest (i) - Feelings, Moods, and Emotions 
 
In this section we will begin to see how our thrownness is disclosed through our 
attunement by looking to how it is disclosed in our everyday feelings, moods, and 
emotions. Given their intense, explicit nature, the phenomenological features that also 
apply to our constant, background attunement, can be seen more clearly in our 
feelings, moods, and emotions. In conformity with the elucidation of disclosure given 
above, the features picked out are, I take it, features that are available within the 
experience itself. While we are typically not explicitly or consciously aware of them, 
                                                        
We might criticize this as being insufficient, saying that our bodily being has distinctive features 
that can’t be subsumed in Heidegger’s general analysis, however it seems that Heidegger does 
understand the body to be included in his account. 
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they are nonetheless always already available to us. I take this to conform to the way 
that disclosure for Heidegger is typically pre-reflective. By paying explicit attention 
to these features of the experience of attunement here, they can be raised to the 
conceptual level of the structural aspect of our being that is ‘thrownness’. Before 
looking at how the structural aspect of our being is revealed, I will begin by looking 
to the feature of affective experience that I think singles it out as the privileged mode 
of disclosure of our thrownness specifically. Affective experienced discloses our 
thrownness because it is an experience of passivity. 
 
Passivity 
 
As the etymology of the word ‘passion’ suggests, affective experience is a kind of 
experience that is synonymous with the idea of ‘passivity - in Heidegger’s words, 
‘attunement assails us’12 (SZ 136).  Thrownness is experienced primordially through 
a kind of passivity before the world; to talk of an ‘affect’ here is to talk of our being 
affected, not our act of affecting. Our language about this kind of experience is 
replete with this sort of characterization: moods ‘take hold of’ us, feelings ‘come over 
us’, and emotions ‘grip’ us. We are moved by them; we do not move them.  
These ways of talking about affective experiences all point to an important 
feature that they share, namely a certain kind of passivity that characterizes our 
experience of them.  This is not something that we ‘do’ but in some way feels like it 
comes to us - in the accusative and not the nominative voice. This is typically 
manifest in the way that affective experiences often lie beyond our control. They 
arrive without invitation, refuse to leave when asked, and fail to appear when we want 
them most. We may know that nerves will negatively affect a job interview, but 
cannot help feel them. We may know that our grief hurts those we love, but we 
cannot conjure good cheer through sheer will.  
 It might be objected that while this is true for the most part, there do seem to 
be occasions where we can exert control over our affective experience. Perhaps we 
are not so passive with respect to them as I have suggested. If I’m feeling down, there 
might be things that are within my power that I can do to cheer myself up – I can visit 
                                                        
12 ‘Die Stimmung überfällt’ 
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a friend and my low mood might be replaced with contentedness or even positive 
good cheer. In some cases, this is no doubt possible. However, I would suggest that in 
these cases an important passivity of the affect still remains. While we may have 
some agency with respect to it, feeling affected itself remains a feeling of passivity. If 
our agency succeeds in bringing about a change of affect, the new attunement 
nonetheless is experienced as coming to us. This essentially passive element can be 
seen in the familiar way that our attempts to control our attunement often fail. While 
seeing a particular friend or watching a particular film might have worked in 
controlling our low mood every time in the past, a time will surely come when it will 
not. Upon feeling low, I may go and visit a friend yet a good mood may nevertheless 
evade me. My melancholy remains unmoved. I may be able to create inviting 
conditions for a good mood to appear but the ability to wholly determine it eludes me; 
I can beckon it but I cannot make it come.  
Bearing out the analysis of thrownness, we can begin to see a kind of 
‘already’ character to feelings, moods, and emotions that is connected with this kind 
of passivity. Initially, we might think about the way that feelings, moods, and 
emotions - unlike actions or judgements – seem to already have been there by the 
time we become aware of them. A feeling has the character of having already been 
upon us by the time we notice it, as opposed to being brought about as an action of 
ours. We ‘find’ ourselves in a mood and there’s a sense in which ‘finding’ requires 
that something is already there. Even in those experiences where we do manage to 
exert a kind of control over an affective experience, I would suggest that we do not 
witness the leaving of the old or the arrival of the new affect. If our manipulation of 
our feelings has been successful, we learn of this retrospectively. At some moment 
we find that our bad mood has gone, or that we are now in good spirits. The new 
mood is always experienced, if and when it is experienced, as already there, even if it 
has come about in some way via our agency. This ‘already’ character of the 
experience of attunement shall be analyzed in greater detail below to reveal that it 
captures the way that attunement is a condition of the possibility of projection. 
This passivity of our everyday affective experiences, linked to the ‘already’ 
character shown above, reveals the passivity and lack of control that Heidegger is 
capturing with the idea of ‘thrownness’. The passivity of our thrownness is 
experienced first-personally in the way that we find ourselves gripped by affective 
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experience – it is the way we find ourselves ‘submitted’ to attunement (SZ 137) that 
captures the way we are ‘submitted’ (SZ 161) in our thrownness. As we proceed, it is 
this passivity and this ‘already’ of affective experience, in conjunction with the 
character of movement, that will challenge traditional conceptions of being 
responsible, and that will have to be taken up into my own positive account. As we 
see how these experiences reveal our thrownness into Dasein as such, and into being 
Dasein in a particular way, it should be borne in mind that these aspects of 
thrownness all grip us, all already hold us, in a way that we are in an important sense 
passive with respect to. This is no less true for the experience of the movement of 
thrownness. 
 
Movement 
 
The relation between affective experience and the idea of ‘motion’ is not unfamiliar 
to us. The etymological connection between the English words ‘emotion’ and 
‘motion’ indicates a connection between the two ideas that is borne out further in our 
everyday way of speaking, as we describe undergoing certain affective experiences as 
being ‘moved’, or talk of being ‘carried away’ by our feelings. We should see this as 
more than just a quirk of language – these expressions capture the way that affective 
experiences lead us to ‘do’ something, to be moved to ‘action’. 
Take a case of extreme anger. We might imagine that we enter a situation to 
find an act of violence being committed against a loved one. As soon as we enter the 
scene and realize what is happening, rage rushes up inside of us. The abuser is the 
sole object of our attention. We might rush towards them and drag them from our 
loved one, perhaps violently tackling them or shouting at them. Everything, and 
everyone, else in the room becomes irrelevant in the wake of this event, as might our 
usual standards of propriety. Or, for another example, we might imagine finding 
ourselves enthralled romantically with someone who is unaware of our affection. In 
such a case, the beloved dominates our thoughts. Everything reminds us of them, and 
we are constantly thinking how we can spend more time with them, how we can show 
our affection, how this affection might be reciprocated. The world shows up in terms 
of possible activities to be done together, possible gestures to be made, and possible 
models of relationships as other couples show up in ways of relating to be emulated 
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or avoided. Perhaps after a particularly nice evening spent with the object of our 
affection, being able to take it no longer, we might find ourselves compelled to make 
manifest our affection in some way or other. 
In thinking through what such an experience is like, our thrownness can be 
seen. Such intense affective experiences circumscribe the field of possibilities open to 
us – how we find ourselves feeling already shapes the landscape ahead of us. In our 
intense anger, only the abuser shows up to us, as the rest of the room or anyone else 
who is present recedes from our focus. The situation is transformed, as the only 
possibilities that show up are ones that involve tackling the abuser. The field of 
possibilities open to us is determined by this intense anger. Similarly in our ardent 
affection, our experience shows up in the light of this feeling, as the world and others 
show up as possibilities pertaining to romance. The feeling we find ourselves with 
shapes the possibilities ahead of us. With this character of our everyday affective 
experience, we can see the feature of thrownness in which the ‘already’ that we are 
determines the landscape ahead by shaping the range of possibilities.  
However, as I argued in the previous chapter, thrownness importantly also 
‘moves’ us, and it is in our affective experience that this can be seen, and its 
pervasive power grasped. In our affective experience, these possibilities do not stand 
there ahead of us like ingredients in a larder. They already touch us; they grip us and 
move us.  It is through these affective experiences that this can be seen so 
dramatically. In the case of anger, the possibility of grappling and striking the abuser 
does not just stand inert as a logical possibility in front of me. I am already gripped 
by it, I am already submitted to it. I find myself drawn almost irresistibly to the 
possibility. ‘Before I know it’, I am already taking it up; I am in its grip, running at 
the assailant.  The same is true in the case of one who is smitten. The beloved and the 
romantic possibilities that subsequently show up have already gripped the subject – in 
the grip of such a feeling, my thoughts return to the object of my affection irresistibly, 
my gaze is ‘caught’ by the acts of other couples, and as I walk I am drawn this way 
and that to investigate possible meeting locations, food venues etc. I am moved to 
take up these possibilities of thinking, seeing, and acting by my affective experience. 
After the wonderful evening spent with the beloved, I might feel compelled to blurt 
out my feelings – I find myself doing it, perhaps in spite of all other considerations 
that this one possibility has overshadowed. Our everyday affective experiences, the 
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way we find ourselves feeling, shape the possibilities ahead by gripping and touching 
us to varying degrees. As these examples show, affective experiences give a certain 
texture to existence that gives us orientation and impetus. Affective experiences 
‘move’ us insofar as they grip us, impel us, or in the intense cases above, compel us, 
to take up possibilities, such that we often find ourselves already taking them up 
before any reflection, decision, or even awareness.  
Here we can begin to better understand how our affective experience 
manifests the ‘already’ of thrownness, which shapes the horizon ahead, first-
personally. We saw that the ‘already’ can be seen in the experience of the intense 
feeling itself, in the sense that the feeling seems to be there before we are aware of it, 
as a condition of ‘finding’ ourselves with such a feeling. However this character of 
the ‘already’, which we saw in the analysis of facticity was not to be considered as 
chronologically prior but as a condition of the possibility of, can be seen more clearly 
in this movement into possibilities. Our affective experiences as characterized above 
can be seen to be a condition of the possibility of projection into the particular 
possibilities of attacking the assailant or declaring our feelings. It is on the basis of 
the feeling of anger that the possibilities of attacking the assailant showed up to us 
and impelled us to take them up. Our experience was the way it was because of our 
anger. Had we not been angry the same possibilities wouldn’t have gripped and 
moved us in the same way –this can be seen in the way that one might point to the 
affective experience as the ‘ground’ of the action by using anger to explain ‘why’ we 
attacked. Equally, the world’s salience is conditioned by the feelings of love, and 
projection into the possibility of spending time with and confessing to the beloved 
wouldn’t have showed up and moved the subject without this affective experience. 
The affect in these cases clearly govern the texture of salience of experience that 
allows that experience to be what it is, that provides orientation and impetus for the 
taking up of possibilities. Like an affective lens that is necessary for this experience, 
these everyday feelings, moods, and emotions are a necessary condition for certain 
possibilities showing up and drawing us to them. 
Importantly, the ‘movement’ of thrownness has also been shown in a way that begins 
to make manifest how pervasive and powerful thrownness is. In contrast to placing a 
range of possibilities ahead of us that we can stand back from and assess, by seeing 
how affective experience moves us we can see how we are submitted to, and moved 
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by, these possibilities already. They grip us, and as these intense examples show, this 
grip can be so tight that there is no room to stop, decide, and deliberate about these 
possibilities. We may only become aware of even taking them up retrospectively, as 
we find ourselves lashing or blurting out ‘before we knew it’ 
 
Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others 
 
While making clear this passivity and movement characteristic of our thrownness, our 
explicit affective experiences might appear to cover over an aspect of our thrownness. 
As we saw, at the most fundamental level we are thrown into human existence – we 
find ourselves as a human being, as a ‘who’. As we also saw, an integral part of 
Heidegger’s philosophical project is to show that a human being is essentially and 
fundamentally related to that which is beyond the bounds of the ‘I’. It is not the case 
that the ‘I’ comes first as a kind of basis of being, from which then comes an external 
world. Rather, we are fundamentally and essentially being-in-the-world and being-
with-others. 
In contrast to this picture, for Heidegger the way our feelings, moods, and 
emotions are typically theorized by disciplines like psychology endorses the Cartesian 
picture of an isolable ‘I’ for whom the world and others are in some way secondary. 
On such theoretical models, feelings, moods, and emotions are ‘inner’ mental states. 
These inner mental states can then be projected onto the world, but their origin and 
meaning are to be found ‘in our head’ in some sense. For Heidegger such theorizing 
distorts the phenomena and as a result goes hand in hand with a mischaracterization 
of human existence as such. In his discussion of attunement in The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics lecture course, he declares that we need to free ourselves 
from these psychological kinds of theories of consciousness, and instead give 
‘releasement’ [Gelassenheit] (FCM p91) to our everyday perspective. Reaffirming the 
methodological commitment I have outlined, in which our being can be gleaned 
within the everyday perspective, Heidegger declares we must listen to this everyday 
voice. And this voice, rather than seeing affective experiences as being inner mental 
states that can then be projected onto things, rather sees the meaning of the affective 
as arising from the world. In his analysis of boredom, this is made plain for 
Heidegger:  
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Strange – ungraspable though this is at first, we must follow what everyday 
speaking, comportment, and judgement actually expresses: that things 
themselves, people themselves, events and places themselves are boring.’ 
(FCM p83) 
In our experience of affects like boredom, the affect is felt as arising from the 
world. As Heidegger describes boredom, it is ‘seated in what is boring, and creeps 
into us from the outside.’ (ibid.) The way we often talk about affective experiences 
is to treat them as coming from the world or other people: it is the crowd that is 
terrifying, the situation that is awkward, and the computer that is frustrating. Such 
ways of talking, for Heidegger, reveal how the phenomena are really experienced. 
This is what shows itself if we bracket ill-fitting conceptual models and look ‘to 
the things themselves’. In our experience, affects arise from objects, people, 
situations, words, events. For Heidegger, all feelings, moods, and emotions contain 
this affective connection with the world and others, and this reveals our 
thrownness into Dasein as being-in-the-world and being-with-others. 
We might grant that affective experiences do often have the character of 
grabbing us from without. But while this may be true when words hurt us, when 
tools enrage us, or when love brings us joy, we might think there are cases of 
feelings, moods, or emotions that don’t obviously find their ‘origin’ or meaning in 
the world or other people. We might even think that some affective experiences 
have precisely the character of arising within the ‘I’ before then being projected 
onto the world and others. Consider a feeling of irritability or anger that might 
seem to arise wholly within the subject, perhaps due to a bad night’s sleep. It 
seems that after getting up on the wrong side of bed, the subject then subsequently 
imposes this feeling onto everything and everyone they encounter. Or we might 
consider a feeling of intense melancholy. Even if all around are in a good mood, 
even if the situation is one that generally (and previously for the subject) evokes 
good cheer, this melancholy that has arisen within the subject seems to then be 
projected onto the world and other people, making grey that which once had 
colour and life. This might seem then, to suggest a primacy of the subject with 
respect to affective experience, which in turn phenomenologically might question 
Heidegger’s account of the being of human existence. 
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However, while it might initially appear that these emotions or moods arise 
within the subject to subsequently create a world in accordance with its hue, a closer 
look to the experience reveals this not to be the case. In the actual experience, it is not 
the case that we feel like a mood has arisen in us then goes outwards from us to 
something or someone else. Rather, with such a mood, I and the world are 
transformed equally, at one and the same instance, or ‘equiprimordially’ in 
Heidegger’s parlance. Co-constitutive of finding myself ‘already’ in a particular 
mood, I encounter a world already altered. We might see this expressed by the way 
we might say in our irritability that ‘I have had a bad day’ or ‘things aren’t going 
well’ - the scope of such utterances reflect that the attunement is not experienced as 
something that primarily resides within my head.  
Additionally, our mood does not simply retain a constant colour as we might 
expect if it were a mere projection, like a blanket which I have thrown on the world. 
It does not apply to anything and everything, but something about ‘the things 
themselves’ draws the feeling13. Even if I am already irritable, my anger will not be 
solicited by someone quietly passing me by on the street, but rather by certain objects, 
qualities, actions, people etc. that I generally find to be objectionable or bad. 
Melancholy won’t appear as a uniformity, but will vary depending on the 
characteristics of what it is I’m experiencing – a certain facial expression, a particular 
wording of a sentence from a loved one, and not others, will deflate me. An affect is 
not something that is in my head that I project onto a world and others. Rather, it 
arises in relation to, and feeds off of, the world and others.  
Thus what it means to have an affective experience is to be struck by the 
world and others in a certain way. However, this is not to say that ‘boring’ or ‘fearful’ 
is a property of people or things that is ‘objective’ in the sense of pertaining 
independently of the subject. A book’s boringness or a crowd’s fearfulness ‘concerns 
us in such and such a way and therefore stands in such and such a relation to us as 
subjects, to our subjectivity’ (FCM p84). The world cannot appear as irritating, sad, 
boring etc. unless it is to a subject that is open to being affected in such a way.  While 
all affective experience has the character of being in some way beyond the confines 
of the subject, this same affective experience is undeniably our own. If anger is felt, it 
is distinctly ‘I’ who feel it. It is not the case that melancholy ‘is’, but always 
                                                        
13 See FCM p85 for a mention of this particular point by Heidegger. 
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specifically that some ‘I’ is melancholic – the melancholy is inescapably mine from 
the moment it is felt. This is borne out in the common everyday way that first-person 
authority and ownership are given to attunement; I cannot be told how I feel, only I 
can know this. Nor can another take my feelings from me - a mood shared is a mood 
doubled, not halved.  
This last point reminds us importantly that to say that an attunement is mine is 
not to say that it is mine alone. The fact that ‘I’ am nervous is all too consistent with a 
whole room full of nervous interviewees, whose nerves fill the room and feed off of 
one another. We can unwillingly share in the infectious euphoria of a large crowd, 
solely in virtue of our accidentally sharing a train carriage. We can even share a 
society-wide affect like ‘fear’ that has been created by a political discourse14.  Yet in 
all of these cases, it is nevertheless and unmistakably still me who feels nervous, me 
who feels euphoric, and me who feels scared, even if the feeling leaves as I leave the 
other people.  
Thus, the ‘I’ too is a necessary constitutive element for affective experience. 
This, combined with the way that the world and others are seen to be necessary to our 
affective experience as a kind of ‘object’ pole, leads Heidegger to declare that 
‘ultimately every attunement – is a hybrid, partly objective, partly subjective.’ (FCM 
p88) But this is just to say in other words that in attunement we can see Dasein as 
being-in-the-world, a fundamental interrelation of an I with a world and others. 
Attunement reveals that Dasein is the being of this ‘between’ (SZ 132) of subject and 
object. Conceived as this ‘between’, we can see clearly why the term ‘attunement’ is 
appropriate in characterizing our affective experience , given that an attunement 
corresponds to a relation, a ‘between’ multiple poles: in attunement, ‘the world, 
Dasein-with, and existence are equiprimordially disclosed’ (SZ 137).  
In this section as a whole, I have shown how the passivity and movement of 
thrownness are manifest in our explicit everyday affective experiences, and how 
contrary to some appearances, our thrownness into being an ‘I’ in relation to the 
world and others is also made manifest in these experiences. In doing so, I have 
                                                        
14 ‘Publicness, as the kind of being which belongs to das Man, not only has in general its own way 
of being attuned, but needs attunements and ‘makes’ them for itself. It is into such attunement 
and out of such attunement that the orator speaks. He must understand the possibilities of 
attunement in order to rouse them and guide them aright.’ (SZ 138-139) 
This shared societal attunement will be important as we see that attunement goes beyond our 
everyday understanding of affective experience. 
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attempted to show how powerful the grip of our thrownness is, in particular by 
showing the way we find ourselves moved by the power of these affective 
experiences. But if I have shown the power of our thrownness, I have done so only 
for specific, intense affective moments that come and go. 
 Perhaps this powerful grip and movement of thrownness only holds in these 
moments of being overcome by feelings. After such moments, one might argue, we 
regain the typical space for thought, reflection, deliberation, decision, and therefore 
the space for responsibility traditionally understood. If thrownness is experienced 
first-personally through our affective experience, on the analysis given so far there is 
no reason so far to think that thrownness is anything more than an occasional force 
that comes over us, but which for the most part is subdued or absent. 
However. We have seen that attunement is one of the fundamental modes of 
disclosure of being to Dasein. We have also seen that ‘Dasein is its disclosedness’ 
(SZ 133). So long as we are Dasein, we are disclosing being. This suggests, given that 
attunement is a fundamental mode of this disclosure, that Dasein is constantly attuned 
and thus constantly disclosing our thrownness. This, in fact, is Heidegger’s position. 
As we see, Dasein: 
finds itself [sich befindet] in its thrownness. In Befindlichkeit Dasein is always 
brought before itself, and has always found itself, […] in the attunement that it 
has. (SZ 135, emphasis mine) 
We will now turn to examine the way that affective experience, and thus the grip and 
power of thrownness, is not limited to our explicit feelings, moods, and emotions but 
is rather a constant and pervasive force of our existence. 
 
Making Thrownness Manifest (ii) - Constant Implicit Attunement  
 
 As we saw, the kind of affective experiences that are ‘ontically the most familiar sort 
of thing’ are those discrete, affective states that we generally call feelings, moods, and 
emotions. These are a constitutive part of what we have called our attunement. 
Beyond these, we might think of attunement as potentially capturing certain kinds of 
experiences which we could call ‘affective’ yet which don’t quite fit into these 
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categories. Finding a place or person eerie, a room tense or awkward, or a vague 
feeling that something was ‘off’ about a person or place might put us at the fringes of 
our understanding of affective experience. Yet for Heidegger, even when we are 
aware of no particular affective experience at all, we are nonetheless attuned. We are 
always and constantly attuned: ‘In every case, Dasein always has some attunement.’ 
(SZ 134) 
Heidegger claims that this affective dimension of experience, our attunement, 
is constant. Yet we are only aware of this affective element of experience in those 
explicit, discrete cases mentioned above. This means that our attunement must, for 
the most part, go unnoticed by us. However, this is not to say that for the most part it 
is unavailable to us. If, as we have seen, our thrownness is pre-reflectively available 
at all times, our constant attunement through which this thrownness is disclosed, 
should also be available at all times. Therefore, it should be the subject of pre-
reflective awareness when it is not explicitly grasped by us.15 
For Heidegger, in line with our analysis so far, it is by looking to those 
explicit attunements that we must notice that we can understand attunement as such, 
and become explicitly aware of this constant attunement that normally remains in the 
background:  
we initially grasp the essence of attunement in terms of what confronts us at 
first, namely the extreme tendencies of attunement, those which irrupt then 
disappear. (FCM p68) 
Those everyday attunements like nerves, pity, anger, and love, can be seen as more 
intense or ‘extreme’ manifestations of this constant attunement that we are 
generally unaware of.16 While the former press on us so intensely that we must 
                                                        
15 See Heidegger’s ‘deepening’ of his discussion of boredom in FCM where he moves from 
boredom that we are explicitly aware of to a kind of boredom that seems precisely to be pre-
reflective as set out earlier: 
‘It has now become completely clear to us – albeit in retrospect – that we were bored after all 
with the evening. We now quite clearly remember a repeated, though suppressed yawning. This 
was not some reactive symptom of being tired or relaxed. We were bored.’ (FCM p110, emphasis 
mine) 
16 See also: 
‘At first and for the most part we are affected only by particular attunements that tend toward 
‘extremes’, like joy or grief. A faint apprehensiveness or a buoyant contentment are less 
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notice them, for Heidegger they are of a kind with this unnoticed, implicit 
attunement. We can look to the features manifest in the explicit cases then, to help 
bring to light that which typically goes unnoticed in this constant affective 
background. I shall look to this way we find ourselves moved in our explicit 
attunements first, given its important to the understanding of thrownness that I 
have proposed. The passivity of this experience should be implicit throughout, 
however will be raised again briefly in what follows. 
As we saw, when in the grip of an intense attunement the scope of 
possibilities ahead of us is determined by that attunement. It is so determined by 
the way that possibilities grip us, and move us to take them up. The situation I 
experience is determined by the particular mood I am in. It determines the things I 
am drawn to and take up. The world looks different in accordance with my mood, 
and whether, how, and to what extent I am drawn to different things varies 
accordingly. However, it is not only in the grip of an intense affective experience 
that the world has a texture of salience - we are not only moved when we are 
angry, particular possibilities don’t only show up and grip us when we are smitten. 
Rather, we are always and constantly absorbed and engaged by particular 
possibilities in the world. Particular objects, tasks, people – and not others – show 
up as we go about our day. We engage with these and not others. Certain 
newspapers show up as to be read or ignored; I find myself stopping to talk to 
certain people while others pass me by. As Heidegger puts it: 
The world solicits concern: This means that, as it is discovered in concern, the 
world does not meet with a mere looking and staring at something on hand; 
[…]In all preoccupation with the world, Dasein as in-being is in some way 
solicited and summoned (way of Befindlichkeit17); this may only be in the 
form of an undisturbed performance, the soothing uniformity of an 
unthreatened employment, the indifference of the everyday handling of what is 
placed under care. ’ (HCT p254, emphasis mine) 
                                                        
noticeable. Apparently not there at all, and yet there, is precisely that lack of attunement in which 
we are neither out of sorts nor in a ‘good’ mood. Yet even in this ‘neither/nor’ we are never 
without an attunement.’ (FCM p68) 
17 Translated as ‘way of being disposed’ with italics in original. 
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In the same way as in explicit cases of affective experiences, we find ourselves 
oriented to certain possibilities and moved – ‘solicited and summoned’ - to take them 
up. For the most part, this soliciting is not explicit. We do not notice being drawn to 
certain objects, people, jobs etc. For the most part, we unreflectively go about our 
daily routines, performing particular tasks, making certain journeys, engaging with 
certain people without thinking about it. We are already moved by them ‘before we 
know it’, just as in the extreme cases of affective experience mentioned. Even in 
cases where we ‘step back’ and become aware, perhaps thinking about which 
direction to walk, where the item we need for work is, or whether it would be 
awkward to stop and talk to this person, we do so on the basis of already being drawn 
to the destination we need to get to, the task we need to complete at work, and the 
other person as someone we already ‘know’ and so could talk to. Just as in our 
explicit affective experience, our everyday practical engagement with the world is a 
taking up of possibilities on the basis of finding ourselves attuned in certain ways.  
As seen in the section on disclosure above, understanding for Heidegger 
includes its everyday sense as an explicit, reflective grasping of something through 
thought. This is only part of the meaning however (SZ 336). Understanding for 
Heidegger more fundamentally captures a pre-reflective projection into possibilities 
that makes such cognitive activity possible. What it means to understand something is 
not just to cognize it explicitly, but to have a grasp of it in a sense that covers 
engaging with it in the broadest way, which includes things like walking to work or 
stopping to talk to someone as outlined above. Ultimately, our understanding of 
particular possibilities in the world is dependent upon a broader understanding of who 
we are, what it means to be. Understanding an ECG machine or the way to the 
hospital is dependent upon my understanding myself as a doctor, upon projecting into 
that possibility. In the same way, our being solicited and summoned to engage with 
particular items, people, directions then depends upon our being drawn to certain 
ways of being more generally. It depends upon being drawn to a possibility of 
existence that makes the world solicit me in a particular way. For particular objects 
and people to show up as drawing us in the ways that they do, Dasein must have 
always: 
already submitted itself to having entities within-the-world “matter” to it in a 
way which its attunements have outlined in advance. Existentially, 
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Befindlichkeit implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can 
encounter something that matters to us. (SZ 137-138) 
I can only be solicited and drawn by an ECG machine if I am drawn in some sense to 
being a doctor. I am moved to pick up a certain paper, or attend a certain protest, on 
the basis that I am drawn to socialism. I am moved to offer a helping hand with a 
house move or arrange to meet for a drink on the basis that I am drawn to a certain 
friendship. As the quote above says, practicing medicine, socialism, or my friend 
must already ‘matter’ [angehen] to me for the world to solicit me as it does. It is with 
this idea of finding things ‘mattering’, what we might in other everyday language 
describe as caring about something, that I think our constant attunement can helpfully 
be articulated18.  
It is through this idea of feeling that something matters that I think we can 
helpfully understand what it means to be constantly attuned. Finding something 
mattering can be seen as the constant, typically implicit, affective feature of our 
experience that Heidegger is capturing with ‘attunement’. While our explicit feelings, 
moods, and emotions are particularly intense ways of finding things matter to us that 
we must notice, things nonetheless always matter to us. And our experience couldn’t 
be as it is if they didn’t. My life, the world, and others must always show up 
affectively as mattering if they are to show up at all. 
Here, in the way that we find ourselves drawn to taking up possibilities, our 
implicit attunement and its passivity can easily be overlooked, and can be difficult to 
distinguish from the understanding (as projection) it underlies and makes possible. As 
we saw, Heidegger describes thrownness and projection as a ‘single basic state’ (SZ 
199). It can seem like I’m not being affected at all in taking up a possibility, and 
perhaps even as if the whole thing is my ‘doing’ something. Nonetheless this 
affective aspect is necessarily always there – the structure of this single basic state is 
‘essentially twofold’ (ibid.). While this may only become explicit in the intense 
attunements where our being gripped by possibilities is overwhelming, this grip and 
‘submission’ to possibilities is nonetheless already there. This intense explicit 
attunement only makes manifest what is always already the case. 
                                                        
18 When I will use ‘care’ in this section, I do so as a synonym for mattering, and not in the 
technical sense that captures the totality of the being of Dasein. 
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As with our intense attunements, this background attunement is still importantly 
characterized by passivity. To be summoned by a possibility is not something that we 
‘do’. We do not decide what matters to us. We just find ourselves already gripped, 
already caring about certain things, which shape our experience. And here the 
character of the ‘already’ that was linked to this passivity in the case of explicit 
affective experience can be seen more clearly.  As we saw in our analysis of 
thrownness, this ‘already’ is not primarily to be seen as chronologically prior, but 
rather prior in the sense of a condition of the possibility of. Finding that things matter 
– attunement – is a condition of the possibility of ‘seeing’ possibilities in terms of 
which I understand myself and the world: 
By way of being attuned, Dasein ‘sees’ possibilities, in terms of which it is. In 
the projective disclosure of such possibilities, it is already attuned in every case. 
(SZ 148) 
Just as our intense affective experiences shaped the possibilities that showed up, 
solicited us, and moved us in anger or love, so too is this affective element necessary 
in grounding the projection that we are. It is only on the basis of being gripped 
affectively by possibilities, by feeling that they matter, that possibilities show up to 
me, solicit and move me. 
But the fact that this affective grip, the way we are oriented and moved, typically 
does not reach the intensity of explicit feelings, moods, or emotions, is not to say they 
are any less powerful. For Heidegger in fact, the converse is true: 
precisely those attunements to which we pay no heed at all, the attunements we 
least observe, those attunements which attune us in such a way that we feel as 
though there is no attunement there at all, as though we were not attuned in any 
way at all – these attunements are the most powerful. (FCM p68) 
The way we find ourselves caring about something, the way something matters, grips 
us so deeply, so thoroughly, that it shapes the whole of existence. As in the example 
above, the beginnings of romance might manifest in an explicit affective experience 
that we must notice. But in contrast to this, we can think of a deep love for another 
that shapes our whole lives and is constitutive of our self-understanding. It seems 
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clear to me that the latter grips us more powerfully, that we are submitted to it more 
thoroughly, despite the fact that this attunement is typically not explicitly felt. While 
such core attunements are typically implicit, disruption or ‘breakdown’ can cause 
these implicit background attunements to become explicit and make their power felt – 
we can think of the extreme and overwhelming grief at the death of loved one as a 
prime example of this. In relation to our earlier examples, we might think of the 
sadness or emptiness I feel at no longer being allowed to practice medicine upon a 
forced move to a new country, the anger I feel at a government’s deliberate shrinking 
or distorting of the space for socialist action, or the guilt I feel if I fail my friend in a 
time of need. In these cases, that attunement that was implicitly gripping, shaping, 
and moving me, becomes explicit, and the passivity that reveals our ‘submission’ to it 
is made clear. 
 
Thrown into a particular world as particular ‘who’ 
 
As we saw in our analysis of thrownness, we always find ourselves as a particular 
‘who’ in a particular world; we aren’t just thrown into being Dasein but into being 
this Dasein. Part of what it means to be thrown into such specificity is to find oneself 
in a particular social context; captured by the idea that we are thrown into ‘the 
publicness of das Man’ (SZ 167). First-personally this means that what matters to us, 
that which touches and moves us, is shaped by this publicness of das Man: 
The dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted has 
already been decisive even for the possibilities of being attuned – that is, for the 
basic way in which Dasein lets the world “matter” to it. Das Man prescribes 
one’s Befindlichkeit, and determines what and how one ‘sees’. (SZ 169-170) 
We are always attuned to the specific society in which we find ourselves - the 
specific social, cultural, historical environment in which we grow up. We find 
ourselves moved in accordance with the particular society in which we find 
ourselves, which determines what can matter, what must matter, and how. Certain 
values, ideals, people, qualities matter to us in virtue of our specific social context, 
and these move and grip us accordingly. The values of individual freedom and 
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equality, the threat of nuclear war, the possibility of poverty, the aspiration to 
celebrity, are all things that can matter to us, here and now in the West, that could not 
have mattered at other times and places. Conversely, the values of a warrior, the 
threat that the gods will withhold the rain or keep the sun from the sky, or the 
aspiration to symmetry of scarring on our bodies, cannot grip us in the way they 
might in societies in other places and times.19  
We might think of the fact that gender matters, and the particular way it does 
so, as being a good example of our societal attunement. In our society, gender is 
something that must matter to us in some way. We are moved in some way by an 
attunement to gender – it determines which possibilities show up and solicit us. For 
the most part this is implicit (and, as suggested, more powerful for this) – we are 
moved to sit in a certain way, to buy certain clothes and not others. From an early 
age, we are gripped by certain ‘gendered’ activities and values implicitly – outdoor 
physical activity or indoor craft; strength or beauty. We are moved to laugh at certain 
jokes, turn our heads at certain people, talk in a certain manner. Even the particular 
emotions we have or don’t have are guided by the way gender implicitly matters.  
At times this attunement to gender itself becomes slightly more explicit, as we 
feel ‘uncomfortable’ because of certain gendered situations, or at being asked to 
perform certain gendered actions or tasks – sitting or crossing my legs in this way or 
that might feel ‘weird’ or ‘unnatural’. This normally implicit attunement can be 
raised to the intensity of an explicit feeling or emotion, perhaps in the form of anger 
or embarrassment at having our gender mistaken, or pride or happiness at being told 
that one embodies a certain gendered attribute. For others, whose gender does not 
conform to general societal standards, the way that gender matters may be as an 
almost constant feeling of anxiety, stress, or sadness that grips them and moves them 
to avoid situations where gender is made manifest in some way. While still others 
may claim that the idea of gender, and thus their own gender, does not matter to them 
at all, this is something that they must be moved to assert, defend, or resolve upon in 
                                                        
19 This last point should be qualified, for what can matter is tied up with the way in which things 
can matter. Things such as the values of a warrior do not typically matter to us in Western 
society, but they are things that could minimally matter as objects of curiosity, or of educational 
interest. However, it cannot matter in the more significant way that it once did, or still does in 
other societies. For a discussion of the way our attunement is tied up with our specific society, 
and with its language in particular, see Mulhall (2002). His insights relate specifically to our 
explicit feelings, moods, and emotions, however I think they hold more broadly. 
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a way that one does not have to with the colour of our eyes or whether we’re right or 
left handed. Negatively or otherwise, our particular societal attunement is one in 
which gender must matter to us in some particular way. We might think of things like 
race and class, as well as countless other aspects of our lives from the mundane to the 
profound, as all being things that matter to us in some particular way, shaping the 
way in which we’re moved, in virtue of our particular socio-cultural situation here in 
the West. 
The ‘who’ of Dasein, while being constituted by the publicness of das Man, 
obviously also captures what constitutes me as a specific individual (which is part of 
what sustains and comprises this societal being). In our analysis of thrownness, we 
saw that this might be my particular race, gender, class, nationality. It might be our 
particular bodies, the state of health we find ourselves with. And it might include our 
upbringing – the particular values we grow up with, the practices and interests we are 
raised on, the particular people we are close to. As with our thrownness into a 
particular social context, these too can be seen in the way that we find things matter 
to us, the different things that touch and move us. We may find we are moved by 
particular values and not others - modesty, creativity, victory, meekness, toughness - 
that we might wish to explain through our upbringing, or just as a kind of 
‘disposition’ or style of character that we find ourselves with. This societal 
attunement is no less important in the kinds of self-understanding we characterized 
earlier – finding that medicine, socialism, and friendship matter to me depends upon 
the way that these things can matter in our particular society. Thus, as an ‘I’ in 
particular social world, I find myself gripped and moved in a wide variety of ways 
that are constitutive of who I am. 
All of these intensely varied and complicated societal and personal factors 
combine in order to produce an attunement to a certain self-understanding, a certain 
shape to what matters to me, that we might call our identity. Given the being of 
Dasein, we must remember that this identity is not a fixed substance, but is projection 
into a possibility, an ability-to-be (Seinkönnen) a certain way. It is that in the light of 
which existence shows up to us, that point on the horizon that we are drawn towards 
that determines the path before us. It is that which gives a certain direction to life, ‘an 
ability-to-be for the sake of which any Dasein exists.’ (SZ 336) in Heidegger’s words, 
which finds its basis in being moved to take up this possible way of being. We are 
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gripped and moved by a certain picture of life – it strikes us as important, valuable, 
worthwhile. As Taylor (1989) describes it, the answer to the question of who we are 
is provided by ‘an understanding of what is of crucial importance to us.’ (p27), what 
matters to us most – the particular relationships, activities, values, ways of life etc. 
that constantly grip me and shape the way existence appears to me. Existence shows 
up, grips, summons, and moves me on the basis of the way we are attuned most 
deeply that we can call our identity. 
 
Thrown into existence as such 
 
We have seen above in the analysis of our explicit feelings and emotions how our 
attunement makes manifest our existence as an ‘I’ in relation to a world and others. 
Myself, the world, and others always show up as mattering to me in particular ways, 
typically in line with our particular identities and the particular world that we find 
ourselves in. Thus it is hard to demonstrate how they must grip me ‘as such’ in a way 
that isolates our thrownness into Dasein as a condition of the possibility of being a 
particular ‘who’ at all. Again we can think to Heidegger’s invocation that the most 
powerful attunements are those that are typically less visible when thinking of the 
difficulty here. But we might here also think of certain situations where an 
attunement potentially appears to arise with no relation to, or against the grain of, our 
identities or societal attunements – awe and wonder at nature, or a feeling of ethical  
obligation that ‘breaks in on us’ as analyzed by phenomenological ethicists like 
Levinas or Løgstrup20for example. Importantly, apart from these situations as I shall 
show in chapter four, certain ‘fundamental attunements’ for Heidegger like anxiety or 
boredom make this affective relation of an I to a world and others as such starkly 
clear. 
                                                        
20 It is clear that Heidegger thinks others must matter to us in some way or another, even when 
they apparently ‘don’t matter’: ‘ontologically there is an essential distinction between the 
‘indifferent’ way in which Things at random occur together and the way in which entities who 
are with one another do not “matter” to one another.’ (SZ 121) The extent to which Heidegger’s 
thought itself points to a kind of ‘ethical’ attunement to others is contentious.  I follow the work 
of McMullin (2013) in thinking that Heidegger’s account contains within itself this ethical 
possibility, even if it was undeveloped by Heidegger himself. See also Raffoul & Pettigrew (2002) 
for a wide variety of further support (in particular the essay on our ethical attunement to others, 
‘Heidegger and the Question of Empathy’ by L. Hatab), and also Raffoul (2010). 
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While discussion of anxiety will wait until this fourth chapter, one further 
aspect of our thrownness has yet to be discussed and illustrated in our analysis of 
attunement at all. In my analysis of how thrownness is manifest first-personally in 
our attunement, I have yet to mention the important idea of the enigma of Dasein – 
the basis that Dasein ‘is’ that shapes what is ahead, which is always in some way 
beyond us, never to be grasped or captured. We might think that there is something 
enigmatic about our intense, explicit attunements. When we feel anger, or romantic 
love, we might think that there is something enigmatic about the feeling in that it 
never seems to be fully captured by our descriptions or our actions. In so far as we 
are in the grip of the feeling, there is a kind of inexhaustibility to it. As the annals of 
poetry attest, our feelings, moods, and emotions seem to admit of endless 
interpretation, elucidation, and description. Despite the richness or clarity of 
expression that attempts to capture it, the feeling or mood is never exhausted – only 
further enriched. And it is something like this enigmatic character, we might think, 
that leads emotions to be described as ‘magical’, as in Sartre’s Sketch for a Theory of 
Emotions. However, to understand more clearly how this enigmatic character of our 
thrownness is manifest in attunement, we need to look to the particular way we find 
that things matter. 
As we have shown, the world shows up to us, grips and touches us, in a 
particular way that is constitutive of our identity. Particular things matter to us in a 
particular way that makes us who we are. However, we can see that beyond the 
particular way things matter, something else matters to us: it matters whether our 
lives are meaningful in a certain way. We care about having a meaningful existence. 
It matters to us that we don’t live in falsehood21, it matters to us that our lives are 
good. In some sense we care about what is meaningful, what is true, what is good. 
Yet what exactly is meaningful, what is true, what is good, is never settled. We need 
only think of Socrates and the aporia with which his discussions end for another 
perspective on the essentially enigmatic nature of what is true or what is good. The 
question is never resolved. Yet as Socrates’ relentless pursuit of the questions of truth 
and goodness also show, what is really meaningful, what is really good or true, is 
something that we are drawn to, something that moves us, in virtue of our being 
                                                        
21 Thought experiments like Nozick’s ‘experience machine’ and films like the Matrix or the 
Truman show rely on something like our caring about ‘truth’ for their effect. 
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human beings as such, notwithstanding our propensity to fall away from facing this 
enigma. I will now try and show provisionally, pending further discussion in chapter 
6, how we are fundamentally attuned to this enigma that we are always gripped and 
moved by, which in fact constitutes the meaning and ground of the particular things 
that grip as, as per the analysis of the enigma in the previous chapter. This ‘enigma’ 
is that which we might variously call the meaningful, the true, the good, and this 
polysemy is in fact further indication of the ultimately enigmatic nature of that 
towards which we are drawn.22 
As we saw in the first chapter, our lives, as projection into possibilities 
through and through, can be seen as the always provisional answer to the question of 
‘who I am’, or perhaps ‘how to live’. Our particular identity, our self-understanding, 
can be seen as the answer we are already giving to this question.Given that being (as 
Dasein) always means to be an ‘I’, the question of who I am can also be phrased as 
the question of ‘what it means to be’. If our projection into a particular identity can be 
seen to be an answer to this question, this must be on the basis of a kind of 
attunement to the question. We must be gripped by the question of who I am, what it 
means to be, to give a kind of answer. It must move us. But not just any answer will 
do. To spend our lives on an assembly line, in the grip of deception by the state, or 
abusing other human beings, would not be acceptable answers for most. It matters 
that my answer to the question of who I am is a meaningful one, a true one, a good 
one23. Just as our identity allows us to take a stance on particular questions of what is 
right, what is good, what is meaningful, so too then our identity itself can be seen as a 
provisional answer to the question of what is good, what is true, what is meaningful. 
To be drawn to this question, we must be attuned to it. 
Our attunement to this enigma of what is meaningful, what is good, what is 
true, can be seen to be the ‘meaning and ground’ of our particular attunements, 
allowing our particular attunements to be what they are, in a way that can be seen in 
the way these particular attunements grip us. By this, I mean that when something 
grips and moves us, it does so as ‘good’, as ‘right’, as meaningful. A possible 
                                                        
22 As Plato showed, the relation between these ideas, and which has ‘priority’ and is that in light 
of which the others are understood, is a hugely difficult question. More will be said about this in 
chapter five. 
23 Here and in what comes I follow Crowell (2013) in seeing Dasein as aiming at something like 
the Good which, again, will be discussed further in chapter five 
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project, or understanding of the world, or way of relating to others solicits and 
summons me in virtue of its showing up as ‘good’, or ‘right’ and it is in virtue of not 
appearing meaningful, good, or true, that other possibilities don’t grip us or don’t 
show up as affecting us at all.  
This attunement is perhaps more visible as the possibilities that matter to us 
become subject to change. It is in virtue of our constant draw to this ‘beyond’ that 
what matters, and thus possible ways to be, come and go. For example, if we are 
gripped and solicited by two particular possibilities that conflict such that they raise 
an explicit question to us, we ask which possibility is ‘best’. What is the ‘right’ thing 
to do? Equally, our attunement to this idea of what is good or true as that in the light 
of which particular attunements have their hold can be seen when we think about 
cases when what matters to us at the fundamental level of our identity changes. It is 
our attunement to this enigmatic beyond that remains, as particular attunements are 
put in question and alter. We might think of our younger selves here, and how what 
mattered then is substantially different to what matters to us now. Who we are, or 
what it means to be, is very different now.  And these different possible ways of 
being show up in the light of our attunement to the good, or the meaningful – what 
matters now shows up and draws us as ‘better’, as ‘more meaningful’, or at least 
‘more true’ than what mattered to our younger self which fails to move us any longer.  
Through all the particular possibilities that matter to us, it is ultimately this enigma of 
what is meaningful, what is true, what is good, that grips and moves us. The attempt 
to answer the question of who I am, what it means to be, or how to live, is that basis 
that we remain oriented towards, in the light of which the particular way we are 
attuned changes. 
The grip of this enigma itself, as with our grip as an I in relation to others and 
a world as such, is difficult to see in isolation, as it is always instantiated in some 
particular way that existence matters. As I will argue in chapter four, as with the other 
aspects of Dasein’s being as such, the power of the grip of this enigma beyond us can 
be felt in breakdown situations like anxiety. But despite its difficulty to isolate, it is 
nonetheless this grip by the enigmatic beyond which gives power to the grip of all the 
particular things that matter to me. The particular way the world matters to me 
matters as true, as meaningful, as good, and this is what gives the particular shape its 
power and hold on me. It is in virtue of the submission to this that other things have 
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their grip on me. It would be easy to change what matters to me if it didn’t have the 
character of being meaningful, good, or true. This gives it its force. This is even more 
apparent if we imagine trying to change the way someone else is gripped and moved 
– it is because racist ideologies or acts of violence, for example, grip and move the 
other as true, as meaningful, as good, that they are so intransigent. And it is from this 
enigmatic beyond that the power of our thrownness comes. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have illustrated phenomenologically how our thrownness is 
disclosed to us first-personally through the passivity of attunement. We saw how 
disclosure for Heidegger was first-personal, applies to the whole of existence, and 
admits of both pre-reflective and reflective forms. In contrast to a prevalent 
interpretation in the secondary literature, I showed how attunement for Heidegger 
includes our everyday feelings, moods, and emotions. I showed how the movement 
of thrownness is manifest in the way that affects grip us and move us to take up 
certain possibilities – the ‘submission’ felt in attunement reveals the ‘submission’ of 
thrownness. Here, the way the world and our engagement with it are so thoroughly 
shaped by the grip of our affects revealed starkly how pervasive and powerful our 
thrownness is. The grip and power of thrownness is of a kind with our most intense 
feelings, moods, and emotions. The thorough grip of our thrownness was realized as I 
showed how this attunement is in fact constant, doing its work for the most part 
without our being explicitly aware of it. The features displayed in our explicit 
affective experiences in fact underlie our entire being-in-the-world, despite these 
features being less visible.  
We saw that as a necessary condition of our existence as projection into 
particular possibilities, existence must always already matter to us in particular ways 
that are shaped by our society, our upbringing, and various other factors. As long as 
we exist, we find ourselves already moved by possibilities, already gripped by certain 
people, values, projects etc. that shape and are shaped by the world we find ourselves 
in. Here, the pervasive power of our thrownness can be seen starkly. We always 
already find ourselves gripped by a certain shape of existence that has a hold on us, in 
the light of which all possibilities show up to us – we ‘see’ the world in a way 
determined by our thrownness, as the possibilities that show up to us are determined 
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by our attunement. Our society, our bodies, and our upbringing, for example, all 
shape the possibilities we already find ourselves gripped by. I argued that the 
particular way I find that existence matters gains its meaning as a provisional answer 
to the question of what it means to be meaningful, good, or true. This is the enigma 
that, as an I in relation to a world and others, I am always attuned to.  To find 
ourselves thrown then, is to always already find ourselves gripped by a certain vision 
of what is meaningful, what is good, what is true. It is through the power of this 
attunement that all particular possibilities matter to me as they do. I always already 
find myself moved down a particular path that strikes me as the right one. 
Having seen how our thrownness is experienced first-personally in the way 
that I am always already gripped and moved by affective experience, we can now 
look to the possibility of becoming responsible in light of this. Having seen through 
our examination of affective experience how tightly and pervasively this thrownness 
grips us, the next chapter will examine in more detail how the traditional model of 
responsibility – which centres on the power and agency of the subject – is threatened 
by this picture. 
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Chapter Three - Clarity, Confidence, and Covering Over Anxiety 
 
As Francois Raffoul’s The Origins of Responsibility shows, in the Western 
philosophical tradition the idea of responsibility has been ‘identified with the position 
of a power, of a sovereign agency’ (2010 p6). Responsibility is identified with what is 
‘up to us’, what comes under my ‘sphere of control and power’ (2010 p23). I am 
responsible for my conduct and not yours, for pushing someone but not falling into 
them, for the way I dress but not for how tall I am, because the former in each case is 
within my power, while the latter is not. It is because I made my bed, so the saying 
goes, that I must sleep in it. 
As Raffoul goes on to show, this idea can be seen to have its origins in Aristotle’s 
identification of responsibility with the ‘voluntary [hekōn]’ (2010 p39-40). What is 
up to us is what we do voluntarily. This voluntary - that which is within our power or 
control - is understood in Aristotle’s work through the idea of decision or choice 
(‘prohairesis’). The idea of responsibility thus becomes identified with that which the 
subject can control through free choice (with ‘freedom’ typically construed as the 
ability to do otherwise). Proponents of such a view might argue that those moments 
we all face in our lives of having to choose, to decide which path to take, are in fact 
the decisive moments in our lives. These moments are where we take control, and 
shape the direction our lives go in. It is through these moments of choice that we take 
responsibility for our being-in-the-world. As in this view’s zenith in Sartre, one might 
suggest that in fact our whole lives are constantly open to such choosing. The 
emotions we have, the relationships we engage in, the projects we pursue, are subject 
to our choosing, and so are ‘up to us’. We are responsible for every aspect of our lives 
because we can control each aspect through choice. Rather than drifting along 
wherever the wind takes us, taking responsibility for our being-in-the-world requires 
taking command of our lives by exercising our control through free choice to the 
greatest degree possible.  
Moreover, this appears to find support from Heidegger specifically with respect to 
attunement, which initially seemed like a threat to our mastery. For Heidegger, it 
appears, we are able and in fact obliged to master our attunement: 
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Factically, Dasein can, should, and must, through knowledge and will, become 
master of its attunement; in certain possible ways of existing, this may signify a 
priority of volition and cognition.(SZ 136) 
Heidegger’s talk of Dasein’s ‘freedom for choosing itself’ (SZ 188) and ‘deciding 
for a potentiality-for-Being’ (SZ 268), if these terms are understood in the same 
way that they are taken up by Sartre, can appear to lend support for reading 
Heidegger in this way. 
Heidegger’s refinement of these terms in Being and Time and other works 
speaks against such a Sartrean understanding1. But what we have already seen 
about attunement shows that this cannot be Heidegger’s position. Sure enough, as 
the quote about mastery continues: 
we must not be misled by this into denying that ontologically attunement is a 
primordial kind of Being for Dasein […] And furthermore, when we master 
attunement, we do so by way of a counter-attunement [je aus einer 
Gegenstimmung]; we are never free of attunement. (SZ 136) 
For Heidegger, any control over the affective aspect of our existence must come from 
another affective aspect. Control is not simply something one exercises over against 
attunement; rather, any control is itself dependent upon and bound up with 
attunement.2  
As proposed through the phenomenological analysis of the last chapter, 
thrownness is manifest in the affective aspect of our first-personal experience, our 
                                                        
1 See, for example, Heidegger’s disavowal of freedom conceived as ‘liberty of indifference’ (SZ 
144) and his endorsement of freedom as really being inclined to something to the greatest 
degree (such as the good, following Descartes and ultimately Augustine): GA 17 as referenced in 
Han-Pile 2013. This will be discussed again in chapter six. 
2I think it is reasonable to suppose that the attunement that we are factically obliged to master is 
our explicit feelings, moods, and emotions, given that it seems unlikely to have a ‘factical’, i.e. 
ontic, obligation with respect to that implicit, background attunement that we are generally not 
conscious of (see Crowell 2015 for agreement on this point). 
It makes more sense to read the ‘counter-attunement’ as this implicit background attunement, 
with its background nature allowing it to appear to us that cognition and volition have priority. 
Additionally, it seems phenomenologically infelicitous to suppose we master one explicit feeling, 
mood, or emotion on the basis of another.  
This lends further support to reading attunement as capturing our everyday feelings, moods, and 
emotions as well as this implicit affective background. If only an implicit background was meant, 
this passage would be very difficult to make any sense of. 
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attunement. There, I suggested that the pervasive power of our attunement was a 
threat to the traditional model of responsibility conceived as the mastery and control 
of the subject, as outlined above. In this chapter, I will aim to show how and why this 
is the case by showing how any ‘mastery’ in fact finds its basis in attunement, and 
ultimately showing how our attunement undermines seeing the subject as site of 
control or mastery. In order to help do this, I will appeal to the later work of Harry 
Frankfurt, which I will show converges with Heidegger’s account in important 
respects. In spelling out more explicitly what appears to be implicit in Heidegger’s 
work, Frankfurt’s work will be utilized to show how control, conceived as choosing 
alone or as choice guided by rational deliberation, cannot be the model for taking 
responsibility for our being-in-the-world. 
Next, I will look to Frankfurt’s own alternative proposal given the similarities 
with Heidegger’s view. Initially this fit with Heidegger’s work seems all the more 
promising, given that Frankfurt’s suggested model of a kind of wholeheartedness 
might be thought to mirror Heidegger’s own idea of ‘resoluteness’ with which taking 
responsibility can be identified. But by looking to Frankfurt’s account, I will argue 
that this model too is unsuccessful. As well as failing by our everyday understanding 
of what taking responsibility looks like, I will begin to show – through the idea of 
anxiety - how Frankfurt’s account undermines itself, pointing to the importance of 
Heidegger’s distinctive ontology for understanding responsibility  
 
Frankfurt Contra Choice and Rational Deliberation 
 
We shall primarily be looking at two works from Frankfurt: his 1988 essay ‘The 
Importance of What We Care About’ and his 2004 book ‘The Reasons of Love’. 
While their aims, styles, and philosophical backgrounds differ markedly, the 
convergence between Frankfurt’s work and elements of Heidegger’s analysis is 
pronounced.  The key point of overlap for our purposes here involves 
Heideggerian attunement, as outlined above, with Frankfurt’s analysis of caring. 
Note that hereafter when talking of care, I will not be talking about Heidegger’s 
use of ‘Sorge’ to designate the structural totality of Dasein, but rather Frankfurt’s 
idea of care which is more in keeping with our everyday understanding of the 
term. 
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Frankfurt’s idea of care overlaps with attunement conceived in terms of 
‘mattering’. In the ‘The Importance of What We Care About,’ Frankfurt characterizes 
the domain of his investigation as concerning ‘what is implied by the fact that we are 
creatures to whom things matter’ (1988 p80).3 The overlap with attunement is seen 
further as Frankfurt goes on to explore ‘love’ as an ‘especially notable variant of 
caring’ (2004 p11). In keeping with our characterization of attunement as including, 
yet going beyond, explicit feelings, moods, and emotions, for Frankfurt ‘it is not 
among the defining features of love that it must be hot rather than cool.’ (2004 p42) 
That is, while love is often experienced as an intense feeling or emotion, this is not 
necessary for it to be love. 
In fact, again in keeping with our picture of Heideggerian attunement, what is 
characteristic for love, and for caring in general, is the way that it orients and moves 
us: it is ‘that with reference to which the person guides himself in what he does with 
his life and conduct’ (1988 p82). What someone cares about is ‘that by which he 
moves himself’ (1988 p84), and caring ‘consists in guiding oneself along a distinctive 
course or in a particular manner’ (1988 p83). 
Moreover, just as for Heidegger having some kind of attunement is a necessary 
condition of meaningful experience, so in Frankfurt we find a picture of caring that is 
surprisingly akin to this phenomenological transcendental kind of explanation. Caring 
is an ‘indispensable condition’ for our engaging in worthwhile activity in the way that 
we do (2004 p58)4. Caring (in this instance, loving) ‘makes possible’ our having 
meaning in our lives (2004 p90). Most strikingly, caring about something for 
Frankfurt: 
bears not just upon the individual specificity of a person’s life, but upon its 
basic structure. Caring is indispensably foundational […] Regardless of how 
suitable or unsuitable the various things we care about may be, caring about 
something is essential to our being creatures of the kind that human beings are. 
(2004 p17) 
                                                        
3 For other uses of this term, see also Frankfurt 1988 p86, Frankfurt 2004 p22-23 
4 See also Frankfurt 2004 p54, where, through a discussion of boredom, caring about things is 
said to be necessary for differences to be noticed and distinctions to be made. 
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Thus, we can see the deep affinity between attunement as previously described and 
the idea of caring in Frankfurt. Given that Frankfurt sees, at least in part, his 
project as considering the implications of being creatures for whom things matter, 
it seems promising to turn to his work for elucidation of Heidegger’s claim that 
willing and thinking (‘volition and cognition’ above), as means of control, are 
always based in an attunement. In what follows, I shall generally use mattering, 
caring, and loving (as a specific type of caring for Frankfurt) interchangeably. 
Beginning with the idea of choice as control, with the help of Frankfurt I shall 
show how the idea of controlling the way we’re attuned is not the right way to 
understand taking responsibility. 
Before turning to the details of Frankfurt’s account, it is worth 
remembering that we have already seen how we must be attuned to possibilities for 
them to show up to us. They must matter to us, we must care about them, if they 
are to solicit us as possibilities to be taken up at all. We are always already drawn 
to particular possibilities that we are taking up, and typically this is not something 
we are aware of. The unthinking way we go about our daily tasks exemplifies this. 
However there are times when two or more possibilities pull on us in differing 
directions. In light of this, we might think that the pull of both possibilities on us 
becomes explicit, as we must make a choice or decision as to which to take up. 
Both the possibilities must matter and solicit us to some degree for the need for a 
decision or choice to arise in the first place. They must both already matter to us in 
a particular way for a decision to need to be made, in the way that no such need for 
decision shows up when a competing possibility doesn’t solicit us at all.  
But perhaps we might think that given the minimal condition of a 
possibility soliciting us to the degree that it shows up as a possibility in my world, 
we can then exercise our free choice among these possibilities to change the shape 
of our lives. As long as a possibility matters minimally enough to show up at all, I 
can then take control through my choosing.  
For Frankfurt, such a reading is misguided: ‘an exaggerated significance is 
sometimes ascribed to decisions, as well as to choices and to other similar “acts of 
will.”(Frankfurt 1988 p84) Frankfurt uses a paradigmatic example of such 
‘exaggerated significance’ to show how. By using the famous Sartrean example of 
the student torn between staying to help his mother and fighting with the 
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Resistance,  Frankfurt wishes to show that an act of will, a decision, is impotent 
unless it accords with what the agent really cares about, what matters to the agent. 
In accordance with the analysis given above, we might say that both 
possibilities must matter to the young man if the dilemma is to occur – if his 
mother or the revolution didn’t matter, no choice or decision would arise or be 
needed. The grip of what matters extends beyond this however. Attunement is 
more pervasive, and its movement doesn’t suddenly stop to open a neutral space 
for choice or decision. As Frankfurt explains it, if the young man in the example, 
asserting his freedom, declares that he is going to stay and help his mother, this act 
of choosing is not enough on its own to gain control of the situation. ‘When the 
chips are down’ for Frankfurt, the young man may find that he cannot bring 
himself to stay and look after his mother. He may find that instead, despite his 
‘deciding’, he is drawn to the opposite course of action. In such case, to say that a 
‘decision’ is made at all would be to reduce the act of deciding to a ‘merely verbal 
or intellectual event’ (Frankfurt 1988 p181). Actually staying and looking after his 
mother is only possible if it matters to him sufficiently, regardless of an ‘act of 
choosing’ to the contrary. In Frankfurt’s words: 
the resolution of the young man’s dilemma does not merely require, then, that 
he decide what to do. It requires that he really care more about one of the 
alternatives confronting him than about the other. (1988 p85 emphasis mine)  
Control with respect to the alternatives is not possible with an act of choosing or 
decision alone, and any power or mastery that a decision wields gains its weight 
from finding ourselves already caring about one possibility more than another. 
Or does it? We may say that what is missing from the Sartrean picture 
above is not mattering but reasons. The act of choosing or deciding is possible and 
is effective in gaining control because it is supported by reasons that I can 
deliberate on and judge between. Control is constituted by our reflective 
evaluation of the course of action to be taken; it comes from our ability to consider 
and evaluate potential reasons. It might be argued that the young man in the 
Sartrean example gains control of the situation by assessing the reasons in favour 
of the options available. It is assessing reasons that allows him to make a choice of 
one possibility over another and for this choice to be effective. It is in virtue of 
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reasons that I can make a choice, and therefore in virtue of reasons that I can take 
control and take responsibility for my being-in-the-world. 
The issue of what a reason is exactly is a vexed question with a deep 
history, and one that can hardly be treated adequately here. However, it is worth 
noting the following points, which I take to bear significantly on the suggestion 
that appealing to reasons is what allows choice, control, and so responsibility.  
The notion of a reason is conventionally linked with reason conceived as 
our faculty of rationality, our ability to think and judge rationally. So taken, it is 
rationality that sits as the basis of our control. It is from this that traction is gained 
to motivate and make effective control, including control of our attunement. We 
can take this to be at least part of what Heidegger is alluding to when he cites 
‘cognition’ as the apparent basis of mastering an attunement. On the basis of his 
analysis of care, Frankfurt can be seen to flesh out the Heideggerian claim – that 
this cognition itself finds its basis in attunement – in two ways. 
If one understands rationality as a pure faculty in contrast to, and separate 
from, anything like attunement – in the Humean vein, for example, as the ability to 
judge consistency of thought with itself and with other facts – then reason alone 
cannot serve as the ground of control, as it is too empty. In order to have any 
purchase, it must connect with something that I care about. Reason can appear to 
act as a basis for controlling my anger by showing that this anger is inconsistent 
with taking up my projects well. For example, by showing me that anger is 
detrimental to attending to my patients as a doctor, or that desiring the latest 
technology flies in the face of a commitment to social justice. But this can only act 
as a ground of control if being a doctor or social justice are things that matters to 
me, are things that I care about – and this because of caring about who I am more 
generally. The question of ‘why’ in relation to control, like the relentlessly 
inquisitive child, cannot be satisfied with appeal to pure formal reason but must 
sooner or later bottom out in finding something mattering to us: 
We need to understand, [...] that the ambition to provide an exhaustively 
rational warrant for the way in which we are to conduct our lives is 
misconceived. The pan-rationalist fantasy of demonstrating – from the ground 
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up – how we have most reason to live is incoherent and must be abandoned. 
(Frankfurt 2004 p28) 
Pure rationality so conceived is not sufficient for control for Frankfurt. Moreover, 
it is not what we tend to mean by talk of rationality and reasons in our everyday 
lives. In accordance with Heidegger’s methodology, this everyday understanding 
reveals something important. While it is common to think of reasons in relation to 
this purely formal idea, our normal talk of rationality in fact conceals within it 
implicit reference to what we care about. Frankfurt demonstrates this with 
reference to Hume’s famous claim that it’s not contrary to reason to prefer the 
destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger (2004 p45)5. 
Frankfurt claims that in our ordinary language, we would precisely import 
language of rationality to rebuke such a person, calling them ‘insane’ or 
‘unreasonable’. We would precisely say they lacked reason and were out of their 
mind. But here there is no inconsistency, no affront to rationality in its purely 
formal conception. The real issue here is that they are failing to care about 
something: the destruction of the world is failing to matter to them in the way that 
we believe that it should. 
This is indicative of the way that, for Frankfurt, reasons are in fact 
grounded in what we care about and not in a pure, disinterested rationality. A 
reason would not show up as a reason unless it connected in some way to what 
matters to me. For Frankfurt, this reflective process of deliberating and assessing 
that we identify with reasoning, with ‘having a reason’ to do something, is itself 
bound up with what we care about. Reasoning must ‘latch on to’ what matters if it 
is to gain any traction. Caring is a necessary condition of possibilities showing up 
to us; there is no ground for thinking that possible reasons for acting are any 
different, and our everyday experience seems to support this view. Going beyond 
Frankfurt now, here I think this can be seen in three ways. 
The first is considering what shows up as a reason for us when we consult 
our own experience. In cases where we stop and reflect about our reasons for 
acting, certain things show up as reasons and not others, and those that show up as 
reasons do so because they have a foothold in what really matters to us. A natural 
                                                        
5 See also the discussion in ‘Rationality and the Unthinkable’ in Frankfurt 1988 
89 
 
disaster might show up as a reason for me to go to work on my day off if I am a 
doctor, but not otherwise. The birthday of a close friend may show up as a reason 
to try and leave work early, while the birthday of a stranger will not. The former 
and not the latter show up as reasons for me because being a doctor matters to me, 
and because I care about my friend. It is only in virtue of this that they are reasons 
for me. Even the ‘coldest’ form of practical rationality, the kind espoused by 
‘game theory’, relies on self-interest as a kind of affective connection to one’s own 
life, the idea that one’s own (economic) gains and losses matter. 
The second type of case where this can be seen, perhaps even more starkly, 
is when trying to persuade another in some way. It is through appeal to what the 
other has an affective connection to, what matters to them, that this is done. If 
trying to persuade someone to vote for a political party, one might do so on the 
assumption that their own lives and their own children matter to them, and so 
appeal to ways in which these would be affected by certain parties. Alternatively, 
in trying to convince someone about an issue that doesn’t affect them directly, 
such as the plight of refugees, one might try and relate it to something that does 
matter to them – the ideal of fairness or justice perhaps. If this doesn’t matter at 
least sufficiently for it to become a reason, one might try and connect to what 
matters to the other through imagination: ‘how would you feel if it were you, or 
someone you were close to?’  Even the reasoning employed in a court of law in an 
attempt to sway a judge or jury can only hold in virtue of the law mattering to the 
judge or jury as something to be adhered to and upheld (whether this matters to 
them as such or only insofar as it comes from their particular role).  
Here we can see how reasons are grounded in our implicit attunements, that 
which matters. But we can how reasons are bound up with attunement more 
clearly when reasons are grounded in our explicit attunements, our feelings, moods 
and emotions. We can think of lawyers who might try and induce explicit 
attunements of sympathy, embarrassment, or pride for persuasion. In the same 
vein, we can think of the tactics used by a state to try and persuade a populace – it 
is commonly through appeal to the way our own safety and security matters to us 
explicitly in the form of fear. Here, we find support in Heidegger’s own discussion 
of oratory in Aristotle, which we are told involves bringing the listeners into a 
certain Befindlichkeit (BCAP p82-83): ‘Aristotle offers a clue regarding this, that 
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all judgements are not made in the same manner, for example, “when we are sad or 
are happy.”’ (ibid.)6 And this is the third way in which the way reasons find their 
basis in attunement can be seen – not in the implicit, background way that things 
matter as in Frankfurt, but in the explicit manifestation of this in our feelings, 
moods, and emotions. In these intense attunements where the feeling of what 
matters is magnified or intensified, so too are potential reasons. In such intense 
affective states, we are all surely familiar with how reasons can present themselves 
to us as such only to dissipate along with the feeling that brought them, as our 
reason to strike someone might fade with the anger it was grounded in, for 
example.  We can see that with these intense attunements we bring to the surface 
that which holds true of those less intense background attunements – that reasons 
always depend on, and are bound up with, attunement. Our failure to recognise this 
can be attributed to the fact that attunement is normally of this less sharp, 
background type. We typically do not even notice it at all, and thus it is difficult to 
see our reasons as grounded in it. Relatedly, this background attunement is 
generally much more stable than fleeting feelings and emotions, the changing 
nature of which allows us to see our reasons coming and going accordingly. 
None of this is to say that deliberative reasons are mere adornments to 
work that’s all done by our attunement, or that reasons are only a kind of post-hoc 
label that do no work at all. Our practical reasoning is not reducible to attunement, 
but nonetheless depends upon an attunement necessarily. All control depends upon 
and is already caught up with attunement, with what matters. 7 
We might take further support for this point by looking to Crowell’s work 
on Heidegger. Crowell is particularly relevant here because more than any other, 
his work has sought to place the idea of reasons and practical rationality in a 
Kantian spirit into Heidegger’s thought. In spite of his commitment to thinking 
Heidegger through the lens of reasons (in particular, as we shall see in chapter six, 
through the idea of reason giving), Crowell nonetheless recognizes that reasons 
                                                        
6 See also, with reference to Aristotle’s Rhetoric: ‘It is into such attunement and out of 
attunement that the orator speaks. He must understand the possibilities of attunement in order 
to rouse them and guide them aright’. (SZ 138-139) 
7 In chapter six I will present my positive account, which will begin to fill the explanatory space 
that reasons and reason giving might be thought to hold exclusively, but in which reasons can 
nonetheless find their place.  
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can only show up in virtue of our attunement, how we are disposed (as 
Befindlichkeit is often translated). Even in cases where ‘reasons’ apparently master 
(explicit) attunements, these reasons must themselves be grounded in an 
attunement: 
If I am finally moved to act “in spite of” the way I feel about things “because” it 
is what reason demands, this is possible only if I am so disposed that I can feel 
the weight of the reasons brought forward. (Crowell 2013 p202) 
Thought about in another way, as Crowell shows in various places (e.g. 2013, 
2013), reasons (as a type of understanding) are always only possible reasons. They 
are reasons in light of projection into a possibility. Yet, as we have seen, all 
projection finds its basis in attunement. A reason, as a possibility, must too find its 
basis in attunement as stated earlier. Practical rationality and the kind of control 
through choosing that it appears to give, finds its basis in our attunement, in what 
matters.8 
In looking to how our choice, decision, and practical rationality find their 
ground in attunement, I hope to have shown how any control, including control 
over our explicit attunements, must find its ground in that which we already find 
mattering to us. As Frankfurt puts it, the things someone cares about: 
guide and limit his agency. They determine what he may be willing to do, what 
he cannot help doing, and what he cannot bring himself to do. They determine 
[…]what he may be willing to accept as a reason for acting, what he cannot 
help considering to be a reason for acting, and what he cannot bring himself to 
count as a reason for acting. In these ways, they set the boundaries of his 
                                                        
8 It follows that it is not just practical rationality that finds its basis in attunement. All rationality, 
and all thought for Heidegger, as a possibility, must find its basis in attunement: 
‘Yet even the purest theoria has not left all attunement behind it; [...] Any cognitive determining 
has its existential-ontological Constitution in the Befindlichkeit of Being-in-the-world; but 
pointing this out is not to be confused with attempting to surrender science ontically to ‘feeling’. 
‘(SZ 138) 
This is even true for something like formal logic. Here, Heidegger’s texts on Aristotle are 
particularly relevant as part of Heidegger’s work here, as Caputo puts it, is to show how 
Aristotle’s theoretical philosophy is grounded in his practical philosophy (Caputo 1994).  
 
92 
 
practical life; and thus they fix and shape his shape as an active being. (2004 
p50) 
What matters to us, what we care about, shapes all that we can be said to ‘do’. The 
particular possibilities of reasoning, choosing, and deciding all gain their impetus and 
weight from the way we are attuned. Attunement is pervasive. It is not something that 
stands over and against our faculty for thought, choice, or decision that can be 
dominated, but rather is constitutive of such thought, choice or action. In Heidegger’s 
words, the way we find ourselves attuned:  
is not – is never – simply a consequence or side-effect of our thinking, doing, 
and acting. It is – to put it crudely – the presupposition for such things, the 
‘medium’ within which they first happen.’ (FCM p67-68) 
But where does this leave us in our investigation of how it is possible to take 
responsibility for our being-in-the-world? We turn now to consider Frankfurt’s 
idea of ‘clarity and confidence’ as a model of responsibility in light of these 
considerations. 9 
 
Clarity and Confidence 
 
If all control is dependent upon what we care about, dependent upon a particular 
attunement, how do we stand in relation to what we care about? For Frankfurt, we 
can have some control over what we care about, over this deeper background 
attunement: 
                                                        
9 Frankfurt does not talk explicitly in terms of responsibility or taking responsibility here, 
however Frankfurt’s discussion fits naturally into our debate, and his purported solution, as we 
shall see, seems to capture some interpretations of authenticity in Heidegger which are taken to 
express what we would call taking responsibility. In addition, Frankfurt’s own positive 
contribution seems to be an extension of the idea of responsibility expounded in his early work. 
There, responsibility concerned particular actions, and an agent is responsible if their grounds 
for acting accord with their own will, regardless of whether they could have acted otherwise (as 
argued for by Frankfurt through so called cases of ‘over determination). It is a sort of 
identification with the action that makes one responsible, the fact that the act is an expression of 
will, not the ability to have done otherwise. Here, what is required is equally a kind of 
identification with oneself, a kind of expression of this ‘deep self’’ throughout one’s existence. 
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What a person cares about, and how much he cares about it, may under certain 
conditions be up to him. It may at times be possible for him to bring it about 
that he cares about something, or that he does not care about it, just by making 
up his mind one way or the other. (2004 p45) 
That is, at times, we can choose to care about something, we can in some sense 
decide that something matters to us. While coming to care about something need 
not happen instantly in the manner in which we typically control our actions, it 
nonetheless seems to be something that we can sometimes do. For example, 
politics might be something that doesn’t really matter to me. However, in some 
thoughtful moment, perhaps after being provoked by a particular incident, through 
a process of consideration I conclude that I should care about politics; I might 
reason that I care about the suffering of other people and that my political 
involvement directly impacts upon that. The process is typically slow and gradual, 
as we steer ourselves by degrees towards something – I might start reading political 
posts on the internet, start watching the news, and in so doing come to develop a 
deep care about politics. In a more or less immediate and dramatic sense, then, it 
seems that I can control what I care about. 
Importantly however, this deeper level of control (deeper in the sense that 
what we care about is the condition of the possibility of particular acts and 
decisions) is itself only possible on the basis of already caring about something 
else. I can only come to care about politics on the basis that I already care about the 
suffering of others for example, or perhaps because I care about the opinions of my 
politically minded social circle. Control at this deeper level also requires a basis in 
a different way of caring, in another way of being attuned. 
And while this kind of control of what matters to us is sometimes possible, 
for Frankfurt we reach a point, a depth at which this is no longer the case: 
With regard to certain things, however, a person may discover that he cannot 
affect whether or how much he cares about them merely by his own decision. 
This issue is not up to him at all. (2004 p45, emphasis mine) 
For Frankfurt, while we can exert some influence over what we care about, we 
reach a kind of bedrock of caring, sometimes characterized by Frankfurt as the 
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particular variety of caring that we call love, which we cannot control. This is the 
foundation upon which all ultimately rests, the ground from which, and in the light 
of which, all else gets its meaning and import. 
So what is this bedrock of care and how does it come about?10 We find that 
we care about certain projects, people, values etc. in this way. This corresponds to 
what we earlier described as our identity, who we are – the foundational way in 
which I find existence matters to me that is constitutive of my self-understanding. 
We care about these things through no choosing of our own, but rather in virtue of 
the ‘exigencies of life’ (2004 p47) - ‘biological, psychological and environmental 
facts’ (2004 p27), here endorsing in some sense the relationship I have outlined 
between our thrownness (which might include such ‘facts’) and its manifestation in 
attunement (or what we care about, in Frankfurt’s terms). Despite their coming into 
being in this contingent way, it is these aspects of our lives that are most central to 
our identity. These ways of caring shape our experience of the world, and are that 
on the basis of which everything else we care about gets its significance and 
import: they are foundational to who we are.  Corresponding to the way that our 
identity can be seen as our answer to the question of who I am or what it means to 
be, for Frankfurt what we care about at this fundamental level amounts to nothing 
less than our answer to the question of ‘how to live’ (2004 p23).  
While we can exert some control over what we care about then, this control 
itself gains traction on the basis of some deeper way of being attuned. At this 
fundamental level, the way we are attuned shapes all that shows up to us. There is 
nothing outside of this attunement from which to gain traction to exert control over 
it. What we care about at the fundamental level is not within our power to change 
or control, since all possibilities of change or control show up in terms of what we 
already care about. So while we could gain control of some attunements by appeal 
to something that mattered to us more, there is nothing that matters more to us than 
these fundamental things we care about. The model of controlling our attunements 
through choice, then, and so taking responsibility with respect to them, cannot 
                                                        
10 Frankfurt at times seems to equate this bedrock with things that we care about in virtue of our 
being natural evolved organisms – we care about our lives, our health, our offspring, for example 
(and even about whether we relate to other people) (2004 p40, 45) However, he admits that it is 
possible for people not to care about these things in the way biology might appear to dictate 
(footnote to p45). It is noteworthy to remember in this respect that Heidegger conducts his 
ontological analysis under the rubric of ‘life’ in The Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle. 
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function at this most important level of who we are: our answer to the question of 
what it means to be is not subject to our choosing. Taking responsibility for our 
being-in-the-world then, cannot be seen in terms of taking control or mastery of 
this through choice, because this control is always dependent upon the way we are 
already attuned at the fundamental level. This grips me, and anything else that grips 
me must do so in terms of this. There is no ground, or reason, to try and change 
who we are or our answer to the question of how to live, since everything shows up 
in its terms. Choice, control, is only an expression of, and has no power with 
respect to, the answer to ‘what it means to be’ that we find ourselves thrown into. If 
responsibility is only to be understood as taking control through choosing and 
deciding, then we cannot be responsible for our being-in-the-world since we can 
exert no control over this at the foundational level from which our lives are shaped.  
For Frankfurt then, what is decisive for us is not having control with respect 
to the things we care about at the deepest level. This is not possible. What is 
required is not control, then, but rather ‘clarity and confidence’ (2004 p28). The 
essential task is ‘simply to understand what it is that we ourselves really care about, 
and to be decisively and robustly confident in caring about it.’ (ibid.)  What is 
required of us in relation to this deepest level of attunement is to be ‘wholehearted’ 
(2004 p95) in relation to it. As he puts it elsewhere, the task is to be ‘satisfied’ 
(2004 p94) or ‘relaxed’ (2008 p105) with ourselves at this deepest level. Thus 
taking responsibility will not consist in being able to control who I am, but in being 
confident in who I am, in affirming my real or true self. It is to identify with all that 
I am and presumably to accept what that entails. 
This idea of ‘wholeheartedness’ is how authenticity, and in particular the 
idea of ‘resoluteness [Entschlossenheit]’, is often read. And a Heideggerian 
account of taking responsibility is often thought to be constituted by, or to include, 
this idea of resoluteness, which is in fact pointed to by Heidegger’s own reading of 
Aristotle. In contrast to Raffoul’s translation of prohairesis as ‘decision’ from 
which the idea of responsibility as choice or control derives, Heidegger reads 
Aristotle’s prohairesis as a ‘taking hold [Zugriff]’ (BCAP p73), as being ‘resolved 
[entschlossen] that a matter be done thus and so’ (BCAP p97).  So understood, 
taking responsibility in the face of our thrownness requires, for Heidegger, this 
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same idea of wholeheartedness, clarity, and confidence that can be found in 
Frankfurt, as commentators like Carman suggest: 
Resoluteness means knowing confidently what one is about, which is a kind of 
certainty, or more precisely a noncognitive being-certain (Gewißsein) about 
oneself,[...] being fully resolved to oneself and one’s situation ultimately means 
projecting wholeheartedly. (Carman 2003)11 
This account of resoluteness still conforms to the traditional idea of responsibility 
as mastery and power of the subject (and on Heidegger’s reading, still conforms to 
Raffoul’s narrative of this idea’s origin in Aristotle), but does so in a way that 
differs from the idea that responsibility is to be found in control or choice. On this 
model, taking responsibility can still be seen as a kind of self-determination of the 
subject, but this no longer thought on the model of choosing and controlling. 
Rather, it is characterized in terms of the idea of being determined by one’s self (or 
‘true self’ or ‘deep self’ as it could be called) in contrast to being determined by 
‘outside’ forces such as other people and desires that aren’t part of one’s true-self. 
Responsibility as Heideggerian resoluteness is taking oneself as the standard or the 
law, having autonomy in this sense12, as opposed to being determined by forces 
exterior to this deep self, or heteronomy. Taking responsibility for our being-in-
                                                        
11 As I will argue in chapter five, McManus (2015) can be read as advancing this kind of account. 
For others, it seems that an idea of wholeheartedness plays some role, if not a central or 
sufficient role, in their interpretation of responsibility in Heidegger. Crowell, for example, 
approvingly cites Haugeland’s location of responsibility in the ‘existential commitment’ of 
resoluteness, but says that this aspect alone isn’t enough and that responsibility requires a 
discursive element (2013 p210-211). While Han-Pile’s account equates responsibility with 
‘choosing to choose’ as we shall see, at one point some idea of wholeheartedness is added that 
seems to be constitutive of this responsibility: 
‘In existentiell freedom , the choice of choosing oneself is made wholeheartedly in the sense that 
Dasein takes without reservation as much responsibility for itself as is allowed by its finitude and 
the relative degree of ontological transparency achieved.’ (2013 p304) 
12 Where the ‘self’ that is the law here is the deep self, contra Kant’s strict understanding of 
autonomy as governance by universal rationality. Frankfurt himself cites approvingly the notion 
of ‘autonomy’, and sees this as the right way to understand freedom (2004 footnote to p20). The 
current chapter’s story could perhaps be read through the lens of ‘freedom’ and its equation with 
responsibility. To be responsible is to be free, and while freedom has been thought to mean 
freedom of will, the ability to do otherwise, Frankfurt shows, mirroring his early work, that 
freedom in fact is an alignment with one’s will, or what one cares about. This too would accord 
with Heidegger’s belief (that freedom is not liberty of indifference, but finding oneself inclined in 
one direction. Importantly, as we shall see, Frankfurt’s reading supposes freedom is finding 
oneself ultimately inclined to the particular things I care about, in contrast to anything ‘beyond’ 
that. I will challenge this view in chapter six. 
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the-world on this reading means affirming our particular attunement, affirming our 
thrownness (as ‘taking over’ our thrownness might perhaps be read). 
 
Rejecting the Frankfurtian Account 
 
However, there are good reasons to reject this as an account of taking responsibility. 
The first point that may strike us about the idea of clarity and confidence is that it 
seems to make something like bloody-mindedness a virtue. It suggests that we 
acquire a kind of affective stamp in virtue of particular environmental and 
psychological factors - in virtue of our thrownness - and once we have this stamp, 
once we care about certain things and have clearly identified this, we are to 
confidently let it guide us through the world, reverting to its authority at every 
checkpoint. This picture presents the task of taking responsibility as a kind of 
obstinate affirmation of oneself, immune to any serious influence from the world and 
others. Responsibility simply requires looking deep inside oneself before ploughing 
head down into the world. 
It seems that Frankfurt himself is aware of this problem, as he feels the need in two 
separate footnotes to assert that his picture does not necessitate being stubborn: 
It is perhaps worth pointing out that being wholehearted does not entail having 
a closed mind. The wholehearted person need not be a fanatic. Someone who 
knows without qualification where he stands may nonetheless be quite ready to 
give serious attention to reasons for changing that stand. (2004 p95. See also 
p28) 
But it’s not clear on what grounds Frankfurt is able to make such a claim. As we have 
already seen, the things someone cares about at the fundamental level: 
determine as well what he may be willing to accept as a reason for acting, what 
he cannot help considering to be a reason for acting, and what he cannot bring 
himself to count as a reason for acting. (2004 p50) 
If this foundational affective lens through which the world shows up to us is 
determinative, it seems that anything that might threaten this foundation cannot even 
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show up for us in a way that could genuinely threaten it. In fact, Frankfurt goes even 
further to claim that what it means to care about something in this way means that we 
deliberately steer ourselves away from anything that might threaten this foundational 
caring and the action that results. The clear and confident agent: 
guides himself away from being critically affected by anything – in the outside 
world or within himself – which might divert him or dissuade him either from 
following that course or from caring as much as he does about following it. […] 
[He] suppresses or dissociates himself from whatever motives or desires he 
regards as inconsistent with the stability and effectiveness of his commitment. 
(1988 p87-88) 
Being ‘clear and confident’ or wholehearted, seems to involve steering oneself away 
from anything that might threaten our answer to the question of how to live, what we 
care about. 
A sense of the general problem can be shown here by looking to how it plays 
out in microcosm in the questions after a philosophy paper. I think we can 
differentiate between three types of comportment that the speaker takes. 
The first is when the whole experience is a one-way conversation. After 
presenting their thoughts, the speaker is blind to any kind of question or critical 
comment. The problems presented by the audience do not even show up to them. 
Despite an important point being suggested to them by several people, to the point 
where patience and politeness begin to wane, they remain impervious and 
impenetrable. The question is not understood, the import completely lost, as the 
speaker merely keeps repeating the same points already made in their paper in 
response. 
On an uncharitable reading, this is the kind of picture we get with Frankfurt’s 
clarity and confidence – once we are clear on what we care about, on who we are, we 
rigidly stick to it, ploughing through the world, head down, in the same way that the 
speaker does once they have come to their philosophical position. Like the speaker 
and their position, anything that might change what matters to us, what we care about, 
does not even show up to us. From this stance, only things that reinforce the position 
itself show up. 
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On a more charitable reading, we might try and take Frankfurt at his word. 
While it is not clear how it is possible given his other claims, we might allow that 
someone who is clear and confident about what matters ‘may nonetheless be quite 
ready to give serious attention to reasons for changing that stand.’ We can see this as 
corresponding to a different type of comportment toward the question and answer 
session. 
This speaker, after giving their paper, listens to and understands the questions 
given. They may even do so keenly, eager to grasp any potential problems their 
position may have. They listen to the questions, perhaps clarifying that they have 
understood the problem, before attempting to respond to them. In contrast to the 
previous kind of speaker, the criticisms and problems show up to them, and they 
show up as problems. However, they show up solely as things to be overcome. They 
show up as issues to be incorporated into, and never as genuine reasons to abandon, 
their position. The speaker’s end goal is unwavering – the destination on the horizon 
is fixed – they are a Heideggerian, or a naturalist, or a utilitarian. The criticisms show 
up and are given focus only to be co-opted into the direction of travel, never to 
change it. 
We can see this picture as corresponding to the most generous reading we can 
give of Frankfurt’s position given the other claims that he has made about being clear 
and confident. Many of us no doubt can recognize a tendency within ourselves to 
comport ourselves in this way – the way PhDs, research projects, careers etc. work, 
nurture precisely this tendency, a tendency that we shall be able to recognize later as 
what Heidegger calls our tendency to ‘fall.’ 
However, I think that we would all agree that this is not what philosophy 
genuinely demands of us; to really do philosophy surely demands being open to 
following new paths, to changing our position. While this Frankfurtian comportment, 
as seen in relation to philosophy, is certainly safer, more comfortable, less painful 
than the prospect of seeing hundreds of hours of work, thousands of words, endless 
energy ‘wasted’, it surely rests on the error of seeing oneself tied inexorably to a 
particular, foundational position. Were this the case, we might wonder how 
philosophy could get going at all. And we might think that here there is some 
connection between philosophy and our answer to the question of how to live. 
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This points us to a second way in which we might express the discomfort with 
Frankfurt’s picture of responsibility, which concerns the relationship between being 
clear and confident and the possibility of change; the nature of becoming. 
As we have seen, it seems that being wholehearted is to look deep inside 
ourselves, realize what matters to us at the deepest level and align ourselves with this, 
clearly and confidently letting this be our guide in the world. We have seen Frankfurt 
protest that this does not mean being closed off to things that may lead us to change 
our position, but given how things must show up in the light of the particular way in 
which things matter to us, and how we even actively divert ourselves away from 
anything that might threaten this, it is difficult to see how this could be true. This is 
confirmed when we look further to how Frankfurt characterizes becoming clear and 
confident or wholehearted with respect to the foundational care that Frankfurt here 
characterizes as love: 
But suppose that our love is so wholehearted, and that we are so satisfied to be 
in its grip, that we could not bring ourselves to alter it even if a measure by 
which it could be altered were available. In that case, the alternative is not a 
genuine option. (2004 p49, emphasis mine) 
This reinforces the idea that the possibility of change does not even show up for 
Frankfurt, but it also introduces another related point. While we are not given a 
detailed account of exactly how we become clear and confident, on Frankfurt’s 
characterization it seems to be a once-and-for-all event. We acquire a particular 
affective orientation to the world through certain natural and circumstantial means, 
and at some point in time we come to realize the foundational nature of this 
orientation and become confident in it. At this point, Frankfurt describes this as being 
akin to the kind of satisfaction achieved through the certainty of mathematics: ‘The 
issue is settled’ (2004 p65). This is no mere analogy, as we later see: ‘The 
wholehearted person is fully settled as to […] what he cares about.’(2004 p95, 
emphasis mine) The kind of picture Frankfurt has in mind is shown even more starkly 
in another section as he outlines what is required for us to be clear and confident in 
what matters. One such feature is that what matters does so for its own sake, and not 
instrumentally. If this was not the case, we could 
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never be genuinely satisfied by it, because it will always be unfinished. Since 
what it aims at is always a preliminary or a preparation, it will leave us always 
short of completion. (2004 p53 emphasis mine) 
Given this, it seems that being wholehearted in what we care about is for the matter to 
be finished, to be completed. We are no longer on the way, but have arrived.  
Such a picture bears an uncanny resemblance to a Hollywood narrative, in 
which an unhappy protagonist toils at their office job, strains to resist the romantic 
advances of their morally suspect co-worker, and all the while neglecting their family 
and their true creative passion. At last they come to realize that what really matters, 
what they really care about, is their family and their creative pursuit. This is who they 
really are, this is their real answer to the question of how to live. Finally clear and 
confident in this, they leave their unsatisfying job and the dark passions it threatens to 
facilitate, escaping to a new life by the coast to pursue their creative passion and 
spend time with their family. The decisive step has been taken and the audience is left 
safe in the knowledge that all is happy ever after. The issue is settled, and the 
audience is supposed to feel as Frankfurt at times describes the state of clarity and 
confidence itself – restful, relaxed, and satisfied. 
But we can surely not be wholly satisfied with this as a characterization of 
how we can stand in relation to what matters to us, as what taking responsibility 
means. Experience tells us that this is not the way life works. Perhaps if we reflected 
longer, we might even question whether this settled, satisfied stasis would be 
desirable. If our film’s protagonist remained affectively orientated in the same way 
despite a political crisis calling upon them to abandon their creative pursuit, or if their 
partner became a fervent advocate of the fascism at the heart of such a crisis , we 
would find their persisting confidence and clarity in what they care about troubling. 
Importantly, in this case and in the general way that Frankfurt’s picture 
presents one as closed off from threats or changes to what we care about, this does 
not seem to be what we would call taking responsibility – it looks more like its 
opposite. Taking responsibility in the case of the philosophy paper would surely 
amount to something more like acknowledging that the philosophical position is 
wrong before giving attention to the truth of the matter at hand and letting oneself be 
guided to a new philosophical stance. Or in the ‘Hollywood’ case, responsibility 
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might demand abandoning one’s creative dreams, confronting one’s spouse, and 
giving oneself over to the political effort that had previously left one unmoved. 
Following the method we have seen wherein the fundamental ontological level can 
always be seen manifesting itself in our everyday understanding, it is not clear how 
the idea of wholeheartedness, clarity and confidence, can be seen to lie at the bottom 
of these cases of taking responsibility as their meaning and ground. These worries 
problematize seeing wholeheartedness as capturing what taking responsibility looks 
like. Instead, Frankfurt’s model gives an undesirable and unlikely way of comporting 
oneself.  
 
Covering Over Anxiety 
 
It will be helpful here to look at what is motivating Frankfurt’s account in order to 
uncover the root of the problem, which will in turn point the way to prospective 
solutions. Frankfurt believes that accompanying the deep level of what we care about 
is a desire that we should relate to this ground with clarity and confidence, that is, 
wholeheartedly: ‘It is a necessary truth about us, then, that we wholeheartedly desire 
to be wholehearted.’ (Frankfurt 2008 p106) 
Yet we might ask how caring about whether we care confidently is possible. If 
the particular things we care about most deeply are the ground on which our life sits, 
if they determine how experience shows up for us and determine, as we have seen, 
what shows up as a reason or not, how could we not be confident with respect to 
them? Surely we could have no reason to not be confident in them if all reasons show 
up in the light of them. Put otherwise, how could we wish to be wholehearted and 
confident in what we care about at the deepest level unless this deepest level, what 
matters to us most, were vulnerable in some way? Why would we need to be 
confident in caring about these fundamental things unless there were the threat that 
they might cease to orient and impel us in our lives, unless what matters to us most 
might stop mattering to us? 
Frankfurt himself provides the answer for the question of how we can care 
about being wholehearted in describing the motivation of his project : 
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What presses us to inquire into them [the questions that find their answer in 
clarity and confidence] is not disinterested curiosity, or puzzlement, or wonder, 
or awe. It is psychic distress of another variety altogether: a kind of nagging 
anxiety, or unease. (2004 p4-5) 
The ground of Frankfurt’s project manifests itself in anxiety. Indeed, the threat of 
anxiety is mentioned several times throughout Frankfurt’s work as that which we are 
trying to avoid with wholeheartedness, with clarity and confidence. It seems that 
underlying Frankfurt’s picture, that which motivates the pursuit of clarity and 
confidence in what matters, is the constant threat of anxiety. 
What seems to underlie Frankfurt’s picture implicitly is the threat that what 
matters most, that which determines who we are, our answer to the question of how to 
live, is vulnerable. Even the affective grip that seems to tie us to our lives as a whole 
might in some way lose its hold. Frankfurt even begrudgingly admits (describing as 
typically pathological) that even our ‘innate’ care for our children and the 
preservation of our own life, this psycho-biological ‘fact’, can lose its hold (2004 
p84). 
But if this threat is always there, if it is possible that even those apparently 
foundational attunements can lose their grip, then none of them grip me with the kind 
of necessity that the idea of ‘wholeheartedness’ tries to suppose or impose. If this is 
the case, there is no firm bedrock of what we care about underlying our existence. 
There is no particular content that we are bound to ineluctably, no particular way that 
existence matters that is not vulnerable to change. Beneath the deepest particular way 
in which things matter, beneath the deepest attunement on Frankfurt’s story, lies what 
Heidegger calls the fundamental attunement of anxiety. What allows Frankfurt to 
describe what we are hoping for as ‘the more intimate comfort of feeling at home 
with ourselves.’ (2004 p5) is precisely what Heidegger calls the uncanniness, the 
‘unheimlichkeit’ or ‘unhomeliness’ of anxiety. 
As Frankfurt shows us, it is anxiety that lies at the basis of his account. But it 
is precisely the failure to acknowledge anxiety, and the vulnerability it reveals (as I 
shall argue in the next chapter), that leads to the aforementioned difficulties with 
Frankfurt’s position. It is anxiety that ultimately prohibits clarity, confidence, and 
satisfaction in the Frankfurtian vane. While his account depends upon, and in places 
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acknowledges, the way that even our deepest cares are vulnerable, his picture of 
wholeheartedness, of clarity and confidence, seems to be at odds with this 
vulnerability. His account seems to depend on suppressing this vulnerability and 
instead pretending that we can erect an immutable, solid foundation for ourselves if 
we so want. 
To believe in a fixed foundation of our lives, to try and stick rigidly to a 
particular way of caring, is to try and cover over the type of things that we are. For 
Heidegger, as we shall see, it is the fundamental attunement of anxiety which makes 
the kind of beings that we are starkly manifest to us. It is in light of this that taking 
responsibility for our being-in-the-world is to be found. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued why the traditional model of responsibility as the 
mastery or control of the subject, whether in the form of choosing or deciding, or as a 
kind of self-determination or autonomy, are not viable models for taking 
responsibility in the light of the thrownness that is disclosed in our attunement. 
Having already shown how all projection was necessarily grounded in 
attunement in the previous chapter, I looked to a similar model of what matters to us 
in the work of Harry Frankfurt. In conjunction with Frankfurt, I argued in greater 
detail to show how any control, whether this was thought to be grounded in reasons 
or in a kind of pure choosing or deciding, had its ground in attunement. Ultimately 
choice, reasons, and control are grounded in the attunement that grips us already in 
virtue of our thrownness. Thus seeing responsibility as taking control of our 
thrownness is illusory, since the weight and power of this control comes from our 
thrownness itself. 
Next, we looked to an account of taking responsibility found in the work of 
Harry Frankfurt, a variety of which some have read Heidegger as advocating. There, 
taking responsibility is seen as becoming wholehearted in our attunement, having 
clarity and confidence with respect to what we care about. I argued that such a model 
was undesirable, unlikely, and ultimately could not be seen to constitute the meaning 
and ground of our everyday understanding of taking responsibility. It was seen that in 
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fact anxiety lies at the basis of Frankfurt’s work, albeit in a way that his account 
sought to cover over or turn away from. 
For Heidegger in the experience of anxiety we face up to the mode of being of 
human existence, as I shall show in the next chapter. In contrast to Frankfurt’s 
account – whose failure lies in covering over the insight anxiety yields, and so 
covering over our mode of being – I shall aim to explicate what anxiety reveals and 
give an account of taking responsibility that is sensitive to this, and thus sensitive to 
the mode of being of Dasein that we find ourselves thrown into.  
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Chapter Four - The Meaning of Anxiety 
 
 ‘I can very well think what Heidegger meant about being and anxiety.’1 This, so the 
story goes, is one of only two of Wittgenstein’s comments on Heidegger’s thought. It 
is perhaps little surprise that it is Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety that would capture 
one’s attention, as for Heidegger it is through the affect of anxiety, and not through 
our cognitive powers, that we get an experience of ‘being as such’: 
Earlier, in analyzing Descartes’s concept of the subject, I referred to his 
statement that we actually have no affection of being as such. But there is such 
an affection (if one wants to use this mode of expression). Anxiety is nothing 
other than the pure and simple experience of being in the sense of being-in-the-
world. (HCT p291) 
In Being and Time anxiety is described as an experience in which ‘the structural 
totality of [our being]… come[s] to light in an elemental way’ (SZ 182), in which the 
central fundamental aspects of our existence are made manifest. To add to this 
striking claim about the ontologically disclosive capacity of a feeling of anxiety, it is 
anxiety that can offer the possibility of existing in a way that is eigentlich, authentic. 
When  brought face to face with our being, the possibility of acknowledging and 
living in the light of this being, the possibility of authenticity, is presented, in contrast 
to a way of living that forgets or flees from our being: ‘the possibility of authenticity 
and inauthenticity, is shown, with a primordial, elemental concreteness, in anxiety.’ 
(SZ 191) What it really means to be Dasein is made manifest in anxiety, and it is by 
living in the light of this that one can be authentic. For this reason, Heideggerian 
accounts of authenticity often take their cue from anxiety2. What it means to be 
authentic, and so by inclusion responsible on the understanding outlined in the 
                                                        
1 Quote of Wittgenstein’s to Schlick and Waismann dated December 30th, 1929, in Waismann 
1979 
See ‘Wittgenstein on Heidegger and Cosmic Emotions’ (Marion  2014) for discussion of both of 
Wittgenstein’s comments on Heidegger.  
2Whether primarily (Han-Pile 2013, McManus 2013), or in conjunction with other aspects of 
authenticity (see, for example, Crowell (2013) who sees the call of conscience as adding the 
decisive element of ‘discourse’ to the idea of authenticity and responsibility, or Guignon (2013) 
for whom a confrontation with one’s own death is required in addition to anxiety in his account 
of authentic existence.)  
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introduction to the thesis, will depend upon the insights that are given in anxiety and 
the way that these insights are taken up.  
In this chapter, in contrast to accounts that see anxiety as opening up a ‘space’ 
for the traditional model of responsibility by viewing anxiety as providing a kind of 
break with one’s thrownness, I will argue that there is no such break. I will show how 
Heideggerian anxiety instead makes us face up to the grip of our thrownness. I will do 
this by focusing on the affective experience of threat that is constitutive of the 
experience of anxiety which – surprisingly – has been neglected. 
With this focus, I hope in addition to remedy a worry that arises from 
Heidegger’s characterization of the relation between fear and anxiety. I argue that we 
are presented with a false dichotomy between an extreme kind of fear and what I shall 
call Heidegger’s ‘radical’ anxiety – a dichotomy in which our everyday experience 
and understanding are missed. This importantly runs counter to Heidegger’s general 
phenomenological approach, and threatens the plausibility and accessibility of his 
account of anxiety and the ontological insight it apparently yields.  
I will begin by outlining this problem, before then focusing on radical anxiety. 
To understand this problem, it is useful to turn back to the problems with Frankfurt’s 
account of responsibility as wholeheartedness in the previous chapter. 
 
Fear, Anxiety, and the Absence of the Everyday 
 
In the last chapter, we saw how Harry Frankfurt’s conception of care shared many 
key features with Heidegger’s analysis of attunement. We looked to Frankfurt to 
elucidate why our attunement threatens the idea of control through choosing as a 
model of responsibility. 
We saw that we cannot change or control the way we’re attuned at the level of 
who we are, from which our thoughts and deeds spring, as any control necessarily 
presupposes and is shaped by these very attunements. In the face of this, Frankfurt 
suggested that what is important in relation to these ways we find existence mattering 
is not being able to control or change them, but rather to be clear and confident, or 
wholehearted, in relation to these attunements. I argued, however, that this resulted in 
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a problematic picture in which bloody-mindedness was a virtue, and the possibility of 
what matters to us changing was foreclosed. 
I traced the significant divergence between the Heideggerian and Frankfurtian 
pictures to the attunement of anxiety. It was contended that the experience of anxiety 
and the ontological insight it affords speak against the Frankfurtian picture. It is 
anxiety that prevents our being clear and confident, that prevents (as Frankfurt 
variously described it) our being restful, satisfied, and at home with ourselves. 
Support for the significance of anxiety was taken to be found in the fact that Frankfurt 
himself acknowledges anxiety as a motivating factor for his project – a motivation for 
our striving to become clear and confident with respect to our deep attunements. I 
argued that despite Frankfurt’s having to acknowledge the attunement of anxiety, it is 
ultimately the suppression of this anxiety and its ontological insight that leads to the 
problems with his account. The implication was that to avoid this problematic picture, 
and ultimately to understand what taking responsibility means in the face of our 
attunement, the fundamental attunement of anxiety must be heeded.  
A kind of ‘confirmation’ of the importance of anxiety was taken to lie in its 
appearance in Frankfurt’s own work as that which motivates the search for clarity and 
confidence. The presence of the very thing in Frankfurt’s own work which, on a 
Heideggerian analysis, in fact undermines that work seemed to attest all too 
triumphantly to the Heideggerian picture.  In having to acknowledge anxiety as a 
feature of our experience, it can be suggested that Frankfurt affirms the Heideggerian 
picture in spite of himself. But the question arises of whether anxiety in Frankfurt is 
the ‘very thing’ that ultimately shows his account to be untenable. More simply, in 
talking about anxiety, are Frankfurt and Heidegger talking about the same thing? In 
accepting the experience of anxiety, is Frankfurt accepting the same experience 
whose analysis by Heidegger might undermine Frankfurt’s account? 
The minor significance Frankfurt attributes to anxiety means that we are told 
very little about what he means by the term. In the several mentions of anxiety 
throughout The Reasons of Love, we are told only that it is ‘psychic distress’ (2004 
p5), and it is suggested that it is closely connected to ‘uneasiness’ (2004 p50). But 
while the minor significance attributed to anxiety partially accounts for the lack of 
Frankfurt’s explanation, perhaps a more important factor is that explanation is 
superfluous; we all know what anxiety is. It is a common kind of affective 
110 
 
experience, the kind we feel before an upcoming job interview, or upon learning that 
our loved one’s journey will soon come into dangerous weather. It is a kind of 
distress, unease, or discomfort characterized by worry or concern. 
We might be forgiven for thinking that our everyday familiarity with the idea 
of anxiety that Frankfurt naturally relies upon would guarantee that he and Heidegger 
are talking about the same thing. At the very least, from what we have seen of 
Heidegger’s method, we would expect that our everyday understanding of anxiety 
will form the starting point from which we go on to see this ontologically more 
significant understanding. We would expect to be shown how this radical, 
ontologically significant anxiety stands as the ‘meaning and ground’ of our everyday 
understanding, thus justifying the use of the term ‘anxiety’ to capture both3. However, 
as we shall see, Heidegger’s description of anxiety appears to depart radically from 
our everyday understanding, excluding all of the everyday examples of anxiety given 
above. Instead, for Heidegger, these would be captured by a different attunement that 
is commonly confused with anxiety (SZ 185), namely fear. In Heidegger’s 
characterization of these two affective experiences, I will argue that the important 
everyday phenomenon of anxiety is missed  
Heidegger begins his analysis of anxiety by way of illustrative contrast with 
the attunement of fear, stating that fear and anxiety are obviously ‘kindred 
phenomena’ (SZ 185) that are so close that ‘for the most part they have not been 
distinguished from one another’ (ibid.) 4. As I shall explore in more detail later, what 
appears to connect the two is that they are affective experiences of some kind of 
threat [Bedrohung] (e.g. SZ 140, 189). The crucial difference however, and the reason 
why the everyday examples of anxiety above cannot be anxiety for Heidegger, lies in 
that which makes us feel anxious and that which we feel anxious for; in other words, 
that in the face of which (Wovor) and that about which (Worum) we experience the 
threat. 
                                                        
3 Support for this idea can be found in Heidegger’s endorsement of the principle ‘a potiori fit 
denominatio’ (SZ 329), a favourite of Blattner’s (1999, p90). 
4 The distinction seems to have been taken from Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety: 
‘[anxiety] is altogether different from fear and similar concepts that refer to something 
definite, whereas anxiety is freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility.’ (1980 p42) 
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Any experience in which the threat comes from a particular entity within the 
world, be it a person or an object, is fear. In contrast, 
That in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world as such. What is 
the difference phenomenally between that in the face of which anxiety is 
anxious and that in the face of which fear is afraid? That in the face of which 
one has anxiety is not an entity within-the-world. […] This threatening does not 
have the character of a definite detrimentality which reaches what is threatened, 
and which reaches it with definite regard to a special factical potentiality-for-
Being. (SZ 186) 
Not only does the threat of anxiety not come in the face of any definite entity within 
the world, but it follows that it is also not a threat that applies to us in virtue of 
understanding ourselves in some particular way, in virtue of projecting into some 
particular possibility: 
That which anxiety is profoundly anxious about [Worum] is not a definite kind 
of Being for Dasein or a definite possibility for it.  Indeed the threat itself is 
indefinite, and therefore cannot penetrate threateningly to this or that factically 
concrete ability-to-be. (SZ 187) 5 
For Heidegger then, our examples of our everyday understanding of anxiety are ruled 
out as being ‘anxiety’. The threat from the interview (presumably the threat of failing 
or doing badly) arises within a definite context, as I apply for a particular job and 
wait in a specific room, etc. It can only threaten me insofar as the particular 
possibility of pursuing that career, and more broadly a certain self-understanding, is 
                                                        
5 Generally less emphasis is given in the secondary literature on the way that fear pertains to 
Dasein insofar as it understands itself in light of a particular possibility (the determinate ‘about 
which’ of fear). This might be because the contrast by Heidegger himself between fear and 
anxiety tends to focus on ‘that in the face of which’ anxiety arises. For example, after highlighting 
again the two structural moments of the ‘about which’ and ‘that in the face of which’ in 
contrasting the indefiniteness of anxiety to fear, Heidegger emphasizes that:  ‘In particular, that 
in the face of which one has anxiety is not encountered as something definite with which one can 
concern oneself’ (SZ 343). This may be because Heidegger wants to hold open the possibility of 
inauthentically relating to death by fearing it: fear for one’s life, while inappropriately conceiving 
death in some kind of innerworldly way as an object or event (SZ 254), nonetheless seems to 
pertain to Dasein as a whole in some way (albeit in a skewed way that fails to see Dasein as 
possibility) and not just insofar as Dasein understands itself in the light of some particular 
possibility. 
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one that I project into. Equally, the threat of harm to my loved one arises in relation 
to a specific being and a specific context, namely the loved one themselves and their 
dangerous journey, and threatens insofar as I understand myself in the light of a 
particular relationship to this loved one. Only to the extent that I encounter these 
specific entities in relation to a projection of myself into particular possibilities, can 
the threat arise and the attunement grip me. Given this determinacy, for Heidegger 
these experiences should be characterized as fear and not as anxiety. 
In contrast, for Heidegger neither ‘that in the face of which’ nor ‘that about 
which’ anxiety arises pertains to anything particular about me or the world. Rather, 
the threat is in the face of being-in-the-world as a whole and Dasein as ‘being 
possible’ as such. In anxiety, that in the face of which and that about which we are 
anxious coincide (SZ 188) and reveal Dasein as being-in-the-world as such. The 
threat doesn’t come from a particular entity but rather comes from ‘nowhere’ (SZ 
186) and threatens us not insofar as we are in any particular way but insofar as we are 
at all. We are anxious about being as such. Rather than arising from and pertaining to 
any particularity, all particular possibilities recede; entities are ‘not relevant at all’6 
(ibid.), the context in which they appear is ‘of no consequence’7 (ibid.). Rather, ‘the 
world has the character of completely lacking significance’ or meaningfulness8 
(ibid.). Given that, as being-in-the-world, we understand ourselves in terms of the 
possibilities afforded by the world, the complete insignificance of the world in turn 
means an inability to understand ourselves in any particular way. With the 
insignificance of the world comes the insignificance of all of our particular relations 
to it, to other people, and to the way we understand ourselves through these.  
Far from arising from and pertaining to anything specific, anxiety arises from 
no particular entity, concerns us in no particular way, but rather is an all-
encompassing threat that grips us from nowhere and renders all our particular 
projects and relations with the world and others insignificant in a particular way. It is 
in fact in virtue of this that anxiety is taken to be so important to yielding ontological 
insight: in the experience of anxiety, albeit in a ‘simplified’ and ‘elemental’ way (SZ 
182), Dasein is said to be brought before itself in its ontological structure, face to face 
                                                        
6‘ überhaupt […] nicht relevant ist’ 
7 ‘als solche überhaupt ohne Belang’ 
8 ‘völliger Unbedeutsamkeit’ 
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with the kind of being it is. Precisely ‘on the basis of this insignificance of what is 
within-the-world, the world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself.’ (SZ 187)  
I will return to the claims of utter or complete insignificance shortly, but for 
now it is enough to have seen that for Heidegger, the difference between fear and 
anxiety is that fear pertains to particular worldly possibilities whereas anxiety 
pertains to no such particular worldly possibilities or the entities and people that 
show up thereby: ‘Fear is occasioned by entities with which we concern ourselves 
environmentally. Anxiety, however, springs from Dasein itself.’ (SZ 344) This is the 
difference, the basis on which fear and anxiety are distinguished. In other respects 
they are apparently alike, ‘kindred phenomena’, which allows us to be introduced to 
anxiety via fear. As presented by Heidegger then, we are given a dichotomy: an 
affective experience of a threat is fear if it pertains to a worldly particular;9 it is 
anxiety if it arises from nothing in particular and in fact all particular possibilities and 
the entities and people these relate to sink into insignificance (SZ 343). 
With this distinction in place, it might seem that Heidegger is simply labelling 
our everyday, determinate anxiety ‘fear’, in distinction from radical, indeterminate 
anxiety. But it’s not clear that this is the case. If we look to Heidegger’s 
characterization of ‘fear’, we see that he is not capturing anything like our everyday 
sense of anxiety. This can be clarified by looking to the distinction between 
authenticity and inauthenticity that apparently tracks that between fear and anxiety. 
Anxiety brings us face to face with our being, and thus is linked to authenticity. 
Additionally, the resoluteness of authenticity is at times characterized as a ’readiness 
for anxiety’ (SZ 297)10. Fear, by contrast ‘is anxiety, fallen into the ‘world’, 
inauthentic, and, as such, hidden from itself.’ (SZ 189) Fear is inauthentic, an 
attunement that has apparently succumbed to the tendency to forget or flee the kind 
of being that we are.  
 This forgetting or closing off the kind of being that Dasein is (SZ 342)  
manifests itself in the ‘bewilderment’ and ‘losing our heads’ (SZ 144) characteristic 
                                                        
9 Heidegger does distinguish between different types of fear (If the threat is sudden it’s ‘alarm’, if 
the threat is from something unfamiliar it’s ‘dread’, if the threat is both sudden and unfamiliar 
it’s ‘terror’. Timidity, shyness, misgiving, and becoming startled are also given as variations of 
fear (SZ 142). These are subcategories of fear however, and the dichotomy between fear and 
anxiety still stands as presented above. 
10 This will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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of fear as Heidegger describes it. We fail to take hold of any particular possibility in 
panic, failing even to distinguish possible from impossible possibilities (SZ 342). We 
simply clutch at the first possibility to hand, as shown for Heidegger in the way that 
those escaping a house fire grab and save items of no import at all:  
When one has forgotten oneself and makes present a jumble of hovering 
possibilities, one thus makes possible that bewilderment which goes to make up 
the attunement-character of fear. (SZ 342) 
Additionally, he suggests that das Man ‘perverts anxiety into cowardly fear’ in the 
face of death (SZ 266), whereas ‘He who is resolute knows no fear; but he 
understands the possibility of anxiety as the possibility of the very attunement which 
neither inhibits nor bewilders him.’ (SZ 344) 
For Heidegger then, in the cowardly attunement of fear, we jumble salience, 
possibility, and impossibility in paralyzing panic that is expressive of covering over, 
fleeing, or forgetting our mode of existence as Dasein. In contrast, anxiety brings us 
face to face with the kind of being that we are, and apparently offers the possibility of 
courage and fearlessness. 
It is clear from this that Heidegger is not labelling our everyday understanding 
of anxiety as ‘fear’ – he is missing the everyday phenomenon altogether. When we 
talk about anxiety in our everyday sense, an experience of worry or concern over a 
particular threat, seldom, if ever, are we talking of an affective experience in which 
we are bewildered or panicked to the point of being disarmed in front of a confusing 
multitude of possibilities. Seldom are we talking about a state in which we disregard 
the kind of things that we are to the point that we fail to see possibilities as mutually 
excluding one another, and to the point at which the texture of salience is so jumbled 
or distorted that we can only grasp at the closest possibility to hand. We typically 
have not strayed so far from our own being when we talk of anxiety in an everyday, 
determinate way. My anxiety about my interview or loved one is not expressive of a 
failure to see that possibilities mutually exclude one another. Nor is my anxiety about 
my interview or loved one expressive of jumbling the importance of different 
possibilities - in these examples anxiety relates to things whose vital importance to 
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my world and self-understanding remains salient, whose importance is in fact 
expressive of the way that these particular possibilities exclude others. 
This is not to say that in this localized anxiety we ‘face up to’ or are 
confronted with the kind of thing that we are in the same way as in the radical anxiety 
characterized by Heidegger. But our everyday understanding of the experience of 
anxiety is certainly not captured by Heideggerian ‘fear’. Our everyday experience of 
anxiety is not the cowardly panic in which my being is covered over or fled from, 
despite our everyday experience of anxiety being an experience of a determinate 
threat. Heidegger’s analysis here appears to have omitted the wide expanse of 
threatening affective phenomena between the extreme experiences of radical anxiety 
and fear portrayed as the blind panic of self-forgetfulness.  
There are several paths we might want to take in objection to this picture11. 
There is a concern that with this dichotomy, insofar as we experience threat 
affectively, we must be more or less debilitated on Heidegger’s story – through the 
insignificance of all possibilities in radical anxiety, or the dizzying confusion of 
possibilities in fear. This simply is not borne out in experience.  In relation to 
authenticity specifically, we might wish to nuance this hard and fast distinction 
between authenticity and inauthenticity (and by inclusion taking responsibility and its 
opposite) that maps on to anxiety and fear. Or we might want to reject the heroic 
tenor, and the denigration of fear that Heidegger himself engages in despite seeing 
this rejection of fear in relation to death as a pernicious characteristic of das Man. 
While these are potentially fruitful avenues, I will approach the problem through the 
phenomenological methodology that I have shown is operative in Heidegger’s work. 
 
Heidegger’s Methodological Inconsistency 
 
As I outlined in the thesis’ introduction, Heidegger is explicit about the 
methodological need to begin from Dasein in its everydayness: 
                                                        
11 Staehler (2007), for example, objects to this picture on the basis that it precludes authentic 
attunements that pertain to another person, such as love. 
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We must rather choose such a way of access and such a kind of interpretation 
that this entity can show itself in itself and from itself. And this means that it is 
to be shown as it is proximally and for the most part – in its average 
everydayness. (SZ 16) 
The force of this ‘must’ is phenomenological, and is in opposition to ways of 
understanding that attempt to squeeze Dasein into ill-fitting ontological 
preconceptions. By beginning with everydayness, we begin with ‘the horizon that 
lies closest to us’ (footnote x to SZ 50), avoiding the kind of ‘free-floating’ (SZ 
36) theoretical abstraction that can soar so high as to lose sight of what it was 
attempting to capture in the first place. Starting from the ‘unbiased evidence’ (SZ 
188) of the everyday ensures that Heidegger’s analysis is grounded in the 
phenomena. Here it is worth remembering that the phenomenon of 
phenomenology properly understood is the being of entities (SZ 35). This is not 
something distinct from, but necessarily contained within every appearing, 
belonging to what thus shows itself (ibid.). Thus, while we learn of the tendency of 
everydayness to forget or cover over Dasein’s being, this being still shines through 
in the everyday, requiring excavation but nonetheless always there. There is no 
disconnect between the deep and the shallow, the profound and the pedestrian. 
Typically, this approach is a virtue of Heidegger’s phenomenological 
method. We begin in the midst of the complexity of existence before being pointed 
to an experience we are familiar with. From there we are led by Heidegger to 
circle downwards in interpretation, looking at the shape this experience takes. We 
are shown what is ‘experienceable’ within that experience – that which is typically 
ignored but is in fact constitutive of that experience, and that which constitutes the 
‘meaning and ground’ of the experience from within the experience itself. We are 
led down through our experience, its contours and limits, to see the kinds of beings 
that we are.12  
Elsewhere in Division II we can see Heidegger adhering to this 
methodological commitment. We begin from our everyday understanding of death, 
                                                        
12 See Burch (2011) who explicates this through the language of ‘formal indication’ (a description 
of method found more commonly in earlier work, but still mentioned in Being and Time e.g. SZ 
177) 
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or guilt, or the call of conscience ‘that everyone agrees that he hears’ (SZ 281). 
And while the ontological understanding of these terms that we reach is not the 
same as these everyday senses, we begin from our everyday understanding and 
pursue this to its depths, never losing sight of the everyday experience as the 
connection to its ontological ground is made clear13. As Heidegger describes in 
relation to conscience: 
on the one hand, the everyday way of interpreting conscience cannot be 
accepted as the final criterion for the ‘Objectivity’ of an ontological analysis. 
On the other hand, such an analysis has no right to disregard the everyday 
understanding of conscience and to pass over the anthropological, 
psychological, and theological theories of conscience which have been based 
upon it. If existential analysis has laid bare the phenomenon of conscience 
in its ontological roots, then precisely in terms of this analysis the ordinary 
interpretations must become intelligible (SZ 290, bold emphasis mine) 
By this reckoning, it seems that if anxiety is ‘laid bare in its ontological roots’, 
then our everyday understanding must become intelligible in connection with this; 
we should be led to see how this familiar experience points to a deeper, 
ontologically revelatory experience, as Heidegger in fact does for another 
fundamental attunement, boredom, in The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics.14  
Yet for anxiety, Heidegger gives us no such path. Instead our everyday 
understanding of anxiety is completely missed, and the possibility of it becoming 
intelligible on the basis of the radical, ontologically significant experience of 
                                                        
13 The case of guilt rests less easily here. As mentioned in the introduction to the thesis, 
Heidegger does not begin from an experience of the feeling of guilt, as we might expect, but 
rather from a conceptual analysis of our everyday understanding of it as a particular debt to 
another, from which Heidegger moves to the idea of a lack at the heart of Dasein, its essential 
‘nullity’. 
14 Heidegger begins here with our everyday experience and understanding of boredom, before 
‘deepening’ the analysis of this most common form to reveal a second, less commonly noticed 
‘intermediate’ (FCM p157) form, before finally explicating the fundamental attunement of 
profound boredom. This latter underlies the other two forms as the condition of possibility (FCM 
p156), constituting their meaning and ground. 
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anxiety is passed over. 15 The problem becomes still more pressing in the light of 
Heidegger’s acknowledgement that most of us will not have experienced this 
radical anxiety: such an experience, Heidegger affirms, is ‘rare’ (SZ 190). While 
the Wittgensteins of this world may know what Heidegger means by anxiety – 
instinctively, as it were – for the rest of us the experience and its possibility of 
ontological insight and confirmation may be completely out of reach.16 
 With only a characterization of wild, ‘cowardly’ fear to latch on to, without a 
propaedeutic path from our everyday experience of anxiety, we are left only with 
Heidegger’s characterization of the radical kind of anxiety. On certain readings of this 
radical anxiety however, in particular the kind of readings that would allow for it to 
reveal a space of ‘freedom’ from which we could take responsibility, this experience 
looks nothing like anxiety at all. In the next section I will demonstrate the kind of 
implausible readings of anxiety that such accounts require. By focusing on the idea of 
the ‘threat’ that I take to be essential to an experience of anxiety, and the idea of 
vulnerability that goes with this, I will argue that anxiety does not reveal a space for 
taking responsibility on the traditional model. I will then show that this same idea of 
‘threat’ is that which should be focused on in linking the everyday idea of anxiety 
with Heidegger’s radical picture of anxiety, thus offering the connection between the 
ontologically significant and the everyday that Heidegger’s own account leaves 
wanting. 
 
Anxiety as the Space of Freedom: ‘Anxiety’ without Anxiety 
 
What is typically stressed in anxiety is that it manifests our freedom. In Kierkegaard’s 
The Concept of Anxiety (whose importance Heidegger acknowledges in two footnotes 
                                                        
15 This methodological connection to the everyday is in fact even praised within the subsequent 
analysis of that which is disclosed in anxiety, as we are told that: ‘everyday discourse and the 
everyday interpretation of Dasein furnish our most unbiased evidence that anxiety as a basic 
Befindlichkeit is disclosive in the manner we have shown’ (SZ 188). 
 
16 This is particularly pressing for the question of the ‘extension’ of the term Dasein. See Martin 
(2013) ‘The Semantics of “Dasein” and the Modality of Being and Time’ 
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in Being and Time), anxiety is emphasized as ‘freedom’s actuality’ (2003 p42)17. In 
Sartre’s adoption of the idea via Heidegger, anxiety is said to be the ‘manifestation of 
freedom in the face of the self [which] means that man is always separated by a 
nothingness from his essence’ (BN p59)18. Some idea of freedom is also clearly part 
of what Heidegger wishes to get at in the disclosure of our being as ‘being-possible’:  
Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-
for-Being – that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking 
hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free for 
(propensio in…), the authenticity of its Being. (SZ 188) 
Or, again: 
Being-free for one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and therewith for the 
possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity, is shown, with a primordial, 
elemental concreteness, in anxiety. (SZ 191) 
As we saw earlier, radical anxiety is an affective experience that does not pertain to 
specific possibilities, to particular objects, people, and projects. Quite the opposite: 
we are told that ‘the world has the character of completely lacking significance.’ (SZ 
186) This experience of anxiety can be understood as a ‘distancing’ (Crowell 2013a 
p294). In anxiety, the particularities of our identity, the particular shape the world 
has, and the particular people we relate to, all slip away in some sense. In falling 
away from us in anxiety, it is revealed that who we are, our identity, is not necessary. 
If it were necessary, this experience of distance could not be possible. Unlike other 
beings whose essence is in some way fixed, this ‘distance’ in the experience of 
anxiety reveals that who I am is only a possibility.  
It is this distancing from our possibilities that could be seen to undercut 
Frankfurt’s account of wholeheartedness. Frankfurt’s story presented taking 
responsibility through wholeheartedness as affirming what we care about as if it were 
                                                        
17 I take it that Kierkegaard’s involved discussion of the sympathetic antipathy and the 
antipathetic sympathy of anxiety avoids the worry about emphasizing the freedom of anxiety in 
what follows. 
18 It is translated as ‘anguish’ in Sartre (2003), including in the specific references to Heidegger’s 
discussion. 
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a solid foundation. Yet as what we care about slips away - as we are ‘distanced’ from 
it in anxiety - it is shown that who we are is not immutable, solid, and unchanging but 
is itself only a possibility. Our being as possibility through and through is shown, and 
with it Frankfurt’s ideal of wholeheartedness appears as an unrealizable attempt to 
cover over or flee from this being. 
Anxiety is therefore supposed to reveal this break or distance from our 
identities and the particular world that co-exists with them. In showing that we have 
no fixed essence, the idea of freedom presents itself. In particular, this distancing 
from what matters to us in anxiety could be thought to reveal the possibility of 
choosing and deciding what we care about, the possibilities we project into. For 
example, in Han-Pile (2013) we read:  
By breaking down its involvement with the world, anxiety enables Dasein to 
become pre-reflectively aware of its self-interpretative nature, and faces it with 
an ultimatum: Dasein has to choose to choose itself, or not. (2013 p294)  
With anxiety and the distancing from who we are, the space is opened for taking 
responsibility by choosing who we are. 
As McManus (2013), Burch (2010), Dreyfus (1991), Crowell (2010) and 
many others have shown, however, this choice cannot arise in anxiety because with 
the slipping away of what matters, there is no basis on which to make such a ‘world-
defining’ choice (Dreyfus 1991)19. As Heidegger declares in The Concept of Time, 
‘anxiety is a state that provides no basis for immersion in the world’ (COT(d) p35). 
This amounts to going back to our analysis of attunement and Frankfurt’s assessment 
of choice, in which choosing requires that a particular possibility already matters to 
us, already grips us strongly enough for us to take it up. If there’s a sense in which no 
possibilities grip us in anxiety, choice cannot arise here. Nonetheless, as accounts like 
Han-Pile (2013) and Thomson (2013)20 suggest in various ways, anxiety could 
                                                        
19I don’t find Bracken’s (2005) scant textual evidence to support his argument that particular 
‘authentic’ factical possibilities appear in anxiety to be convincing against the philosophical and 
experiential force of the counter-claim. 
20 See also Friedman (2000), as presented in McManus (2015 p165) 
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nevertheless be understood to reveal a distance from what matters that allows for a 
choice to be made as we come through anxiety or find ourselves on the other side. 
Here we need to be careful. The type of freedom that is revealed and the type 
of ‘choice’ that goes with it depend upon the nature of the ‘distance’ from what 
matters that anxiety is supposed to disclose.  One might think that this distance is a 
radical disconnect from what matters, a separation of a kind of pure self from all the 
particularities that we find ourselves thrown into – this is the kind of ‘nothingness’ 
between consciousness and facticity revealed in anxiety for Sartre, for example, in 
which our radical freedom is disclosed. This kind of complete break from what 
matters to us can be seen as a return to the kind of ‘larder’ picture of thrownness we 
saw in chapter one21: anxiety reveals that we can, in some sense, step back from the 
larder of possibilities, survey the whole, and thereafter have some increased scope or 
potential for choice. Here, the power of the subject and the traditional model of 
responsibility are reaffirmed. In this break from possibilities, the movement of 
thrownness is suspended, to reveal some sort of ‘I’ that is exempt from its power. It 
might be thought to reveal that in fact the power of these attunements, the grip of 
these possibilities, is suspended. The possibilities stand before me, inert, and their 
grip is given its force only through my assent or choosing. I will argue, however, that 
this picture of ‘anxiety’ in which there is a complete ‘break’ from the power of our 
attunements, however, couldn’t in fact be anything that we could plausibly call 
anxiety.  
As we saw earlier, radical anxiety is characterized by Heidegger as an 
experience in which particular possibilities ‘sink away’ into ‘utter insignificance’ (SZ 
187), in which ‘the world has the character of completely lacking significance.’ 
(ibid.) This may give the impression of a fantastical experience in which the world 
and the way I understand myself through it disappear completely, which would seem 
to leave only a bare perceiver in some kind of void or darkness. Heidegger could 
perhaps be understood to advance such a view in saying that ‘anxiety does not ‘see’ 
any definite ‘here’ or ‘yonder’ from which [the threatening] comes.’ (SZ 186) Here 
the experience seems to be one of total blindness, total void. Yet such a mystical 
                                                        
21 And indeed, Withy (2011) seems to endorse such a complete break from who we are: given the 
indeterminacy of anxiety for Withy, it makes as much sense to say it is revealed that I am a sense-
maker (as Withy characterizes Dasein) as to say ‘there are sense-makers’. 
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picture does not seem to capture anything remotely close to any experience we could 
conceivably characterize as ‘anxiety’. 
If we look closer however, we see that this blindness cannot be what 
Heidegger has in mind, as we are told that ‘[t]he utter insignificance […] does not 
signify that the world is absent’ (SZ 186). It is rather that the world and its particular 
possibilities no longer grip us to the point where we can take them up and project into 
them. The ‘sight’ that we no longer have is not the visual representation of geometric 
space, but the existential spatiality that comes from the concerned involvement that 
requires projecting into particular possibilities. The ‘understanding’ that anxiety 
deprives us of is the existential understanding that is projection into possibilities.22  
This characterization of the experience is not the complete blindness that 
seems so implausible. However as presented here, there is nothing to suggest it is not 
a state in which the world’s possibilities float before me, none of which grip me in 
any way at all. I sit out of the reach of all possibilities equally. Projecting into the 
possibility of a relationship with my partner of many years grips me no more than a 
relationship with the postman; of pursuing philosophy no more than philately.  All 
possibilities stand before me, devoid of any hold on me at all. Characterized as above, 
this may sound like a relaxed tarrying alongside the particular commitments of 
existence, a quiet moment to survey life’s rich tapestry of possibilities. But an 
experience of such complete detachment could not be anxious. 
The first point to note is that the world and possibilities that disappear are not 
a world or possibilities in general but my world with its texture of salience. It is 
important to remember what ‘the world’ that is lost (and thus the ‘worldhood’ that 
shows itself) are. ‘World’ for Heidegger means a referential context of significance 
(SZ 123). But it is a context of significance whose shape as a whole is partially 
constituted by my particular relations and self-understanding (ibid.). As we saw in the 
first and second chapter, the lay of the land ahead is determined by the point on the 
horizon that I am aiming at. The world that sinks into meaninglessness in anxiety is 
the world from my perspective; the world that sinks away in anxiety is my world. The 
definite shape of the world that impressed itself upon me leaves a hollow with 
                                                        
22 Here I follow Burch (2010). I shall also go on to basically agree (for different reasons and in a 
slightly different form) with his contention that a ‘trace’ of our particular worlds and identities 
must remain in anxiety 
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definite contours, the particular way I was gripped leaves a mark. It is not that all 
possible relations with others, all possible self-understandings, all projects stand 
before me equally. Thus, I agree with Burch (2010) in saying that something like a 
trace of our particular world remains23.The connection between the existential and the 
existentiell is not completely severed, leaving something like a pure ‘I’ of 
apperception that is untouched by the grip of thrownness.  
We can find support for this reading of anxiety in the description of the 
analogous fundamental attunement of boredom in The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics: 
the ‘it is boring for one’ itself explodes the situation and places us in the full 
expanse of whatever is in each case manifest as a whole  to this specific Dasein 
as such, in each case has been manifest, and in each case could be. […]For 
whom then [do beings as a whole refuse themselves]? […] presumably for the 
self whose name, status and the like have become irrelevant, and which is itself 
drawn into indifference. Yet the self of Dasein that is becoming irrelevant in 
all this does not thereby lose its determinacy, but rather the reverse, for this 
peculiar impoverishment which sets in with respect to ourselves in this ‘it is 
boring for one’ first brings the self in all its nakedness to itself as the self that is 
there and has taken over the being-there of its Da-sein. (FCM p143, bold 
emphasis mine) 
The meaninglessness or irrelevance experienced in a fundamental attunement is 
experienced in relation to the specific meaning or relevance that is my life, my 
world.  
                                                        
23  I disagree, however, with the contention that we must pull ourselves out of anxiety through a 
choice, and this choice on the basis of the trace. Even if resoluteness requires a response to 
anxiety as declared (Burch 2010 p219), it seems that this does not necessitate a response in or 
from anxiety. See, as quoted earlier, The Concept of Time, ‘anxiety is a state that provides no basis 
for immersion in the world’ (COT (d) p35). I don’t think the idea that anxiety passes without 
requiring action on the part of its sufferer is ‘facile’ or ‘insufficient’ (Burch 2010 p219). As I 
argued in chapter two, while we may sometimes influence our attunements, it seems that they 
can and often do come and go without any action on our part. Additionally, Dasein’s being as 
fallen is such that it essentially moves away from facing up to its ontological constitution; anxiety 
wouldn’t be possible or necessary if this falling away from our being didn’t happen. The move 
out of anxiety is written in Dasein’s ontological constitution. 
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A ‘distancing’ of some sort occurs which allows one to see who one is as a 
possibility. After all, we have seen Heidegger describe an experience in which the 
world ‘sinks away’ into ‘utter insignificance’ (SZ 187). However I think the 
particular things that matter to us, the way the world shows up to us, can still be 
seen. In the inability to grip us as they once did, our affective bond to them is seen. 
The fact that these possibilities and not others matter to us is made manifest. I 
think that the experience of anxiety could in this respect helpfully be likened to 
semantic satiation, the experience of repeating a word so many times that it loses 
its meaning. Here, like anxiety, that which was previously meaningful is 
experienced as meaningless. The word which previously meant something 
becomes a mere phoneme. But this is not to say that the phoneme disappears. The 
phenome remains, but it does not connect with us in the same way anymore. It 
stands at a distance, empty. Importantly, the phoneme is not experienced as 
meaningless in the same way that other noises are meaningless, or that words in a 
different language might be meaningless. It is a conspicuous absence of meaning 
that shows up precisely in virtue of its previous meaningfulness. It shows up as a 
positive inability to touch us as it once did.24 So it is with our particular self-
understanding and relations with the world and others. Their meaninglessness is so 
stark in virtue of the particular way that they were previously meaningful, in virtue 
of the particular way that they oriented and moved me. They are conspicuous in 
their distance, in the absence of the kind of grip they once had. They still touch us 
in this shadowy sense. 
To say that possibilities slip away from us does not in itself describe an 
anxious experience. As suggested above, this distancing could perhaps describe a 
blissful kind of meditative experience in which what matters to me, and all the 
troubles and difficulties this brings, no longer touch me. Yet anxiety is anxious 
precisely because those particular relations, self-understandings, projects that are 
normally the secure foundation of my life remain and touch us as no longer 
meaningful. But some kind of affective bond remains to my identity and world, a 
bond that precisely makes itself manifest in its being threatened. I think that this is 
                                                        
24 To borrow a phrase from Regina Spektor, we might otherwise characterize this as being like 
forgetting the words to your favourite song. 
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required for anxiety to be anxious, for it to be the kind of intense, unpleasant 
experience that radical anxiety surely must be. 
In the next section, I will examine this threatening character of anxiety by 
beginning from our everyday experience of anxiety – thus restoring the connection 
to our everyday understanding that I argued Heidegger’s own exposition of radical 
anxiety problematically missed. I will show how, through this threatening 
character, the grip of thrownness remains in such a way that makes us face up to 
our thrownness at the deepest level, our thrownness into the enigma of Dasein. 
Rather than offering a space of respite from the power of thrownness from which 
we can take control and mastery of our lives, anxiety reveals how pervasive this 
grip is and in so doing, points us towards the need for a different understanding of 
responsibility. 
 
Threat and Vulnerability 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, for Heidegger fear and anxiety are 
united by an experience of the ‘threatening’ (e.g. SZ 140, 266). The affective 
experience of threat is the constant that allows the differentiation between threat that 
pertains to particular entities, objects, and possibilities characterized as ‘fear’, and the 
indefinite threat of what I have been calling radical anxiety (SZ 186).  
The feeling of threat is one that we can see as underlying our everyday 
experience of anxiety. In anxiety before an academic job interview, the austere 
building and room of serious faces appear threatening. What is threatened in this case 
is the possibility of pursuing an academic career, of being an academic, or a 
philosopher perhaps. In anxiety over our loved one’s journey through inclement 
weather, the threat is to their well-being. In this feeling of threat, what is rendered 
explicit is that what is threatened matters to me. In feeling anxious about the 
interview or the flight, it is made manifest that being an academic or my loved one 
respectively matter to me. I am affectively bound to them, I am attuned to them. 
This determinate feeling of threat can be described in other words as an 
experience of vulnerability. In the threat experienced in our everyday cases of 
anxiety, what matters is shown to be vulnerable – it is open to being lost, broken, or 
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disappearing in its current form. In various ways my pursuit of academia and my 
loved one are shown to be vulnerable. The way that they matter to me, the way that 
they orient and move me, is open to being lost. What is threatened is revealed in its 
character as thrown projection. In the experience of threat the affective grip of, and so 
my thrown submission to, what is threatened is revealed; the threat could not arise 
unless what is threatened mattered25. Equally, its character as possibility is also 
shown. If my career aspiration, relationship, or life were essential, necessary, as part 
of a fixed essence, then they could not be threatened. 
Our everyday experiences of anxiety then are characterized by a determinate 
threat arising in a particular situation in which a particular aspect of existence that I 
am bound to affectively is shown to be vulnerable. As we saw, it is the experience of 
threat that characterizes radical anxiety too for Heidegger. But while the threat in our 
everyday anxiety is limited to some one particular thing that matters to us, radical 
anxiety is not contained in this way: ‘the Befindlichkeit which can hold upon the utter 
and constant threat to itself arising from Dasein’s ownmost individualized Being, is 
anxiety.’ (SZ 265 - 266) 
While our everyday experiences of anxiety arise in relation to particular 
possibilities, situations, people, and objects, radical anxiety reveals a threat that is 
‘utter’ and ‘constant’.26 It is not just the case that one particular aspect of our 
existence is threatened and shown to be vulnerable. It is rather that every particular 
thing that matters to us is vulnerable; we are vulnerable as such. The particular ‘who’ 
that each of us is, our answer to the question of what it means to be, is shown to be 
vulnerable. The particular way the world strikes us as meaningful, as true and good, is 
dramatically shown to always be vulnerable and open to threat. In this extreme 
anxiety, the threat and vulnerability of our everyday experience of anxiety is 
radicalized and extends to every particular aspect of our lives. 
I think that emphasizing this particular ‘threatening’ aspect of Heidegger’s 
explication provides a way of understanding the link between everyday anxiety and 
radical anxiety, thus avoiding Heidegger’s own neglect of the everyday experience 
that I showed to be problematic above. More importantly, this threatening aspect is 
                                                        
25 This is what I take Sartre to miss in his famous characterization of anxiety at the precipice. 
This experience could only be anxiety if my life touched and gripped me as ‘mattering’. 
26 ‘ständige und schlechthinnige’ 
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essential to the experience of radical anxiety, as Heidegger himself characterizes it. 
This threatening aspect, as I have shown above, reveals that an affective connection 
still remains with what matters to us – it precisely makes manifest what matters to us 
as it is threatened wholesale. To read anxiety as revealing a strong break from what 
matters, a complete disconnect with who I am, is to miss this threatening aspect that 
makes anxiety what it is. There is no such ‘break’ in our thrownness in which we can 
find freedom to choose. There is no space to find power and control, and thus there is 
no haven for the traditional model of taking responsibility in the experience of radical 
anxiety. There is no such break from the particular being I am thrown into; even in 
anxiety, I remain in the throw.  
 
Face to Face with our Thrownness into Dasein 
 
It should be clear from what has been said already in relation to our everyday anxiety 
how this absolute vulnerability of radical anxiety reveals our being as thrown 
possibility.  The particularities constitutive of who we are, that which matters to us at 
the deepest level, are shown to be vulnerable in radical anxiety. Here, it is disclosed 
that even that which we are bound to most deeply, that which is constitutive of our 
identity to the point where it shapes our whole existence, is only a possibility. With 
those foundations of our particular lives revealed to be possibilities, Dasein’s being as 
such as possibility is revealed. Yet as I have argued, we still remain touched by these 
particular possibilities in their conspicuous inability to grip me in the same way that 
they once did, as my affective connection to them is threatened. They remain 
conspicuous in their meaninglessness. In some sense, our thrownness into a particular 
‘who’ can still be seen. Yet we have not illustrated how our thrownness into Dasein, 
which stands as the meaning and ground of the particular way we are thrown, is seen. 
Radical anxiety for Heidegger is so important because ‘the structural totality’ of 
Dasein is made starkly manifest, albeit in a ‘simplified’ and ‘elemental’ way (SZ 
182). I will now demonstrate how we are brought face to face with our thrownness 
into the being of Dasein in radical anxiety. 
 In the experience of radical anxiety, the fact that Dasein is an ‘I’, the fact that 
being is first-personal, is made visible for Heidegger in the way that the grip the 
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world and others previously had on me loses its hold, or ‘sinks away’ as Heidegger 
describes it here (SZ 187). In the vulnerability of my particular affective bonds to the 
world and others, with no worldly possibilities or others gripping me as they once 
did, the ‘I’ obtrudes: 
The ‘world’ can offer nothing more, and neither can the Dasein-with of Others. 
[…]Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world. (SZ 
187) 
In radical anxiety, Dasein is disclosed as ‘solus ipse’, as an I alone. But perhaps with 
this ‘I alone’ there might be a return to the power of the subject, a focus on the 
subject from which the traditional model of responsibility might again find a 
foothold. 
 In anxiety, it might be thought, we can see a kind of independence of the self from 
the world and others, and taking responsibility will involve living in a way that is 
expressive of this. Perhaps there might be a way of negotiating the vulnerability of 
what matters, maybe by seeing this vulnerability as the ultimate vulnerability of what 
matters in death, but that until then the point is to ‘stay true to ourselves’ in the face 
of the world and others in the manner of Frankfurt (albeit with a greater 
acknowledgement of our ultimate mortality). While anxiety may not reveal a space 
from the particular things that matter to me, it reveals an independence of who I am 
from the world and others. There is a kind of independence in which it is revealed 
that it is ‘up to us’ as Guignon (2013), for example, reads this experience of anxiety:  
In the mood of anxiety, we discover ourselves as individualized, as solus ipse, 
in the sense that our usual dependence on the world and others breaks down and 
we find that our lives are up to us alone to live. (2013 p15) 
To take responsibility will be to affirm this independence in some way, this autonomy 
in the face of the world and others. 
Yet while the ‘I’ and the mineness of being become pronounced in anxiety, I don’t 
think that this is to the neglect of the world and others. For one thing, I don’t think 
vulnerability can be read in the way above, given that even if applied narrowly to our 
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mortality, this kind of reading sees death as an event at the end of life and not the 
ever-present possibility that it is for Heidegger. But more simply, Heidegger himself 
is quite clear on this point: 
Anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as ‘solus ipse’. But this 
existential ‘solipsism’ is so far from the displacement of putting an isolated 
subject-Thing into the innocuous emptiness of a worldless occurring, that in an 
extreme sense what it does is precisely to bring Dasein face to face with its 
world as world, and thus bring it face to face with itself as Being-in-the-world. 
(SZ 188, emphasis mine)27 
In direct contrast to Guignon and in accordance with the quote above, I take 
radical anxiety to in fact show a kind of dependence of the ‘I’ on the world and 
others, the necessity of the others and the world that are beyond the I.  I take 
anxiety to show the necessity of this relation, and thus Dasein’s being as being-in-
the-world and being-with-others. My particular affective connection to the world 
and others, the particular way the world and others matter, has lost its 
meaningfulness. But this is not to say that the I can be meaningful alone. It rather 
shows the opposite. With the threat to the grip of my world and particular others 
on me, my need for that grip as such is shown more starkly than ever.  
We can see this in the language Heidegger uses in discussing anxiety. 
Anxiety is variously said to reveal our ‘abandonment’ (e.g. SZ 192, 308)28, our 
                                                        
27 See also: ‘But if concern and solicitude fail us [in anxiety], this does not signify at all that these 
ways of Dasein have been cut off from its authentically Being-its-Self. As structures essential to 
Dasein’s constitution, these have a share in conditioning the possibility of any existence 
whatsoever.’ (SZ 264) 
28 This idea of abandonment, like anxiety in general, can be taken up in a one-sided way (as by 
Sartre e.g. 2003 p463, as we saw in chapter one) as manifesting our freedom. Here, the idea is 
that in being abandoned we are cut off from any guidance or rules that would constrict us. We 
are abandoned, alone, and what we do is up to us. Yet I don’t think this is where the accent on 
the idea generally lies, nor is it that which Heidegger is attempting to capture. The idea of 
abandonment is introduced not as an explication or illustration of Dasein’s being-possible as 
‘freedom’ but precisely to emphasize the other side of Dasein that anxiety also reveals. Having 
just told how anxiety reveals Dasein’s being-possible (SZ 191), Heidegger emphasizes (‘but’, 
‘however’ (SZ 192)) that this is not the only feature of Dasein’s being that is revealed in anxiety. 
Additionally, ‘[t]he abandonment of Dasein to itself is shown with primordial concreteness in 
anxiety.’ (SZ 192)  
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uncanniness as the ‘not-being-at-home [das Nicht-zuhause-sein]’ (SZ 188)29, and 
Dasein as ‘naked’ (e.g. SZ 343-344).30 With these images, we can see that in a 
certain sense there is a slipping away of the world and others to reveal an ‘I’ alone. 
In abandonment, some person or persons have departed and left us alone, without 
support or guidance, when they otherwise might have been expected or obliged to 
stay. When we are not at home or without a home, the shelter, support, 
relationships, space, privacy, etc. of home are out of reach. In nakedness, we are 
without the garments that protect and warm us, or perhaps constitute our identity, 
and are left as a ‘pure’ I alone with nothing ‘external’.31  
Yet in each case, the sense is not that the ‘I’ in this state is presented as 
independent. These are not positions of power or self-determination. In 
abandonment, not being at home, and nakedness, the sense is not that life is ‘up to 
us’ without these ‘external trappings’ of these particular others, our home, or our 
clothing. Rather, the importance of these things is shown in the threat of their 
absence. In the absence of those closest people who support us, the home in which 
we comfortably dwell, and the clothes that warm and protect us, and through 
which we are ‘ourselves’, it is shown how much they matter. It is shown how we 
rely on the particular things and people that we are affectively bound to in the 
world. 
In fact their absence reveals, in a ‘simplified way’, that we are effectively 
bound to the world and others as such. In the threat to, the vulnerability of, our 
particular attunements to the world and others, it is revealed that in some way the 
world and others must matter to us. In the experience of abandonment, 
homelessness and nakedness that Heidegger evokes in describing anxiety, it is not 
the case that the world and others disappear completely. Rather, the world and 
others as such loom larger, daunting and strange. They are inescapably there, and 
we are open to being touched and affected by them, as much as we might want to 
                                                        
29 ‘Here “uncanniness” also means “not-being-at-home” [das Nicht-zuhause-sein]. […]Being-in 
enters into the existential ‘mode’ of the “not-at-home” [Un-zuhause]. Nothing else is meant by 
our talk of ‘uncanniness’.’ (SZ 188-189) 
30 We saw the idea of Dasein’s being in its ‘nakedness’ earlier in the quote from FCM p143. 
31 Compare here an image from Kierkegaard’s Works of Love (2009 p95-96), in which the 
particular everyday ways in which we understand ourselves, our particular roles, relations and 
self-understanding, are likened to clothes or garments we wear. 
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close ourselves off in these kinds of experiences. With this imagery used to 
capture what it feels like to experience radical anxiety, Heidegger is pointing to the 
way that in anxiety it is revealed that the world and others must matter to us. The 
world and others as such, looming large and indeterminate, reach in and grab us in 
a way that the ‘I’ cannot close itself off from. Rather than showing a kind of 
independence, I take this vulnerability that is felt in anxiety, captured in 
Heidegger’s descriptions of abandonment, not being at home, and nakedness, to 
reveal that we remain affectively bound to the world and others as such. Anxiety 
does not reveal the independence of the I from the world and others that can then 
serve as a basis for some self-determination and the restoration of taking 
responsibility on the traditional model – anxiety in fact shows the necessity of our 
being gripped affectively by them.  
In thinking to the question of responsibility, it is clear that taking 
responsibility for our being-in-the-world must, then, be sensitive to the revelation 
of our necessarily being affected by the world and others that is revealed in 
anxiety. Anxiety, contra accounts like Guignon’s, shows that the focus of taking 
responsibility cannot be on the subject conceived in opposition to the world and 
others. 
I have showed how radical anxiety makes manifest the way we find 
ourselves having to be an ‘I’ that exists as possibility in relation to a world and 
others. Finally, I can now show how radical anxiety brings us face to face with the 
enigma of our being – the way that we are gripped by the question of what it 
means to be, though the ‘answer’ always lies beyond us. In this experience of 
anxiety, as we have seen, the way the world and others grip me, in connection with 
my self-understanding, fails to do so in an important sense. My answer to the 
question of who am I, what it means to be, fails to connect with me as it once did, 
just as the meaning of a word evades me in semantic satiation. Yet as my ‘answer’ 
sinks into a kind of meaninglessness, it affects me in doing so. I feel anxious. And 
this is so because I am still gripped by the attunement to the meaningful as such. I 
feel anxious as my life strikes me as meaningless because having a meaningful life 
matters to me. I am still gripped by the meaningful as something that orients and 
moves me, as something that I aim towards.  
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As we saw earlier, the meaningful as related to our lives as such can be 
captured with the way we use the ‘true’ or the ‘good’ – in seeking the meaningful 
we seek what is otherwise called true, or good. In the loss of meaningfulness in 
anxiety then, we may say that our lives, our answer to the question of what it 
means to be, suddenly no longer strike us as true, or good. What we thought was 
meaningful, true, or good, suddenly strikes us as empty. It no longer grips as it 
once did. Yet this experience is anxious precisely because being in the truth, 
aiming at the good, matters to us. We remain in the grip of the meaningful, the 
true, the good. This is not to say that in anxiety we suddenly experience a 
‘meaningful’ or ‘true’ or ‘good’ in itself. Far from it. But as the shape of our lives 
suddenly strikes us as meaningless, as no longer true or good, we see that this is 
what we are gripped by and aiming at all along. In the breakdown of what we took 
to be good, true, or meaningful, our attunement to it is made manifest. 
In anxiety it is revealed that the question of what it means to be and a 
certain kind of answer – one that is good, true, meaningful - matters to us. But by 
the same token, in this experience it is revealed that the ‘answer’ is beyond my 
grasp (which is in fact the direction that Wittgenstein takes anxiety as the opening 
quote continues)32. If what is meaningful, good, or true were fully grasped by me, 
if I had full understanding of what it means to be or how to live, this could not be 
taken away or undermined. I would possess it, it would be mine. But as anxiety, an 
attunement that breaks in one me, threatens my answer to the question of what it 
means to be, it is revealed that this is not the case. As my answer to the question of 
how to live or what it means to be is threatened, it is revealed that what is 
meaningful, true, or good,  was never completely in my grasp at all, but always 
beyond me – this is the sense of the enigma of Dasein, as I argued in chapters one 
and two. If it were not beyond my grasp in some way, it could not be so radically 
questioned and undermined in radical anxiety. Despite my remaining gripped as 
                                                        
32 ‘I can very well think what Heidegger meant about Being and Angst. Man has the drive to run 
up against the boundaries of language. Think, for instance, of the astonishment that anything 
exists. This astonishment cannot be expressed in the form of a question, and there is also no 
answer to it. […] This running up against the boundaries of language is Ethics. […] In ethics one 
always makes the attempt to say something which cannot concern and never concerns the 
essence of the matter. It is a priori certain: whatever one may give as a definition of the Good – it 
is always only a misunderstanding to suppose that the expression corresponds to what one 
actually means (Moore). But the tendency to run up against shows something.’ 
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shown above, this vulnerability of my entire conception of what is a meaningful, 
good, or true life shows that whatever it is, it is beyond my grasp of it. 
Returning to Frankfurt briefly can help to make this clear. In covering over 
anxiety in the previous chapter, Frankfurt can be seen to be covering over the 
ontological insight it contains. As well as ignoring anxiety’s revelation that we are 
fundamentally being-in-the-world and being with others, as the examples of the 
closed-off subjects in the previous chapter showed, Frankfurt’s idea of 
wholeheartedness, of clarity and confidence, suggests that our answer of how to 
live is settled. Far from being an enigma that perpetually draws us yet is always 
beyond our reach, what is meaningful, what is true, what is good, is already to be 
found in what we care about for Frankfurt. It is within our grasp. In contrast, I take 
anxiety to reveal that what is meaningful, what is good, what is true, is not settled 
by looking to what we care about. It is never within our grasp, and as such it is 
always at issue for us. 
This is what human existence is, as the foregoing analysis has shown. But 
crucially, in radical anxiety we are forced to pay attention to this thrownness into 
the enigma of Dasein as being-in-the-world and being-with-others, which stands as 
the meaning and ground of the particular self and world we find ourselves thrown 
into.  As everyday experience attests, it can often take a project, a relationship, or 
even a possession of ours to be under threat for us to take notice at all and to give 
it our attention. The extreme threat to who we are, to our answer of what it means 
to be, makes us pay attention, however briefly, to the question of what it means to 
be, and to the answer that we are giving. It makes us pay attention to the way we 
are gripped by what is meaningful, true, good, and the way that the world and 
others must matter to us. It makes us pay attention to the particular things that 
matter to us in the light of this. While the being of Dasein may be manifest in other 
attunements, anxiety brings human existence face to face with itself against our 
tendency to fall away from this being (SZ 184). 
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter I have offered an interpretation of anxiety in which the grip of our 
thrownness in all its aspects still holds. As a result, I have demonstrated that the 
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experience of anxiety offers no space for redemption of the traditional model of 
taking responsibility, in contrast to readings which suggest that it might. Anxiety is 
not a space within or outside of our thrownness from which leverage can be obtained 
for the subject to ‘take responsibility’ through the power of choice or self-
determination.  
In doing so, I identified a problem with Heidegger’s own account of the 
dichotomy of fear and anxiety, arguing that this completely misses anything like our 
everyday experience of anxiety, a point that I argued was methodologically 
problematic. I then showed how characterizations of ‘anxiety’ that are congruous with 
the idea that it reveals a complete detachment (as a possible space of freedom) in fact 
miss anything like the experience of anxiety at all. 
I argued that the ‘threatening’ aspect of anxiety, and the vulnerability that 
goes along with this, links our everyday experience of anxiety and radical anxiety, 
and should therefore be emphasized. By looking to this integral aspect of the 
experience of anxiety, I argued that the grip of our thrownness still holds in anxiety, 
and that the traces of our thrownness into a particular ‘who’ in a particular world 
remain. I then argued that in the face of the revelation of the vulnerability of our 
identity, we are brought face to face with the way that we remain gripped as an ‘I’ in 
relation to the world and others. Finally, I argued that anxiety shows that at bottom 
we are gripped by what is meaningful, what is experienced as true or good, yet what 
exactly this is remains in question for us - it grips and moves us, yet remains beyond 
our grasp. Anxiety forces us to face up to this as the being of Dasein. 
 In the next chapter I will assess a number of Heideggerian readings of taking 
responsibility for our being-in-the-world in light of our thrownness. Each yields 
important insights and captures an aspect of what I take to be important, and so points 
towards an answer of what it means to take responsibility for our being-in-the-world. 
Yet I will argue, on the basis of the thesis so far, that each falls short.  
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Chapter Five - Heideggerian Accounts on the Traditional Model 
 
In seeking to understand a Heideggerian account of taking responsibility for our 
being-in-the-world, I have provided an analysis of how thrownness and its first-
personal manifestation in attunement, including the fundamental attunement of 
anxiety, threatens the traditional model of seeing responsibility as lying in the power 
or mastery of the subject. Having now completed this analysis, I am in a position to 
assess more thoroughly attempts in the Heideggerian literature to find such an 
account of responsibility in Heidegger’s thought. In this chapter, I will assess four 
recent accounts of taking responsibility on the basis of Heidegger’s existential 
analytic that I take to be compelling representatives of some version of a traditional 
account of responsibility1. By looking at responsibility for our being-in-the-world 
conceived as rational reflection and judgement, choice, wholeheartedness, and 
independence from das Man (represented by Crowell (2013), Han-Pile (2013), 
McManus (2015a) and Withy (2015) respectively), key insights will be gained for the 
positive account that I propose in the next and final chapter. However, I shall argue 
on the basis of my preceding analysis, and the methodological principle that such an 
account of taking responsibility for our being-in-the-world should be able to make 
intelligible our everyday understanding of responsibility, that each of the following 
accounts falls short in virtue of ways in which they maintain the accent on the power, 
control, or self-determination of the subject. 
 
Reflection, Judgement, and Giving Reasons 
 
Perhaps the commentator who has sought to characterize Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology in terms of responsibility and taking responsibility most explicitly, and at 
                                                        
1 I will not discuss accounts, most prominently made by Guignon (e.g. 2013), that interpret 
authenticity as a kind of ‘narrativism’ in part because I think that such accounts are less 
commonly explicitly linked with the idea of taking responsibility. I am also sympathetic to the 
criticism that such narrativist accounts rely on an understanding of temporality that is not 
Heidegger’s (See Crowell 2002). Additionally, as should become clear as I put forward my own 
Heideggerian understanding, I think such accounts risk missing the fundamental ‘correlation’ of 
the human and being that lies at the heart of Heidegger’s whole thought, in particular the ‘giving’ 
of being that’s more prominent in the later thought. Limits of space preclude the full discussion 
that this argument would require however. 
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greatest length, is Steven Crowell. We can see Crowell as representing a reading of 
taking responsibility that is more in keeping with prominent strands of thinking about 
responsibility outside of Heideggerian thought that identify it with some kind of 
cognitive process of judgement, evaluation, or assessment in terms of reasons.2 
In Crowell’s Kantian inspired view, we are essentially responsible beings because 
the givens of our situations that affect us do so only as possibilities – as claims to be 
endorsed or not. This is revealed in anxiety, as all claims (which for Crowell typically 
grip us in the form of Korsgaardian practical identities) breakdown. This breakdown 
is a ‘distancing’ (Crowell 2013 p249) revealing an aspect of the self that is irreducible 
to those particular claims, that stands in relation to those claims. This aspect of the 
self is an orientation to ‘measure’, to better or worse, or to something like the Platonic 
Good. We are responsible beings because the things that claim us do so as 
possibilities that we stand towards in the light of ‘measure’ (2013 p189).3 By taking 
up these claims, these possibilities we’re solicited by affectively, we give them 
authority as ‘good’ or ‘best’ and make them our ground and basis for acting: 
Ontologically, then, to be responsible would mean that I am essentially called to 
view the givens of my situation as assessable in light of better and worse, that I 
cannot not view them in that way. When I opt to attend my son’s Little League 
game over having a beer with my buddies – both of which belong to my 
facticity as claims upon me toward which I am inclined – I have made the 
former inclination my reason by treating it as normatively better than the latter. 
(2013 p221-222)  
This basic way that Dasein is a responsible being for Crowell can be ‘taken over’ 
authentically – Dasein can take responsibility (2013 p280, p300). As mentioned 
above, Crowell identifies taking responsibility with Heidegger’s account of ‘taking 
                                                        
2 For example some versions of Korsgaard’s work, and more straightforwardly ‘analytic’ work on 
responsibility such as the work of Angela Smith (e.g. 2005). Others within that debate do appear 
to give more value to non-cognitive aspects alongside cognitive aspects (e.g. Shoemaker’s 
accounts of attributability and accountability in Shoemaker 2013), however in general the focus 
appears to be on the more cognitive modes of experience. 
3 In accordance with our earlier analysis, Crowell sees that our privileged way of being claimed is 
through our attunement: ‘What claims us is primarily affect: Affect is the primary way in which 
the factic ground that I must take over shows itself.’ (2015 p221) 
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over being-a-ground’, which means ‘that I take responsibility for my facticity’ (2013 
p276). 
As the idea of making into a ‘reason’ in the quote above alludes to, Crowell 
understands Heidegger’s existential analytic, and specifically the idea of ground or 
basis, in terms of ‘reasons’4. To take up a possibility that claims me affectively is in a 
sense to make it my ‘ground’, my basis for acting. But to do this authentically is to do 
this transparently (2013 p254) which for Crowell means to take this claim as my 
reason: 
to take over being-a-ground would be to stand toward grounds in the sense of 
being determinants of my being as toward grounds in the sense of potentially 
justifying reasons’ (2013 p 189) 
To take responsibility for Crowell is to make possible grounds, the way I am 
claimed affectively, into reasons, in light of better or worse. So what does making 
a claim into a reason involve, what is a reason? 
A reason for Crowell seems to be that which one can give to another by way of 
justification: taking responsibility is ‘taking over factic grounds as justifying 
reasons’ (2013 p277)5 Here again Crowell appears to see Heidegger through a 
Kantian lens, wherein something like a notion of universality is tied into the idea 
of making something a reason: 
The possibility “articulated” in breakdown is being-responsible 
(verantwortlich); but because Dasein is Mitsein, to be responsible is to be 
                                                        
4 Crowell acknowledges Heidegger’s generally critical stance toward rationalism (footnote 26 to 
2013 p187); the way that for Heidegger the primary disclosure of the world is affective rather 
than cognitive or rational (2013 p179); that reasons can only show up as reasons on the basis of 
attunement (2013 p202); that for Heidegger reason giving does not go all the way down, that 
giving reasons at some point ‘gives out’ (footnote 26 to 2013 p187); and that our most basic 
commitments themselves cannot be rationally grounded (footnote 15 p210). In light of this 
acknowledgement, to then argue as he does that being Dasein authentically centres on reasons, 
requires a great deal of textual and argumentative work, reinterpreting Heidegger’s whole 
project of fundamental ontology through a variety of texts from the late 1920s to argue that 
Heidegger is concerned with normative grounding and that such grounding receives its 
legitimacy by being understood in terms of reasons. Accordingly, to assess this approach as a 
whole as a reading of Heidegger would require a breadth and depth of analysis that is not 
possible here. 
5 See also ‘reasons, grounds in the sense of justifications.’ (2013 p188)  
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answerable or accountable to others. And this means that whatever other 
possibility authentic Dasein commits itself to, it is simultaneously beholden to 
the practice of reason-giving. (2013 p216)6 
At times this sounds like taking responsibility is constituted by actually justifying 
oneself to others, by verbalizing one’s reasons to other people: 
Responsibility transforms a creature who is “grounded” by social norms into a 
ground of obligation – one who “grounds” norms by giving grounds, that is, 
reasons. (2013 p187) 
Yet this surely cannot be right. If we think back to occasions, great or small, 
whereby we can consider ourselves to have taken responsibility to any degree, to 
have manifested in our ontic comportment an assumption of responsibility, no 
doubt plenty of experiences will come to mind in which no such justification of 
ourselves to others was required or appropriate.  
However, it seems that this is not Crowell’s meaning. In recognition of 
Heidegger’s discussion of reticence as authentic discourse, Crowell tells us that 
taking responsibility does not mean ‘chattering endlessly about how I am justified 
in doing this or that’ but rather ‘being prepared to give reasons for (to own up to) 
the measures at stake in one’s behaviour’ (2013 p226). Taking responsibility as 
making my grounds into justificatory reasons does not mean that such reason-
giving to others must materialize. It rather means that others are in principle taken 
into consideration in what it means to make something a reason for myself. I must 
be prepared to give justificatory reasons to any other, just as for Kant to make 
something my maxim means I must be prepared for it to become universal law. 
Taking responsibility requires entering the space of giving and asking for reasons, 
even if this never results in actually being called upon to justify oneself to another. 
                                                        
6 See also: ‘to take over being-a-ground is to be oriented toward the measure of what is best as 
such and so to stand toward the given as toward (possible) reasons. […] Because Dasein is 
essentially Mitsein, in being accountable for myself I am answerable to others who are affected or 
could be affected by what I do’ (p235) 
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Here I think we should question this model of relating to others. It is not 
clear why our being-with-others, and even specifically our linguistic being-with-
others, should be conceived in this way of asking for and giving justification to 
others. Surely there are many ways of relating to others that we might think are 
responsible (such as attempting to share the way I see the world with another) that 
are not of this adversarial nature. Equally, this model seems to give undue priority 
to linguistic communication. Surely we can ‘answer’ others without giving 
justificatory reasons, and instead answer by pre-reflectively projecting on the basis 
of the solicitation of an attunement – feeling moved to give money to a homeless 
person, or instead finding my own journey to matter more, are both ‘answers’ to 
this person’s silent question, before any idea of linguistic justification has entered 
the scene. 
But the idea that an answer can be ‘before’ the idea of justificatory reasons 
brings us on to the worry I will pursue with this idea of taking responsibility, 
which concerns what the idea of this ‘preparedness’ to give reasons involves. The 
worry is that such a picture requires explicitly thinking about, deliberating, or 
assessing the things that are making claims on me, before deciding which one 
should be my reason. This would be done in the light of what Crowell calls an 
orientation to measure as such, at times equated with the good: ‘thanks to […] the 
ability to take over being-a-ground – I am able to judge and act in light of the 
good, in light of what is best; that is, in terms of (justificatory) reasons. (2013 
p209) 
The idea of ‘judging’ invoked here supports the worry that what taking 
responsibility means for Crowell is deliberating or reflecting upon reasons and 
deciding which is best, such that I can then give this reason to others by way of 
justification if called upon.7 It seems that this reflection is a way of ‘stepping back’ 
from the solicitations of our thrownness to enable us to take responsibility for 
them. This ‘stepping back’ need not be a step back to a ‘pure reason’ that is 
                                                        
7 This kind of assessing of reasons could not go on during anxiety for Crowell, as the breakdown 
of our practical identities leaves us without any criteria by which we could assess these identities 
as possible reasons. As Crowell notes, our most basic commitments themselves cannot be 
rationally grounded (footnote 15 p210, p300). And authenticity (and by inclusion taking 
responsibility) is not to be conflated with ‘breakdown’ (2013 p216).  Presumably then, the 
preparedness to give justificatory reasons must be something that a responsible individual does 
when going about their everyday lives. 
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completely free of our attunement – as we saw in connection with the discussion 
of Frankfurt, Crowell acknowledges that all reasons find their basis and weight in 
attunement (Crowell 2013 p202).  A problem remains however. The idea that 
taking responsibility requires reflecting on and judging possible reasons before 
assenting to the best paints a picture of being responsible that is at odds with how 
we are for the most part, as Heidegger’s general analysis famously makes salient, 
and which we have seen in particular in relation to the attunement that grounds our 
being-in-the-world. As we have seen, for Heidegger ‘cognition’ (which 
presumably includes explicit judging) is famously a ‘founded’ phenomenon (SZ 
137). It is founded on the more basic way in which we exist as being-in-the-world 
as projecting on the basis of attunement, which need not be, and typically is not, 
explicit. An important part of Heidegger’s project is to displace the philosophical 
primacy of cognition and the thinking subject in favour of human existence as a 
pre-reflective understanding of being on the basis of a pre-reflective attunement, 
that typically takes the form of an absorbed engagement with the world. It would 
seem strange then, to say the least, to suggest that to be this being ‘properly’, 
authentically, essentially requires some kind of conscious awareness. To make 
reflection inessential to Dasein’s relationship to being as we have seen, only then 
to make it essential to having this relation ‘authentically’ seems wrong.  
If being prepared to give justificatory reasons requires reflecting on each 
possible reason for action and assessing these reasons (and further, assessing in a way 
that considers them as justificatory reasons that could be given to others), then this 
model seems too reflective, too cognitive, to be a model of taking responsibility in 
light of Heidegger’s compelling analysis which reveals the extent to which our being 
is not reflectively self-aware. Instead, our movement through the world is typically on 
the basis of an attunement that is pre-reflective. Entering into the space of reasons 
seems to require a level of explicit awareness that goes against the thrust of 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology as we have outlined specifically in the disclosive 
grip of attunement. The importance of this point is explained well by Han-Pile: 
much of Being and Time is intended to bypass the primacy of consciousness 
and to show that being in the world , in its everyday forms, does not require 
self-awareness (on the contrary, this would prevent us from responding 
appropriately to the affordances of the world). (Han-Pile 2013 p293) 
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Yet, if making my factic grounds into ‘justificatory reasons’ is not this reflective act, 
it’s not clear what it could be. At times, Crowell seems to rebuke such a reflective 
characterization: 
The point is not that I necessarily sit around weighing reasons for whether 
fatherly duty has priority in this case; rather the point is that in following the 
one “inclination” I am making it my reason; I am not just following it in the 
way an animal would follow its instinct. (2013 footnote 7 p222)   
The difference between ‘making something a reason’ and something like 
following instinct, we learn, is that in the former ‘I (transparently) hold it best’’ 
(Crowell 2013 p225, emphasis mine). This transparency, for Crowell, is identified 
with recognizing that the practical identity which claims me, the particular way I 
find that the world affects and solicits me, has no normative claim on me, no 
authority, independently of my commitment to these claims. To take responsibility 
for the claims that are made on me is to ‘recognize their motivational force as 
stemming from my commitment to them.’ (2013 p300). Leaving aside the question 
of whether the insight in anxiety, that things that solicit me are possibilities, is the 
same as the idea that something’s normative force is to be thought of as coming 
from my commitment to it (which my argument in the previous chapter disputes), 
it remains unclear what Crowell thinks this ‘transparency’ is, if we are to reject the 
idea of reflecting on justificatory reasons (with an eye to others) as I think we have 
good cause to do. We seem to be left with something like an idea of ‘commitment’ 
that is yet to be specified, while the motivation to understand taking responsibility 
in terms of making motivations into ‘reasons’ in the first place becomes unclear. 
 
The Choice to Choose 
 
As we just saw in the preceding section, Han-Pile (2013) is explicitly sensitive to the 
non-reflective thrust of Heidegger’s account, and her own account of what it means to 
take responsibility shows this. For Han-Pile the self-ascription of responsibility is 
identified with the ‘choice to choose’, which ‘makes Dasein responsible for what it 
is.’ (2013 p301) Broadly speaking, this is the choice to face up to our ontological 
freedom as revealed in anxiety, our lack of any fixed determining essence, which then 
allows us to make the choice of who we are existentielly. For Han-Pile this choice, 
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and thus our responsibility, is not absolute in the Sartrean vein, but is limited by our 
thrownness: ‘Nor can the responsibility involved be absolute, since the choice itself is 
not fully within Dasein’s control. Dasein is responsible up to a point, and this is as 
good as it gets.’ (2013 p309) The central idea is a familiar one: taking responsibility 
is identified with choice, with something like taking control. To assume responsibility 
for, is to exercise choice over. However, in contrast to the accounts of responsibility 
of Kierkegaard and Sartre that influenced and were influenced by Heidegger 
respectively, this choice is not an explicit, reflective choice, but is rather ‘pre-
reflective’, and thus sensitive to the way that much of our existence is based on being 
pre-reflectively gripped by possibilities. We are not aware of this choice whilst 
choosing, but nor is the choice closed off from our explicit awareness of it, as we may 
become aware of the choice we have made retrospectively. But importantly, such a 
choice, and the taking responsibility that it constitutes, need never be made conscious. 
While Dasein may become aware of its choice to choose (for example, by being 
pressed for reasons from others), ‘such full awareness may never arise, or the reasons 
for its actions may never be fully articulated, and Dasein would still be existentielly 
free.’ (footnote 9, p314). For Han-Pile, we take responsibility insofar as we pre-
reflectively choose in light of a pre-reflective awareness that we are not determined 
by any fixed essence. While, as we shall see, Han-Pile’s account offers a variety of 
insights, we might be reticent to adopt this picture of what it means to take 
responsibility on a Heideggerian account. 
Han-Pile, in contrast to Crowell, importantly emphasizes the non-reflective 
thrust of Heidegger’s account. However, we might worry that Han-Pile’s own picture 
may go too far in the other direction. While she argues that the choice constitutive of 
assuming responsibility need not be conscious, she goes on to suggest further that not 
only need we not be aware of taking responsibility itself, but that we cannot be aware 
of taking responsibility when it happens. We can become aware only in retrospect: 
The pre-reflective awareness of responsibility is not directly available as such 
to Dasein in the first person, because the very process whereby it would become 
available would transform it from pre-reflective into reflective. (2013 p310) 
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The idea that we cannot be aware of assuming responsibility or being responsible is a 
strange one.8 It appears to claim that if, first-personally, we ever think we are taking 
responsibility, or if we make a conscious attempt to be responsible, we are wrong and 
misguided. This seems out of keeping with Heidegger’s general methodological 
approach in which our everyday ways of thinking contain within them some sense of 
the ontological truth of the matter. While not being the ‘final criterion’, ontological 
analysis ‘has no right to disregard the everyday understanding’ (SZ 290) as we have 
seen. It also seems to go against the way that for Heidegger, attunement and 
understanding for example, while primarily being pre-reflective, still have explicit, 
reflective forms. Attunement and understanding do not cease to be when they become 
explicit and reflective, even if these are ‘founded’ on the pre-reflective forms, so it’s 
unclear why taking responsibility should be different. 
More importantly, Han-Pile appears to give no argument to suppose that this 
is the case. Heidegger’s emphasis on the ‘founded’ mode of explicit awareness points 
to the need to be able to explain assuming responsibility without requiring such 
explicit awareness. But while it is important for this reason to show that taking 
responsibility can happen without explicit first-person awareness of this, we are not 
shown what warrants the further thought that such assuming responsibility must be 
pre-reflective and only pre-reflective. 
A second concern emerges in relation to the focus on choice, and the way in 
which this is characterized. While Han-Pile importantly acknowledges that choosing 
can be pre-reflective and is not absolute, the characterization given nonetheless 
portrays such a choice as a kind of leap of blind will, albeit one from which our gaze 
is averted: 
Think back on your life: there are hard-to-pin-down but crucial moments in our 
existence when we are pre-reflectively aware that, even though nothing 
prepared us for it and there is nothing necessary about it, a possibility has 
opened up that calls to us in such a way that we have to make the leap of 
                                                        
8 The quote technically says that pre-reflective awareness of responsibility is not available first-
personally. But unless the quote is to be taken as a mere truism stating that pre-reflective 
responsibility is pre-reflective, it seems the stronger claim is meant that taking responsibility as 
such is pre-reflective and is not something that can be done with explicit awareness. Han-Pile’s 
third-personal example of taking responsibility later in the paper seems to suggest further that 
this is her meaning. 
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appropriating it inasmuch as we can. Such a leap is the choice of existentiell 
freedom. (2013 p311) 
While anxiety reveals that there is ‘nothing necessary’ about the particular 
possibilities that are taken up, I think that this does not warrant the further idea that 
‘nothing prepared us’ for taking up such a possibility – an idea which threatens to 
portray choice as baseless or arbitrary.  
As our analysis of attunement has shown, for a choice to arise, for a choice 
to show up to us (even pre-reflectively), we must be attuned to the possibilities. 
Both possibilities must already draw me in some sense otherwise there would be 
no choice to be made. While we may want to hold on to the idea that choice can 
feel like a leap, that qualitative shifts are made, I don’t think it is a leap in a totally 
unknown direction, a leap completely in the dark. If I follow Han-Pile’s suggestion 
to think back on decisive moments in my life in which I see that a choice was 
made, the lack of necessity rings true – there is some sense of a leap. But it does 
not feel like nothing prepared me for such a choice. When I land from such a leap I 
am not completely lost and disorientated. The choice makes sense to some greater 
or lesser degree. When I find myself on the other side of the choice, I find that, 
whether I have been aware of it or not, I had in some sense seen where I would 
land. I was oriented to this possibility. Indeed, I surely had to have been for the 
situation to even show up to me (pre-reflectively) as offering a choice. As we saw, 
it is our attunement that allows such possibilities to show up, and solicits us to take 
them up. 
 If Han-Pile is not to be seen to be offering a phenomenologically 
inaccurate and philosophically problematic account of choice as suggested above, 
we are at the least owed an account of how such decisive choices come about. As 
presented, the choice to choose as an account of what it means to take 
responsibility is lacking. 
Wholeheartedness - Choosing Oneself 
 
McManus’ (2015a) account of taking responsibility, like Han-Pile’s, takes up the 
notion of the choice to choose. Unlike Han-Pile’s however, the idea of choosing 
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between differing existential possibilities does not occupy a central place in the 
story here.  
For McManus’ Wittgenstein-inspired account, anxiety functions as a 
corrective to our tendency to erroneously read-off how to live from a perceived 
essence of the world. Anxiety makes us realize that, instead of there being 
inherent, essential meanings in things in the world that can dictate how I live, ‘I 
see that the meaning of the objects that I encounter is determined by the life I 
happen to be living’ (2015a p173). As well as shattering this illusion, anxiety for 
McManus throws into relief projects that speak to us, that we find ‘intrinsically 
meaningful’ (2015a p176), and that need no justification. In contrast, other 
projects are shown to be ‘provisional’ as their significance disappears along with 
the world and others in anxiety’s individuation. 
In light of this, choosing to choose is at no point conceived as choosing 
between existentiell possibilities or projects. It is (in accordance with my analysis 
of attunement) ‘not choosing per impossible – what to care about’ (2015a p179). 
Rather: 
I am choosing myself as the one who will choose – rather than deferring the 
judgement in question to someone else – to ‘the world’ or the They – and their 
assessment of what matters. This is also recognizably something that could be 
called ‘assuming responsibility for oneself and one’s actions. (McManus 2015a 
p178) 
Here, McManus’ model appears to mirror the account by Frankfurt we saw 
earlier. Just as Frankfurt conceives the task as a kind of wholeheartedness in which 
one finds out what one cares about and lives confidently in accordance with this, 
so for McManus the task is: 
choosing to live in line with what one fundamentally cares about. The challenge 
in doing so is acknowledging that one has an opinion, refusing to disburden 
oneself of one’s own judgment, and accepting this burden – actually acting on 
that opinion, that judgment – is taking responsibility oneself for one’s actions. 
(2015a p179) 
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In virtue of the similarity with Frankfurt’s picture of clarity and confidence, the 
worry is that the same problems apply. As we saw, in Frankfurt’s picture we are 
left with a stubborn, bloody-minded individual imposing their will upon the world 
and others, unreceptive to that which is given. And indeed, at times McManus’ 
account here worryingly threatens to present a similar kind of picture, as he tells us 
that having realized the possibilities that really matter to us, ‘we will act on the 
former [ownmost possibilities] come what may, irrespective of whatever 
legitimation or confirmation ‘the world’ may offer’ (2015a p180, emphasis mine). 
It seems difficult to believe that to be responsible could mean to become 
insensitive to changing demands that the world and others might make on me.9 
When this kind of worry was seen in Frankfurt, it was suggested that not 
only was such a picture out of keeping with how we might typically understand 
taking responsibility, but that it also wasn’t possible to sustain such a picture. 
There, it was argued that the experience of anxiety ‘undercuts’ the bond of even 
our deepest attunements. Yet McManus’ Heideggerian view, in contrast to 
Frankfurt, pays close attention to anxiety. 
The contention here concerns McManus’ reading of anxiety. While 
acknowledging that anxiety reveals meaninglessness in some respect, this is 
interpreted by McManus in two ways. For inauthentic Dasein who holds the 
erroneous view that meaning is inherent in things in the world, there is the 
experience of relative meaninglessness as this error is shattered. For those who do 
not hold such a fantasy, there is the revelation of the meaninglessness of a life in 
which the closest, provisional possibilities have been taken up instead of our 
ownmost possibilities. 
 As the previous chapter on anxiety shows, I agree that texture of some sort 
remains in anxiety – while the world recedes into insignificance in anxiety, it is 
nonetheless our world that is disrupted by the experience, and as it recedes it leaves 
an emptiness in the distinct shape of that which has departed. The shadows that 
                                                        
9 Heidegger’s remarks on resoluteness seem to point against such a conception, as we are told 
that in resoluteness we:  
‘cannot become rigid [versteifen] as regards the Situation, but must understand that the 
resolution, in accordance with its own meaning as a disclosure, must be held open and free for 
the current factical possibility. The certainty of the resolution signifies that one holds oneself free 
for the possibility of taking it back’. (SZ 307-308) See also SZ 391 
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remain retain their particular form, and their grip on us is shown in the threat to them 
that anxiety is. However, I think it is integral to anxiety that these projects that are 
closest to us lose their grip in some sense, as I argued the experience of threat and 
vulnerability captures. The threat shows them to be possibilities, and ultimately 
shows my being itself to be as possibility. In contrast, in McManus’ view these 
projects keep their hold, as only the ‘provisional’ projects recede into 
meaninglessness. While I think that some kind of distancing of what matters most is 
important in revealing our being is possibility, I think that three other issues arise 
with this picture in which our ownmost possibilities retain their hold in anxiety.   
The first is that it is unclear how McManus’ reading can accommodate a 
number of claims that Heidegger makes about anxiety. Heidegger’s characterization 
of the ‘collapse’ in anxiety is that it impacts the ‘totality’, that the world has the 
character of ‘completely lacking significance’ (SZ 186). Yet if our ‘ownmost’ 
possibilities retain the same grip and only ‘provisional’ possibilities recede, it’s 
difficult to make sense of the way that anxiety is in some sense all-encompassing. So 
too, it is hard to see how McManus’ account can capture the uncanniness or 
‘unhomeliness [unheimlichkeit]’ (SZ 188) of anxiety, in particular when the 
possibilities that are our ‘ownmost’ are characterized by McManus himself as those in 
which we feel ‘at home’ (2015a p176)10 
The second reason is that without the collapse of those possibilities that are 
closest to me, those that matter most, it’s hard to see why the experience would be 
anxious, which as we saw requires that we are shown that what matters to us might 
not. The experience as McManus characterizes it for those who don’t hold on to the 
delusional view of meaning, while perhaps making them realize they have been 
neglecting their ownmost possibilities in favour of those which matter less, does not 
sound like an anxious experience to the extent that Heidegger’s language suggests. If 
                                                        
10 By way of counterargument, it should be mentioned that McManus points to a passage that 
could be read to support his view: 
‘He who is resolute … understands the possibility of anxiety as the possibility of the very mood 
which neither inhibits nor bewilders him. Anxiety liberates him from possibilities which ‘count 
for nothing’, and lets him become free for those which are authentic.’ (SZ 344) 
However I don’t think this entails that ‘becoming free for’ means that particular possibilities 
retain their grip on Dasein in the experience of anxiety itself. I think this could more plausibly 
read as suggesting that anxiety performs some kind of revelatory function in the light of which 
particular possibilities are taken up, rather than ‘during which’. 
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I were to see that I did in fact have possibilities that really matter, commitments that 
remain unshaken in the face of some collapse, this experience seems heartening and 
edifying, which is in contrast to Heidegger’s description and, I imagine, our own 
experiences of anxiety. The threat and vulnerability of the experience of anxiety 
requires that what matters is shown to be a possibility, and not a solid foundation that 
I can build my life upon post-anxiety. 
The third reason is that McManus’ picture seems to rely on the idea that I can 
retain possibilities, projects that are ‘ownmost’, while the world and others fade into 
insignificance and ‘have nothing more to say to me’ (2015a p176). This is preceded 
and supported by the idea that those ownmost projects are those which I would 
continue to find meaningful even ‘were my society to abandon the values that inform 
such projects’ (2015a p176). I take it that the intention is to show anxiety as an 
experience that deprives Dasein of the possibility that inherent meaning or value in 
the world can dictate what to do, that the world can live Dasein’s life for it in some 
sense. Given the suggestion of finding meaning regardless of what the world had to 
say, and the way that for Heidegger (and for McManus) it is the ‘world’ as a whole 
and every other Dasein that become meaningless or superfluous in anxiety (2015a  
p176), the implication is that we can have projects and possibilities independently of 
a world. But because Dasein is essentially being-in-the-world, this is not possible. As 
we saw, to be Dasein is to find oneself gripped by the world in attunement – to be a 
doctor or a socialist or a friend just is for the world and others to show up as 
mattering in a particular way. What’s more, any particular project depends for its 
meaning on the world; its meaning is given, sustained, and recognized by the norms 
and standards of the world which solicit me affectively. It’s not clear how I could 
hold on to being a father, as McManus suggests, if fatherhood and all the meanings 
and values on which it depends (family, love, support) were no longer meaningful in 
the world I found myself in. If we are to avoid this picture of the individual as being 
able to hold on to particular projects and possibilities independently of the world and 
others, I think that in anxiety all of my possibilities must be shown to be vulnerable, 
as I have suggested in the previous chapter. 
As with Frankfurt, I think McManus’ account of taking responsibility, 
accommodated by a reading of anxiety that I would challenge, paints a picture of an 
individual closed off from, unreceptive to, the world and others. It is a picture that 
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should be questioned on Heideggerian grounds, as well as the way that such an 
account is at odds with our idea of being responsible. 
 
Independence from das Man 
 
Katherine Withy’s (2015) account of taking responsibility centres around attunement 
and with this focus, as our earlier analysis of attunement suggests, the idea of being 
open to the solicitations of the world is important. Yet while Withy’s account 
presents an openness to the world as integral to taking responsibility, it nonetheless 
also describes what I take to be an unfeasible picture of a certain kind of 
independence of the individual, thus according with the traditional focus on the self. 
It is a representative example of specifically Heideggerian accounts, not yet 
encountered in this thesis, that see taking responsibility as a kind of distancing from 
das Man, a taking back of responsibility from those who previously carried it for us. 
For Withy, taking responsibility is letting our attunement (which, given that 
she focuses on Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, she calls ‘pathé’ here) be ‘genuinely 
disclosive’; taking responsibility is being receptive and open to that which attunement 
discloses. We are told that being genuinely disclosive means attunement that 
discloses in a way that resists averageness, or das Man:  
In the repeated resolution for genuine openness and against averageness, we 
make ourselves responsible for the pathé [...] In this, we own up to the constant 
temptation of averageness and we take ownership of our affective life. (2015 
p30)11 
To take responsibility for our affective life (on the basis of which we project as we 
have seen, and thus, to take responsibility as such) means to hold ourselves open to 
be affected in a way that is ‘against averageness’. 
The concern here is that Withy is in some sense attempting to separate the 
individual from the world in a problematic way – to set the individual in 
                                                        
11 We are also told that genuine disclosing is disclosing what the excellent person discloses, 
finding things matter that the phronemos would find matters, but the only route we are given 
into this circle is the story about resisting averageness. 
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opposition to that which is necessarily constitutive of them as an individual. For 
Heidegger, as we saw, the way the world is disclosed to us through attunement is 
constituted by the public way of being: 
The dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted has 
already been decisive even for the possibilities of being attuned – that is, for the 
basic way in which Dasein lets the world “matter” to it. Das Man prescribes 
one’s Befindlichkeit, and determines what and how one ‘sees’. (SZ 169-170) 
There exist no ‘separate’ attunements that would reveal possibilities outside of those 
provided by das Man.12 The world shows up to us through a lens wrought by our 
particular social, political, historical situation. This manifests the ‘societal’ aspect of 
our thrownness as discussed in chapter two. What being authentic, and by inclusion 
taking responsibility, means for Heidegger, cannot be any kind of separation from the 
crowd: 
Authentic Being-one’s-self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the 
subject, a condition that has been detached from the “they”; it is rather an 
existentiell modification of the “they” – of the “they” as an essential 
existentiale. (SZ 130) 
Withy comments in a way that appears to be sensitive to this idea, stating that: ‘We 
cannot extricate ourselves from social norms entirely, nor should we want to – it 
would be contrary to our political or social nature.’ (2015 p27-28) However, it is 
difficult to see how this insight is incorporated into the account13. In the very next 
sentence, we are told that ‘resisting averageness must be some version of standing off 
to the side of the crowd so as not to get caught up in its mood.’ (2015 p28) And later, 
that taking responsibility ‘governs the intentionally complex pathos negatively: it is a 
                                                        
12 We could also see Heidegger’s rejection of the possibility of a kind of ‘bare’ experience as 
making the same point:  ‘In no case is a Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way in 
which things have been interpreted, set before the open country of a ‘world-in-itself’, so that 
it just beholds what it encounters.’ (SZ 169) 
13 At one point Withy makes a distinction between blameworthy and unblameworthy, owned 
and unowned falling (2015 p31) which perhaps could do some work here, however this is never 
explained. 
 
 
151 
 
resolution not to allow public norms to interfere.’ (2015 p30) Again, this sounds like 
a kind of detachment. Given that all particular attunements, that which determines 
what shows up as mattering, are constituted by public norms, on Heideggerian terms 
this is not possible. 
At times it seems like taking responsibility might not be finding oneself attuned in 
a way that is detached from das Man and all its standards, but perhaps attuned in a 
way that is resistant to the dominant norms, the most prominent ways of being 
attuned. We can think that the scope of attunements arises from within das Man, that 
what ‘matters’ cannot be something completely beyond the parameters of our socio-
cultural context, yet still think that taking responsibility is to be found in difference or 
independence from the prevailing wind, by going against it or finding currents in its 
margins. At times it seems like this might be what Withy has in mind as a way of 
incorporating opposition to das Man in a framework that acknowledges our social 
nature: 
In closing ourselves to the pull of averageness and holding ourselves open to 
the situation, we set ourselves out for being touched and against the customary 
ways of being so. (2015 p29, emphasis mine) 
However, to make acting contrary to popular norms the standard is equally to be 
beholden to those norms, when it is clear that for Withy genuine disclosure is 
being beholden to the situation instead. By acting in contrast to the general trends 
of das Man, we take our orientation from these trends just as much as if we 
conformed to them. In both cases, individual Dasein’s openness to, engagement 
with, any matter is transformed into an openness to, and engagement with, society 
and the crowd’s stance. Whether in conformity with or in contrast to, we are no 
longer oriented by what is, but only by what is popular. Yet this is exactly what 
accounts such as Withy’s seek to avoid. 
Conceptualizing responsibility through independence from das Man 
appears to either posit an individual that is in some way detached from the crowd, 
or is problematically beholden to them in a way that such accounts actually want 
to avoid. 
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The Failure of the Traditional Model 
 
I take it that the above accounts of Crowell, Han-Pile, McManus and Withy each 
point to something important, as I will show in the next chapter. But in different 
ways, I think each falls short. This can be seen to be a result of the attempt of such 
accounts to maintain the idea that responsibility is to be found in the power or self-
determination of the subject in some way or other. This traditional model, as I 
hope to have shown, needs revision on the basis of the prior analyses of 
thrownness, attunement, and the fundamental attunement of anxiety. 
While Crowell’s account of responsibility through judgement and reason-
giving didn’t appeal to any kind of pure reason, it nonetheless appeared to locate 
responsibility for our being-in-the-world in the ability of the subject to ‘step back’ 
from the grip of what matters, the movement of thrownness, through reflection, 
deliberation and judgement. Responsibility was still found to lie in some 
detachment that enabled the subject to assent to and thus ‘give’ the power to the 
grip that reasons have for it. Yet the perpetual movement of thrownness, the way 
that we are always already attuned to possibilities pre-reflectively and the way that 
the grip of what matters retains some of it force even in anxiety, all speak against 
seeing responsibility in the power of the subject to step back and judge or reflect. 
Too much of what is important in life happens in between such judgements. 
Han-Pile offered an account of choice that was sensitive to this pre-
reflective nature of existence, to the way we are drawn to possibilities without 
explicitly reflecting on them. But while this account of choosing was sensitive to 
certain features of Heidegger’s account, to focus on the (pre-reflective) ability of 
the subject to choose, neglected the way that any choice is already dependent upon 
possibilities mattering to us and soliciting us, as I argued in chapter three: ‘the 
chips are already down’ in Frankfurt’s words, pre-reflectively or otherwise, and an 
account of responsibility needs to be sensitive to this. 
McManus appeared to offer an account in the vein of the wholeheartedness 
of Frankfurt. While this account offered a reading of anxiety that acknowledged 
that our identity in some sense still touches us, ultimately this was used in a kind 
of affirmation of the subject. To take responsibility was presented as lying in the 
self-determination of the subject in opposition to the world and others. But as the 
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analysis of the attunement to the world and others that necessarily grips us in 
chapter two showed, this model of responsibility is out of keeping with 
Heidegger’s account of our thrownness and attunement. This was further 
demonstrated in my analysis of anxiety. Here the important vulnerability of what 
matters to us, revealing our being as possibility, was also shown, which again 
speaks against such an account of taking responsibility. 
Withy’s account of responsibility, while sensitive to the way Dasein is 
attuned to that which is beyond the ‘I’ in some respects, nonetheless tried to locate 
responsibility in a kind of independence from das Man, thus focusing on the 
subject through asserting a kind of self-determination relative to das Man. The 
analysis of our thrownness into a particular society in chapter one, and the way this 
manifests in our attunement in chapter two, speaks against such a reading. 
I take it that my analysis of thrownness, attunement, and the fundamental 
attunement of anxiety all show that responsibility for our being-in-the-world can’t 
lie in reflection, choice, wholeheartedness or independence from das Man. I take it 
that my analysis so far has shown these attempts to maintain the traditional model 
of responsibility in the face of thrownness to fall short. 
In contrast to such attempts, I take Blattner (2012, 2013, 2015) to begin to 
point away from the traditional model, revealing important insight in doing so. While 
pointing away from the traditional model of responsibility however, I take his account 
to nonetheless miss our thrownness at the deepest level, our thrownness into the 
enigma of Dasein.  
 
Responsiveness and the Missing Enigma 
 
For Blattner, assuming responsibility or being responsible amounts to a 
responsiveness to: ‘Dasein is thus the ground of itself in that it is responsible for, 
because responsive to, who it already is.’ (2013 p329) Given that Dasein’s being is 
being-in-the-world, to be responsive to who it is just is to be responsive to the 
solicitations that come from the world and others that are textured in a way that is 
constitutive of my identity. Rather than conceiving of taking responsibility as 
emphasizing a distinction between ourselves and the world and its norms, for Blattner 
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taking responsibility is a particular way of being responsive to the solicitations that 
arise from the world. 
For Blattner, when absorbed in das Man in such a way that we are not taking 
responsibility, ‘one’s responsiveness to norms is diminished or compromised’ (2013 
p330). As a result, we experience only the ‘general situation’, in which the situation is 
‘experienced in terms of crude and prepackaged elements, rather than in terms of all 
its normative subtlety and nuance.’ (2013 p330) In contrast, the responsible 
individual is responsive to the particular situation and not the levelled down, 
prepackaged version; they are ‘open to alternative possibilities obscured in the 
general situation’ (2013 p331). 
In contrast to the picture of a closed-off subject imposing itself on a world that 
threatened McManus’ account (and characterized Frankfurt’s earlier), for Blattner 
taking responsibility as being responsive means avoiding this kind of stubbornness 
that he confirms characterizes the inauthentic for Heidegger: ‘Heidegger associates 
beings lost in the Anyone with “stubbornness [Versteifung] about the existence one 
has achieved.”’(p325, quote from SZ 26414)  To be responsible, that is responsive, in 
contrast for Blattner is to be ‘more flexible’ in how one navigates the world (2013 
p333). 
Blattner’s characterization of anxiety is important here. In agreement with my 
previous analysis, anxiety for Blattner captures the vulnerability of Dasein’s projects, 
the way that the particular affective ties I have to the world can break down. Living in 
the light of the vulnerability of my commitments revealed in anxiety for Blattner 
means that I must become receptive to how my affective ties with the world and 
others may change, to the way that some can break down (to be replaced). I think it is 
worth quoting Blattner at length here, where he says this receptivity (and flexibility):  
requires the ability to “take back” prior commitments and habitual modes of 
activity. As the situation changes and as one’s attunements alter, one is called 
upon to adapt and change with the situation. If one falls out of love, if the 
community in which one lives disintegrates, or if the for-the-sakes-of-which to 
                                                        
14 This is in contrast to Macquarrie & Robinson’s translation as ‘tenaciousness’, which Blattner 
(correctly, I think) rejects as being too positive to characterize the inauthentic picture that 
Heidegger is presenting at this point in the text. 
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which one is committed are no longer possible, then one is called upon by the 
situation to change. That is, one must be open to the vulnerability of existence. 
(2015 p333) 
McManus (2015a) rejects Blattner’s reading of anxiety which accords with my own, 
due to a failure to be able to explain how, in some way, authentic (and by inclusion 
responsible) Dasein could be ‘ready for anxiety’ as Heidegger tells us they are (SZ 
301, McManus 2015a p167).15 Here, McManus’ worry seems to rely on seeing ‘ready 
for’ as being prepared for some event that will happen in the future, with the worry 
arising ‘if such readiness is meant to help one deal (in some sense) with anxiety when 
it strikes.’ (McManus 2015a p167) However, given Heidegger’s project in Being and 
Time of revealing how this kind of linear time is in fact derivative from a more 
original existential temporality as discussed in chapter one (and this from the 
originary ecstatic openness of Dasein as temporality), it would be surprising if being 
‘ready’ for authentic Dasein were to be understood in the sense of inauthentic time as 
an event to happen in the future. Just as for Heidegger the ‘anticipation’ of death does 
not mean relating to some event that will happen in the future16  but rather concerns a 
manner of comporting oneself that is expressive of one’s finitude (SZ §53), so too I 
think this readiness for anxiety should be understood as a way of comporting oneself 
that is expressive of the insight revealed in anxiety. 17 
And I take it that Blattner’s position begins to gives us such a comportment that is 
expressive of the vulnerability of our commitments that is revealed in anxiety. 
Moreover, he importantly does so in a way that avoids seeing this as requiring some 
kind of explicit reflection, as Crowell’s account supposes. Our acknowledgment of 
                                                        
15 For McManus, this readiness for anxiety is explained by the way the inauthentic hold the 
delusion the world has inherent meaning that is shattered in anxiety, whereas the authentic have 
no such delusion, and are thus in a sense ‘ready’ for anxiety.  
16 ‘by “Being towards death” we do not have in view an ‘actualizing’ of death’ (SZ 261) -  This is 
rather the understanding of the ‘they’, who seek to transform a proper relation to death into ‘fear 
in the face of an oncoming event’ (SZ 254) (in which the fact that it is ‘fear’, is related to the 
inappropriate temporal understanding). 
17 This idea can be seen throughout Heidegger’s work, for example in his lectures on religion, we 
see that the second coming is not to be understood as an event in the future but rather mode of 
comportment: – ‘the question of when the second coming will be is not an object-historical when, 
but is understood in the ‘how’ of a comportment’ p73 The Phenomenology of Religious Life 
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the vulnerability of our commitments is not an intellectual acknowledgment, but 
rather one that is integrated into our comportment: 
to be aware of the vulnerability of one’s deepest commitments and 
entanglements is to be prepared to struggle for them. To “take a friendship for 
granted,” as we sometimes say, is to fail to attend to it and nurture it. One must 
attend to it and nurture it because it is vulnerable. (Blattner 2012 p171) 
So I take it that in fact Blattner’s account shows how the authentic (and so the 
responsible) are ‘ready’ for anxiety insofar as their projection is expressive of the 
insight revealed in anxiety, is expressive of the vulnerability of our commitments. As 
we shall see, my own account will build on Blattner’s gesture to such a comportment 
here.  
Like the anticipation of death, this may incidentally in turn mean that one is 
‘ready’ for a future occurrent episode of anxiety insofar as the vulnerability that 
anxiety reveals has already been appropriated, and thus perhaps an occurrence of 
anxiety will not be such a shocking departure from our previous way of being. 
However, just as the time of ‘future nows’ is derivative upon the more fundamental 
futurity of a stance toward possibilities, this kind of readiness is derivative upon this 
type of comportment that I believe Heidegger is fundamentally pointing to with the 
idea of ‘readiness for anxiety’. In responding to McManus’ criticism of Blattner, I 
take it that here I have indicated how my own account will be understood in relation 
to the question of ‘readiness for anxiety’. 
Before going on to suggest a model of taking responsibility or being 
responsible that I think is generally consistent with Blattner’s account yet importantly 
goes beyond it, I would like to point to a worry about a potential omission in the 
account which concerns our thrownness into, our attunement to, the enigma of being 
Dasein. 
Blattner conceives taking responsibility as being responsive to the 
solicitations of the situation. Being responsible means being responsive to the 
attunements that define me, my identity, in a flexible way that is open to the 
possibility that such attunements might shift or change. Blattner notes that 
Heidegger’s account of authenticity (and by inclusion responsibility) has a 
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transcendental aspect insofar as ‘conscience is a transcendental condition of the 
possibility of Dasein being responsible at all.’ (2013 p322). But he is quick to assert 
that this does not mean that Dasein’s responsiveness has the character of 
transcendence: 
The normative responsiveness that defines the authenticity of the self is not 
responsiveness to norms that are themselves transcendental, that is, not to a 
categorical imperative or transcendent good, but rather to the everyday goods or 
for-the-sakes-of-which of practical life. (2013 p333) 
We might agree that there is no transcendent ‘content’ that we respond to, no 
particular dictates whose words come from above and beyond. Yet I think (and 
believe Heidegger thinks) that we respond to these particular solicitations in the light 
of, with an orientation to, something that is in some sense beyond any particular norm 
that solicits us, as my analyses in chapters one to three have argued. 
I take it that Heidegger’s focus on transcendence in various forms throughout 
his work points not only to the transcendental as being a condition of the possibility 
of, but rather also to transcendence in the sense of being always beyond. My analyses 
of the enigma of facticity as that ‘beyond’ on the basis of which we project, its 
explication in the analysis of thrownness as that ‘already’ which we are submitted to, 
and the way we are gripped by that which is beyond us in the analysis of attunement 
(including anxiety), all support this. 
Throughout this analysis, I have referred to this enigma as the question of 
what it means to be, and I have described the way that this grips us through the idea 
that what is meaningful, what is true, what is good matters to us. To those familiar 
with Heidegger’s work, the idea that we are gripped by meaning or the meaningful, or 
even by truth should be familiar. Less familiar might be the idea that on a 
Heideggerian story we are gripped, moved and oriented by, what is ‘good’. While I 
outlined reasons for thinking that this characterizes our experience earlier, I spoke 
very little about its aptness as a characterization of Heidegger’s thought. 
Following Crowell, I think Heidegger’s references during the period of Being 
and Time to the Platonic ‘Good’ lend support to this view. In explaining Plato’s 
iconic analogy in Basic Problems of Phenomenology – ‘All vision needs light, 
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although the light is not itself seen’ (p 284) - Heidegger can be seen to point to the 
idea that, contra Blattner, these everyday norms solicit me in the light of something 
beyond them. As briefly touched upon, Crowell has done the most to bring out the 
significance of Heidegger’s remarks on the Good for agency and responsibility. 
Crowell focuses in particular on passages found in The Metaphysical Foundations of 
Logic, in which Heidegger identifies the Good with Dasein’s for-the-sake-of-which, 
that in the light of which understanding as projection occurs: ‘The [idea ton agathon], 
which is even beyond beings and the realm of ideas, is the for-the-sake-of-
which.’(MFL p184) And while I think there are good grounds to reject understanding 
this in terms of ‘justificatory reasons’, I think Crowell importantly highlights that for 
Heidegger we are always oriented to something that is beyond all particularity and is 
that in the light of which particular possibilities show up to me and solicit me. 
I think this is borne out phenomenologically in our everyday experience as I 
outlined in chapter two, and in the limit situation of anxiety in the previous chapter.18 
Our world shows up to us by gripping us in terms of qualitative distinctions, our 
attunement is textured by gradations of better or worse in a wide variety of respects, 
and this seems to be constitutive of our experience – our experience couldn’t be as it 
is without some possibilities (pertaining to ourselves, objects, people etc.) gripping us 
as better than others. When we are solicited by possibilities, when we are attuned to 
one possibility and not others, this is constituted at the same time by the sense that the 
possibility we are taking up is better in some way or another than others. Its being 
good in some way is part of what solicits us, is bound up with the meaning of the 
solicitation. 
In addition to shaping our experience, I think that when something strikes us 
as good, its goodness does not strike us as coming from us, as our analysis of 
attunement showed. To foreshadow our direction by quoting Iris Murdoch, ‘The 
ordinary person does not, unless corrupted by philosophy, believe that he creates 
values by his choices’ (2001 p95). Here I think, as so many times already on 
Heidegger’s recommendation, we would do well to heed this everyday voice. In this 
                                                        
18See also, for example, Jonathan Lear’s characterization of radical irony as revealing a distance 
between what we aim at in taking up certain possibilities, and the particular norms and 
standards that are constitutive of those possibilities:  ‘my ironic experience with teaching 
manifests an inchoate intimation that there is something valuable about teaching— something 
excellent as a way of being human—that isn’t quite caught in contemporary social pretense or in 
normal forms of questioning that pretense.’ (2011  p22) 
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sense of not finding its origins in us, this goodness, that at which we aim, is beyond 
us. And not just beyond in the sense of a societal understanding that I might one day 
catch up with. As I have argued, this ‘outside’ is that which can never become wholly 
‘inside’ – it always remains beyond our grasp. To follow Murdoch and Charles 
Taylor once again here, we can see this phenomenologically in the way that our 
experience contains gradations of goodness that always point to the possibility of a 
better. All possibilities that present themselves do so as better than others, but none as 
perfect. There is always better, there is always a ‘beyond this particular possibility’. 
There are always further adumbrations of ‘good’ yet to be revealed, that we do not 
currently have access to or understanding of. To borrow an idea from Emerson’s 
essay ‘Circles’ (2003), our experience contains within it the idea that around every 
circle another can be drawn. There is always a beyond that our taking up possibilities 
aims at and aspires to. As we already saw, Charles Taylor sees this relationship to 
something like the good as an: 
inescapable feature of human life […]in order to make minimal sense of our 
lives, in order to have an identity, we need an orientation to the good, which 
means some sense of qualitative discrimination, of the incomparably higher. 
(Taylor 1989 p47) 
Given that Heidegger in places himself uses the term, I think we are justified to 
point to this beyond as the ‘good’ in a Heideggerian account, so long as we 
remember that this ‘good’ includes but is not limited to what we might call the 
‘moral’, and essentially contains within itself an enigmatic character of that which 
is not fully graspable by us. This enigmatic character should not be lost by adding 
to it the idea of ‘goodness’ as capturing that towards which we strive. What is 
good or best remains forever only partially revealed to us, always undergoing more 
or less radical revision. As the Socratic dialogues show, the search for the good is 
relentlessly aporetic. Despite our constant pull to its direction, the good remains 
enigmatic. 
We must not let analogies or our first contact with Plato lead us to believe 
that the Good is some big sphere in the sky that can show us what to do, as I shall 
explore further in the next chapter. Like being for Heidegger, good is not a being. 
Rather, good is that always beyond that we aim at that structures our experience - 
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that is contained within our experience, yet is always beyond that experience. It is 
that in light of which the experience shows up.  
So is ‘good’ the term that should be used to capture this enigma? While 
Heidegger does use the term ‘good’, the idea of ‘truth’ is also used in his 
discussion.19 In some such cases, an awareness of the difficulty of this connection 
is highlighted. For example, in speaking of the sun analogy here in Basic Problems 
of Phenomenology, the sun is identified with truth: 
The understanding of truth is the condition of possibility for scope and access to 
the actual. We must here relinquish the idea of interpreting in all its dimensions 
this inexhaustible simile. (BPP p284) 
Perhaps ‘truth’ is the better term for capturing that which we remain gripped by, 
that structures our existence yet remains perpetually beyond, as Emerson’s 
characterization here has it: 
Our life is an apprenticeship to the truth, that around every circle another can be 
drawn; that there is no end in nature, but every end is a beginning; that there is 
always another dawn risen on mid-noon, and under every deep a lower deep 
opens. (2003 p225) 
Shortly after Heidegger’s link of Plato’s sun with ‘truth’, we read: 
How the [epekeina] must be defined, what the “beyond” means, what the idea 
of the good signifies in Plato and in what way the idea of the good is that which 
is supposed to render knowledge and truth possible – all this is in many respects 
obscure. (BPP p285-286) 
This obscurity is essential. What this ‘beyond’ is, is ultimately for Heidegger the 
enigmatic open question of our facticity that we can’t help but strive to get at, 
                                                        
19 It is perhaps worth remember that with Heidegger’s conception of ‘understanding’, any 
distinction between truth as pertaining to knowledge, and goodness to action, breaks down 
given that our fundamental relationship to what ‘is’, our understanding of what is (and so what is 
true) consists of projection into possibilities and not just theoretical knowing.  
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beneath, or beyond, which placing a name on risks limiting and closing off as an 
enigma. The terms ‘good’, ‘meaningful’, or ‘true’, all point to our relation to that 
which is beyond us, to that which we can never fully grasp, capture, or solve, but that 
which we always strive for, that which always matters to us and always solicits us. 
Each might be thought to include the other in some sense, and thus we can see no 
obvious priority of that which is the ‘ultimate’ beyond.  
In some ways it might be most faithful to Heidegger’s word to call this 
‘beyond’ and our relationship to it ‘being’ and our always partial disclosure of it.20In 
which case we might describe the way that this disclosure reveals itself as always 
partial, always pointing beyond itself, and note the way that we are always already 
engaged in the project of disclosing. Yet I think the idea of the ‘good’ best captures 
the grip of the enigma, the way that this enigma is something I ‘aim’ at and find 
myself striving for and drawn to. In relation to our agency, I think ‘good’ is often the 
most appropriate characterization. 
Whatever it is called, I think this enigma that we are submitted to, gripped by, 
is an aspect of our thrownness that Blattner neglects, if not rejects completely with his 
comments on a ‘transcendent good’, although perhaps this is with a more substantive 
notion of ‘good’ in mind. Yet I think the account of the flexibility of our 
commitments depends upon such a notion of being gripped by that which is beyond 
any particular commitment, which also feeds in to the idea of the vulnerability of our 
commitments that Blattner is alive to. When we see that our commitments need to 
change, we see them as bad, mistaken, or meaningless; when we see that new 
attachments must take their place (which they must), we see other possibilities as 
better, or the truth, as more meaningful. And it is our aiming at this, our being attuned 
to this, which facilitates the breakdown of old possibilities and the replacement with 
new. 
Despite this important omission, the beginning of a move away from the 
traditional model in Blattner chimes with my account so far. In fact, my positive 
suggestion for how taking responsibility is to be understood is, I think, to be found 
                                                        
20 This appears to be what Heidegger comes to have in mind as he talks of our striving for being 
in a discussion of Plato’s cave in The Essence of Truth lectures of 1932. 
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implicitly in some of Blattner’s remarks. Blattner talks of rejecting seeing only the 
‘crude’ situation in favour of ‘clearly seeing’(2013 p333), allowing the ‘subtlety and 
‘nuance’ (2013 p330) of the genuine situation to appear. We are told that being 
authentic ‘expands one’s vision’ beyond our own narrow confines (2013 p325-326). 
Being inauthentic is to ‘fail to notice’ – failing to notice instead of ‘attending to these 
changes in one’s attunement’ (2012 p172 – emphasis mine). It is from this latter idea 
of attending, of attention, implicit in the ideas of expanding vision and being 
perceptive to subtlety and nuance, that I propose we can understand what it means to 
be responsive, and so to be responsible. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, on the basis of the analysis of chapters one to four, I have argued that 
attempts to read Heideggerian accounts of taking responsibility on the traditional 
model as lying in the power of the subject – whether as reflective judgement, choice, 
wholeheartedness, or independence from das Man – fall short. These models, 
represented in compelling forms by Crowell, Han-Pile, McManus, and Withy 
respectively, each offer important insights that will be taken up in my own account in 
the next chapter. 
I then looked to Blattner’s account, which I argued pointed away from the 
traditional model. In virtue of the similarities with my own account so far, in 
particular the idea of anxiety as revealing the vulnerability of what matters, progress 
was made in understanding what an account of taking responsibility that is sensitive 
to Heidegger’s insights will look like. We have seen that to take responsibility 
involves being in some way ‘responsive’ to the way we’re attuned in a manner that 
acknowledges the vulnerability of our deepest commitments, and how this can be 
seen as a ‘readiness for anxiety’ in accordance with Heidegger’s description. To be 
responsible one must be receptive to the solicitations of the world.  However I also 
argued that Blattner’s reading importantly misses our thrownness into the enigma of 
Dasein, before justifying characterizing this as the enigma of the good. 
In the final chapter, taking inspiration from Iris Murdoch, I will propose that 
taking responsibility for our being-in-the-world means becoming attentive. 
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‘Tell me to what you pay attention and I will tell you who you are.’ (Ortega y 
Gasset (1962 p94)  
Chapter Six - Attention 
In this chapter, I will outline what I take attention to be, and will argue for why a 
Heideggerian account of taking responsibility for our being-in-the-world should be 
understood in its terms. Through the idea of attention, I seek to provide an account of 
taking responsibility that is sensitive to the insights gained from the preceding 
analysis of thrownness and its first-personal manifestation in attunement. The aim is 
to provide a recognizable account of taking responsibility, and through the use of 
examples I will aim to show that attention or attentiveness captures what we 
recognize to be taking responsibility. 
It should be pointed out again that this is a ‘Heideggerian’ account of taking 
responsibility. This is not to say that Heidegger himself speaks of authenticity in 
terms of attention. But neither does he characterize authenticity in terms of giving 
reasons, making a pre-reflective existentiell choice, being wholehearted, or separating 
oneself from das Man. As mentioned, Heidegger’s writing of Division II of Being 
and Time was notoriously rushed1, and this, for some, explains the difficulty in 
extracting a clear account from Heidegger’s words of how authenticity should be 
understood. The variety of interpretations that Heidegger’s talk of authenticity 
attracts, indicates that understanding exactly what it means requires going beyond 
Heidegger’s own words to some degree. 
 As we have seen, Heidegger does offer us some tools with his talk of 
resoluteness, choosing to choose, etc. But the meaning of these is highly contestable, 
illustrated with Han-Pile’s and McManus’ diverging interpretations of ‘the choice to 
choose’. The point becomes stark when we see how resoluteness can either be taken 
to mean something like Frankfurtian wholeheartedness or its very opposite as 
‘unclosing’ disclosure (Kompridis 2006).2 
                                                        
1 See Kisiel (1993) Appendix C, as also referenced by McManus in his introduction to Heidegger, 
Authenticity, and the Self. 
2 See Kompridis’ interpretation of ‘decision’ and ‘resoluteness’: ‘The German word for decision is 
Entscheidung, whose literal meaning refers to the act of unsheathing, as in unsheathing one’s 
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Rather than beginning from textual analysis of the concept of ‘authenticity’ in 
Division II, the idea of attention arises as a result of my analysis thus far of ideas 
introduced in Division I. And while it is not a characterization that Heidegger himself 
uses, I think we can see this as a Heideggerian account insofar as it finds its origin in 
Heidegger’s distinctive conceptions of thrownness and attunement (including 
anxiety). The plausibility of this as a Heideggerian reading will come from the way 
that ‘attention’ fits with Heidegger’s analysis as I have characterized it. In addition, 
the account will also tie in, by contrast, with the idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity 
that characterize falling. 
 
Heidegger and Murdoch 
 
The use of the idea of ‘attention’ as a philosophical concept finds its most prominent 
home in the works of Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch, the latter under the former’s 
influence. And it is with the aid of Iris Murdoch that I think the idea of attention can 
appropriately be used to help us understand a Heideggerian account of responsibility.  
On the face of it, using Iris Murdoch to help us give a Heideggerian account 
of responsibility seems unlikely or perhaps ill-advised. Murdoch sees Heidegger as a 
romantic existentialist, as one who writes with ‘superficial gloom’ that conceals self-
satisfaction and a feeling of superiority over, and contempt for, the ordinary human 
condition (2001 p49). At one point Murdoch even goes so far as to posit that 
‘Heidegger is Lucifer in person.’ (2001 p70). It is not just Heidegger’s style or 
character that cause this ire – the idea of authenticity for Murdoch is associated with a 
problematic ‘force of will’ (2001 p49). Likewise, the concept of responsibility is also 
associated with such a will, as well as with some misguided ideals of sincerity, or 
freedom as detachment in the form of choice, decision, or rationality (2001 p48, 78-
                                                        
sword. But Entschlossenheit is not synonymous with decision, or decisiveness, or a manly 
readiness to take action; it is synonymous with Erschlossenheit, with disclosure, or disclosedness. 
“Unclosing” or “unclosedness” would serve as a much more accurate and felicitous translation. It 
preserves the common semantic origin of both terms in the verb schliessen, to close, as well as 
the characterization of human sense making activities as activities of disclosing meaning and 
possibility. More important, it draws attention to the receptive character of the activity to which 
both terms refer.’ (Kompridis 2006 p58) For what it’s worth, as should be clear, I would favour 
this interpretation. 
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79). The ideals of authenticity and responsibility are conceptions that Murdoch 
spends a great deal of time arguing against.  
But as I have shown, precisely these conceptions of authenticity or 
responsibility are not ones that best capture a Heideggerian picture. It seems Murdoch 
herself perhaps allows room for this with the admission of never being too sure of 
having understood Heidegger (2001 p49). Additionally, her detailed (unfinished) 
engagement with his work shortly before her death3, as McManus (2015b) notes, 
further suggests that Murdoch herself saw something in Heidegger’s work outside of 
the picture of romantic freedom, sincerity, or self-assertion that she derided. And 
indeed, as McManus shows, important points of convergence (which McManus traces 
to the influence of Aristotle) can be seen between the two thinkers that suggests the 
possibility of a fruitful exchange.4 
Beyond McManus’ idea of a kind of shared Aristotelianism, I believe a deep 
core of convergence can be seen to run through their thought, which can be viewed 
from various angles. Both thinkers aim at something like the unity of existence: 
Heidegger’s lifelong struggle with, and pursuit of, the univocity of being can be seen 
to be captured by Murdoch’s understanding of the good as a kind of ‘shadowy, 
unachieved unity’ stretching through the whole of existence (e.g. intro. to SZ, 
Murdoch 2001 p95). Both thinkers famously tread the borders of mysticism 
(Murdoch 2001 72)5; both eschew the idea of a fact/value distinction (e.g. Murdoch 
2001 p296, SZ 71); both want to retain an idea of the human as fallen that is not tied 
to theology (Murdoch 2001 p27, SZ 179-180).  
                                                        
3 See ‘Sein und Zeit: Pursuit of Being’ in Broackes (2012) 
4 McManus focusses on a shared Aristotelian heritage in order to show, with the help of Murdoch, 
how conceptual ‘seeing as’ is possible on a Heideggerian account in a way that can accommodate 
the heterogeneity and novelty of concrete experience. Interestingly, at times McManus 
characterizes this kind of conceptual seeing as a way of being responsive to, and responsible for, 
the norms of the world. It’s not clear how this discussion of responsibility as conceptual seeing 
fits with McManus’ account of taking responsibility and authenticity that we saw earlier. But in 
contrast to that earlier account of responsibility, I take this ‘seeing as’ picture to cohere with the 
account of responsibility that I will propose. However, constraints of space mean I cannot discuss 
the interesting issue of the particularity of the concrete further here. 
5 Heidegger’s later work is more commonly considered to lean towards mysticism, although 
throughout his career Heidegger held an interest in mysticism, in particular that of Meister 
Eckhart (See Kisiel 1995 throughout, but esp. p18, 76 and Part I section 2). For all its 
systematicity, Heidegger’s search in SZ for the ‘transcendens pure and simple’ (SZ 38) can be seen 
to retain some connection with mystic thought. 
6 See also p27 and 253 in Existentialists and Mystics (Murdoch 1997) 
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But there are three important aspects of this core that Murdoch and Heidegger 
share that I take to be most relevant here; three aspects of Murdoch’s account that 
map features of Heidegger’s thought that we have seen to be relevant in our 
discussion of taking responsibility or being responsible. In explicating them, the aim 
is to justify turning to an idea of attention inspired by, and developed in conjunction 
with, Murdoch.  
The first important shared feature is that Murdoch rejects a Cartesian picture 
of the subject, a picture that she sees as underlying the kind of existentialism that 
Heidegger too rejected as a mischaracterization of his own thought.7 For Murdoch, 
this dominant existentialist philosophy8 that she finds in the moral sphere is 
problematic because it is: 
still Cartesian and egocentric. Briefly put, our picture of ourselves has become 
too grand, we have isolated, and identified ourselves with, an unrealistic 
conception of will, we have lost the vision of a reality separate from ourselves. 
(2001 p46) 
We can see this as corresponding to the central Heideggerian idea, exemplified in the 
idea of ‘being-in-the-world’, that we are not a separable locus from which being 
emerges. Being is not reducible to the subject; rather, being and Dasein require one 
another as correlates, and one is not reducible to the other. As we saw from our 
analysis of attunement, we exist as the ‘between’, as one pole always in relation to 
another that exists and impacts upon us in a way that is outside the control of our 
particular projections9. This shared feature is that which Frankfurt and the positions 
                                                        
7 See, for example, in the Letter on Humanism (e.g. p157-158) 
8 Murdoch uses this term to capture not only the philosophical movement that found its centre of 
gravity around Sartre in France of the 1940s, but also the Anglophone moral philosophy that 
surrounded her in England at the time, seeing the latter as being in essence a version of the 
former. 
9 For Heidegger being cannot be separate from Dasein (SZ §44) and interestingly, Antonaccio’s 
(2000) reading of Murdoch as a ‘reflexive realist’ suggests that the same is true of Murdoch:  
‘The vision of the good is only available through subjective resonance. 
We can conclude from this discussion that the idea of the good implicit in Murdoch’s account of 
realistic vision is a reflexive principle whose objectivity is not conceived independently of a 
thinking, valuing consciousness. The good as a criterion of truthful moral vision is not purely 
external to consciousness but is located between mind and world.’ (p142). Accordingly, I think 
the ‘reality separate from ourselves’ in Murdoch’s should be understood as a reality that is not 
subject to our grasp or control, and whose being cannot be subsumed to ours. 
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represented by McManus and Withy seem to ignore in assuming some kind of 
independence or disconnect from the world and others when taking responsibility.  
In acknowledging that individuals are always bound to that which is ‘beyond’ 
them, Murdoch does not then tie them exclusively to social norms, as a position like 
Blattner’s threatened to. Famously for Murdoch, as we saw too for Heidegger, that 
which is beyond us as individuals is not confined to the world and others, but rather 
points to the perpetual beyond which Murdoch, as at times Heidegger, sees in terms 
of the Platonic Good. As with Heidegger, this ‘beyond’ for Murdoch is not a being 
that we can see apart from beings: ‘The Good itself is not visible[…] it cannot be 
experienced or represented or defined.’ (2001 p68) 
And just as we saw that for Heidegger there is no solid, determinate basis 
underpinning the striving of our existence, so too for Murdoch: 
The only genuine way to be good is to be good ‘for nothing’ […] That ‘for 
nothing’ is indeed the experienced correlate of the invisibility or non-
representable blankness of the idea of Good itself. (2001 p69-70)10 
The good for Murdoch (which she also links with the beautiful, the true, and with 
‘reality’, of which the latter two resonate with ‘being’ for Heidegger), as we saw 
with Heidegger’s use of the term, is that which is always beyond particular 
possibilities and that in the light of which particular possibilities show up. 
Antonaccio (2000) captures this point clearly in what she calls the ‘formal’ 
component of Murdoch’s idea of the good, a description which shows how I think 
the idea can be seen to work in a Heideggerian vein: 
The good is a transcendental notion that provides the condition for the 
possibility of moral identity without itself specifying any substantive 
conception of value or identity. Further, the transcendental idea of the good 
includes the notion of perfection even at this formal level. This is because the 
idea of value itself presupposes qualitative distinctions of worth that depend on 
                                                        
10 We can see this as linking to the way that anxiety is at times characterized by Heidegger as 
revealing the ‘nothing’. 
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the notions of good and bad, better and worse, truth and falsity in relation to 
some ideal of “the best” of most perfect. (Antonaccio 2000 p15)  
The inclusion of the word ‘moral’ before ‘identity’ in the quote above is, I believe, 
a slip from Antonaccio, who in the next paragraph distinguishes this formal notion 
of good for Murdoch with a substantive meaning which ‘specifies the specifically 
moral content of this idea of perfection’ (ibid.). This substantive content points to 
something like resisting (as far as possible) the ‘fat relentless ego’ (2001 p51) that 
threatens to dominate our agency, and instead appreciating the individual reality of 
other human beings. It is not the substantive but the formal notion of good that I 
see as mapping on to the Heideggerian project, whose domain is ‘broader’ than the 
moral. The lack of substantive content is particularly important for Heidegger 
when we consider the ultimately enigmatic nature of that on the basis of, and 
toward which, we strive. We will return to the ‘substantive’ issue in due course but 
for now, it is important to flag this as a potentially significant point of divergence 
between Heidegger and Murdoch.11 This same difference can perhaps be seen in 
the way that Murdoch will talk of virtue, while Heidegger will talk of authenticity. 
While this is not insignificant, both nonetheless see these respective terms as 
capturing something like an expression or actualization of a deep human essence 
to which we have a propensity, yet which must constantly resist a counter 
tendency (for Heidegger falling, for Murdoch the ego).  
                                                        
11 In Heidegger’s lecture course of 1932 (beyond the primary range of my analysis), Heidegger 
seems to go further than saying the ‘good’ is broader than the moral, and seems to positively 
reject any moral connotations at all. Heidegger at first rejects any kind of delimitation: 
‘We must once again underline the necessity of freeing ourselves at the very outset from any 
kind of sentimental conception of this idea of the good, but also from all perspectives, 
conceptions, and definitions belonging to Christian morality and its secularized corruptions (or 
any kind of ethic), where the good is conceived as the opposite of the bad and the bad conceived 
as the sinful. It is not at all a matter of ethics or morality, no more than it is a matter of a logical 
or epistemological principle.’ (ET p72) 
Before then seemingly going further and potentially excluding the moral: 
‘[Good] does not have any kind of moral meaning: ethics has corrupted the fundamental 
meaning of this word. […] The good is the sound, the enduring, as distinct from the harmless 
meaning suitable for aunties: a good man, i.e. respectable, but without insight and power.’ (ET 
p77) 
Whatever the merits of Heidegger’s thought there, I see no reason on the basis of Heidegger’s 
thought around Being and Time to exclude the moral. 
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Importantly though, we have seen that Murdoch shares Heidegger’s anti-
Cartesianism in seeing that we are always necessarily bound to that which is 
beyond us. We have seen that for Murdoch too this beyond is ultimately something 
that is perpetually beyond us that our agency nonetheless aims at. It is this to 
which we are ultimately drawn, ‘a magnetic but inexhaustible reality’ that we feel 
ourselves solicited to (Murdoch 2001 p41). We can see this is the same 
inexhaustibility of the enigma that we are thrown into, which Murdoch, as at times 
Heidegger, identifies with something like the Platonic Good. 
The second important feature that Murdoch’s picture shares with 
Heidegger’s is related to the rejection of an isolable Cartesian subject, and captures 
another feature that we have seen in the analysis of thrownness and attunement. As 
we saw, for Heidegger Dasein is always attuned, and this attunement is the basis 
from which possibilities arise and are taken up. This contrasts with the view that 
sees Dasein as a ‘free floating potentiality for being’ or liberium arbitrium (SZ 
144). Like Heidegger, of central importance for Murdoch is a rejection of an idea 
of a pure will (or any other kind of ‘pure’ faculty such as rationality) that is in 
some way detached and free to move independently from all ‘empirical’ factors.12 
Instead, Murdoch gives an account in which our actions and choices arise from ‘a 
continuous fabric of being’ (2001 p29), a background of ‘attachments’. This 
corresponds with the account given earlier of attunement as the privileged first-
personal experience of our thrownness (which is often partly characterized as these 
‘empirical’ factors as we saw in chapter one).  
This background from which choices and possibilities arise can be seen to 
capture what positions represented by Han-Pile threaten to obscure with language 
of unprepared leaps. Attachments for Murdoch, like attunement for Heidegger, 
structure our experience in terms of the possibilities that show up for us. It is in 
light of this, rejecting the leaping of an empty will, that Murdoch claims ‘I can 
only choose within the world I can see’ (2001 p35-36). ‘Seeing’ and choosing to 
take up possibilities already depends upon some kind of affective relation to those 
possibilities. In keeping with our rejection of positions where power and 
responsibility come through choice, for Murdoch we need to already be attuned to 
                                                        
12 Murdoch here typically characterizes these ignored factors in terms of empirical psychology, 
Freudian psychology, and Marxism. 
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(or have some ‘attachment’ to in Murdoch’s parlance) a possibility for it to show 
up to us as a possibility. As a result, for Murdoch it is important (perhaps most 
important) to look to the background attachments that ‘[lie] behind and in 
between’ (2001 p65) our actions and choices that in fact make them what they are. 
The third feature that Murdoch’s account shares with our Heideggerian picture 
can be seen through the way Murdoch appears to share Heidegger’s well-known 
veneration of the ‘peasant’: ‘The virtuous peasant knows [..], although what he knows 
he might be at a loss to say.’  (2001 p72) Underlying this, we can see the rejection of 
a picture of the human as finding its greatest expression in reflection and explicit 
thought. This is the picture, represented above by Crowell, that we saw must be 
rejected on a Heideggerian account. And it seems on Murdoch’s too, as her account 
of human being doesn’t necessarily find its pinnacle in explicit reflection – rather, ‘it 
must be possible to do justice to both Socrates and the virtuous peasant.’ (2001 p2) 
We note also here that while for Murdoch, as I have suggested for Heidegger, explicit 
reflection is not a necessary feature of her account of human being at its utmost, this 
is not to say that explicit reflection is thereby excluded; the virtuous peasant and 
Socrates are to be included in her story. 
Thus we can see the deep similarities between the basis Murdoch has for her 
account of the virtuous human being and the basis we have obtained for a 
Heideggerian account of the authentic, and by inclusion responsible, human being. 
Like Heidegger, Murdoch denies the idea of a self-subsisting subject from which the 
existence of all else comes, in favour of acknowledging the foundational, necessary 
relation to that which is beyond the subject. She sees this beyond as ultimately being 
the ‘good’, which transcends any attempt to grasp it, shapes our agency, and which 
we continually aim at without any ultimate ‘ground’ from which we do so, in the 
same way that I have proposed Heidegger’s account of the ‘enigma’ should be 
understood. Like Heidegger, Murdoch views human agency as constituted by and 
arising from that to which we already have an affective attachment or bond – all 
particular possibilities are taken up on the basis of these attachments. And like 
Heidegger, Murdoch’s account seeks to avoid setting explicit reflection at its summit, 
whilst not banishing it all together. 
It is on this conceptual basis that is shared with Heidegger, and is so relevant 
to our discussion, that Murdoch invokes the idea of ‘attention’ and being attentive as 
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the route to, and substance of, virtue; it is the ‘instrument and outcome of moral 
growth’ (Cf. Bagnoli 2012 p218). From this, we can think of the idea of ‘attention’ 
and being attentive as being expressive in a special way of the distinctive picture of 
human being that Murdoch portrays, which is shared by Heidegger. 
Before advancing attentiveness as a model of responsible, it is first necessary 
to examine what attention and attentiveness are. In doing so, we shall see how the 
comportment of attention avoids the problems that we have seen other possible 
Heideggerian understandings of responsibility meet, in a way that remains true to the 
insights of Heidegger’s idea of attunement. I will then show why the idea of being 
attentive is an appropriate way of understanding being responsible, taking 
responsibility, on a Heideggerian account. 
 
A Phenomenology of Attention 
 
I assume that attention is something familiar to us, something that we can easily point 
to in our own experience. We might think of when we are studying or learning, as 
perhaps when listening to a lecture or reading a text. Murdoch gives the example of 
learning a language, Russian. Or we might think of when we are talking seriously 
with a close friend, perhaps about a difficult time they are going through. In each 
case, if comporting ourselves as we’d wish in these situations, I think we would see 
ourselves as attending to, giving or paying attention to, the Russian instruction or our 
friend’s words.  
 In doing so, we can think that we ‘focus’ on the textbook in front of us, or our 
friend’s words. Our energies are directed toward this and not towards other things that 
may otherwise hold them. If we decide that we need to do our Russian homework and 
begin going through our textbook, we find that we ignore the conversation on the 
radio, the other books on the desk, or the thought of what we are going to eat for 
dinner, as our thoughts, our vision, our bodies, are directed toward the textbook. 
Likewise, when talking with our upset friend we ignore the phone vibrating in our 
pocket, the newspaper on the sofa, and the plans we may have had to spend the time 
relaxing or reading. We turn ourselves to face them, and direct our eyes and ears upon 
them as they speak. In paying attention, attending to, we orient ourselves toward the 
object of our attention to the relative exclusion of other things. The greater the degree 
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to which we do this, the more of ourselves we orient without remainder, the more we 
can be said to be attending or paying attention. 
This orientation seems also to require something like constancy. We would 
not wish to say we were attending to learning Russian or our friend’s troubles if we 
read or listened only for a minute, before making a tea, perhaps to return for another 
minute or two, before answering an email. We might think of attention as necessarily 
requiring some kind of duration, a kind of minimum time span. But I think here, in 
characterizing attention as a mode of comportment for a Heideggerian model, we 
should remember Heidegger’s insights regarding existential temporality. As we have 
seen, the everyday sense of clock time as a series of ‘now’ points is a derivative form 
of the more primordial existential temporality that is captured by the structure of 
Dasein as fallen thrown projection. Rather than considering attention as requiring a 
minimum kind of duration in everyday ‘clock time’ then, I would suggest that the 
kind of constancy that captures our experience of attending to something is to be 
understood as projecting on the basis of that to which we are attending. It is taking the 
object of attention as our point of orientation. When we attend to something or 
someone, we project on the basis of that or them, or more specifically as we have 
seen, we project on the basis of our attunement to that or them. When attending to 
Russian, it is on the basis of my attunement to this object that I take up possibilities: I 
might physically move to better read the Russian text, note down vocabulary, or reach 
for a grammar book in search of a rule. The Russian text is that centre that my acts 
are aimed towards. Likewise, when listening to a friend I take them as the basis for 
my projection, I take them and their trouble as my point of orientation, the locus for 
my thoughts and actions: I ask them questions about how they are feeling; I leave 
silence for them to collect their thoughts and to talk or not as they so wish; I place a 
hand on their back to give comfort. The reason why the brief stints of reading or 
listening are not really attending is not their brevity of duration, but rather because 
they fail to project on the basis of Russian or the friend. They fail to take them as 
their point of orientation. Rather, in these examples we project on the basis of other 
concerns, such as our desire for tea, the issue of a forthcoming email, or perhaps 
simply a desire precisely not to attend. 
The idea of the ‘constancy’ of attention, I think, captures another feature of 
attention. This orienting ourselves around, projecting on the basis of, can also be seen 
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in the way that we might characterize attention colloquially as becoming ‘absorbed’ 
in that to which we are attending. I think this potentially suggests a loss of self that 
we shall see is misleading. But nonetheless I think it captures a sense of giving 
oneself over to, heeding, that which is the object of attention. In projecting on the 
basis of it, we are receptive to it as something that doesn’t just exist as an extension 
of ourselves, but has an existence beyond us. We say in paying attention that we ‘lose 
ourselves’ in the Russian book because we orient ourselves around this: the truth of 
Russian language (as instantiated in our textbook) we might say becomes our 
measure. Equally, in attending to our friend, we take them and the troubles they 
describe as the basis for our projection, as we let the truth of their difficulties and 
what is best for them be the standard for our actions. The object of attention becomes 
the locus of our projection.  
Yet it is important to note that despite taking the object of attention as the 
basis for our projection, ‘giving ourselves over to it’ in some sense, the self still 
remains and is not ‘lost’ in the object – both subject and object poles are necessarily 
‘there’ in attention. While we focus on the Russian text or our friend’s words, we are 
still ourselves projecting into our particular possibilities that allow the language or 
our friend’s troubles to manifest themselves: even when engrossed in the Russian 
textbook the particular self remains, searching for the grammar rules we don’t yet 
understand, pronouncing aloud the words most alien to us, rereading sentences we 
find difficult. So too when talking to our friend: we ask questions to facilitate their 
story, we might ask them if their trouble is similar to a particular previous occasion, 
we might make the kind of jokey comment we are aware they like if it seems they 
need a release of tension. Our identity still remains and continues to structure the 
projection. Here the resonance of the word attunement might be helpful. As the idea 
of attunement suggests, two poles are required. This is true of tuning an instrument: 
both the instrument and a standard note (such as that from a tuning fork) are required. 
In tuning, the instrument itself is adjusted and tweaked, its particular sound taken into 
account. But it is the tuning fork’s note which is the focus, the standard, and point of 
orientation for the tuning.  While the instrument and its particular tones are 
considered, they are so always in relation to the standard note as that at which they 
aim. 
176 
 
This relates to another way in which we are still ‘there’ when attending. In her 
essay ‘Reflections on the Right Use of School Studies with a View to the Love of 
God’, Simon Weil describes school children’s efforts at being attentive: 
Most often attention is confused with a kind of muscular effort. If one says to 
one’s pupils: “Now you must pay attention,” one sees them contracting their 
brows, holding their breath, stiffening their muscles. If after two minutes they 
are asked what they have been paying attention to, they cannot reply. They have 
not been paying attention. They have been contracting their muscles. (Weil 
2009 p109-110) 
I think this captures the idea raised above that attention is a kind of orientation to, a 
giving oneself over to, that to which we are attending. It is partly because the school 
children see the point of focus as themselves, concentrating on their own exertion and 
act of attending, that they fail to attend. But equally it points us to the kind of 
awareness we have when attending. Weil seems to suggest that the students’ ability to 
retrospectively make explicit what they have been attending to is indicative of 
whether they have or have not been attending. And this characterization maps that of 
pre-reflective consciousness (that we saw typically characterized attunement in 
chapter two), suggesting that this is at least one way in which we attend. 
If we consider what it’s like to attend, I think this rings true. As we saw, we 
might characterize attending by saying that we are absorbed in the work or the 
conversation, or even that we ‘lose ourselves’ in them. We saw that this language 
captures the focus of the activity and the point of orientation (where the particular 
self, our identity, still plays an important part). But this idea of ‘absorption’ also 
captures the way that when we are attending, we often stop explicitly reflecting or 
thinking about what we are doing. When attending to our study of Russian, we can 
imagine becoming engrossed in trying to translate a paragraph or reading down the 
list of verb conjugations. I would suggest that here we would not be explicitly aware 
of what we were doing, nor necessarily explicitly deliberating about or reflecting 
about the content. Equally, when asking questions to our friend to hear more about 
their difficult time, or placing an arm on their shoulder for support, I think in both 
cases we would typically not be explicitly reflecting on, nor deliberating about, what 
we were doing. Yet, as Weil suggests, if interrupted and asked about the Russian 
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conjugations we were trying to understand, or if, after our friend has left, we stop to 
reflect on the conversation and their situation, we would be able to do this. So while 
there is some sense in which attention can feel like we lose ourselves in that to which 
we are attending, our reflections on what it’s like to attend suggest that we remain 
pre-reflectively aware and thus pre-reflectively still ‘there’. We might think of this in 
contrast to cases where we become transfixed or mesmerized by something or 
someone in a kind of stupor; when asked in this case what we were attending to, we 
may very well be lost for all but the most basic words. 
This type of contrast case points to another feature of attention. In this kind of 
entranced state with a thing or person that might bear some formal similarities with 
attention, we have no sense of anything beyond the object of our gaze. Yet, if we look 
again to Simone Weil and her description of the particular kind of ‘effort’ of attention 
that can be seen in some form in academic work, we see a hint that attention proper is 
not like that: ‘When we set out to do a piece of work it is necessary to wish to do it 
correctly, because such a wish is indispensable in any true effort’ (Weil 2009 p108). 
The idea here is that when we attend to something, in this example academic work, 
we do so in the light of that which is beyond the work in some sense, namely here 
‘correctness’ or truth, but which we might also capture by saying we wish to do the 
work ‘well’. In light of the analysis earlier, we might say we wish to do so in light of 
the good. I think something like this can be seen if we look to what it’s like to attend 
again in our examples. In attending to learning Russian, as Murdoch describes, ‘My 
work is a progressive revelation of something which exists independently of me’ 
(2001 p87). In attending to Russian, we attend to it as something ‘true’, as something 
whose truth comes from beyond us: we read its vocabulary, its grammar, as 
something whose truth does not come ‘from us’ but ‘to us’.  
I think this perhaps become manifest in the way that, when attending, we 
might stop in puzzlement at the textbook’s apparent flouting of a rule we thought we 
knew, before looking to check a different text for help – the possible ‘breakdown’ of 
its truth makes our orientation to it in light of its truth manifest here. I think the same 
‘beyond’ can be seen when we attend to our friend. We orient ourselves to our friend, 
take them and their trouble as our point of orientation, the basis of our projection. But 
we do this in the light of, ‘with an eye to’, the idea of a beyond, the true or the good. 
Even while we are fully engaged in their words, oriented to them - their need to be 
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comforted, their request for an opinion - this is done with an eye to what is best for 
them. Again, in the experience of the possible ‘breakdown’ of what is best for them - 
as they ask us to do something that appears to make their situation worse, or as we 
see the need to gently contradict them with an uncomfortable truth – we see that our 
orientation is to them in the light of what is best, what is true, or what is meaningful 
perhaps. We give ourselves over to them in the light of that which is beyond them 
(and beyond us too). We are oriented to their good. 
There is one final aspect of attending, being attentive, that can be seen in our 
examples. While we have pointed out that attention doesn’t require our explicitly 
reflecting on the object of attention, it is additionally worth pointing out that paying 
attention is not just a ‘mental’ activity, pre-reflective or otherwise13. Perhaps seen 
more clearly in the term ‘attending’ (as in attending an event, to business, to someone 
in need), rather than ‘paying attention’ which is usually associated with mental focus, 
I think attention as such includes our comportment more generally. It is something 
done with the whole self. As we saw, paying attention to Russian is constituted by 
positioning ourselves to read the textbook, searching through other sources for help, 
perhaps sounding out words to ourselves. So too, paying attention to our friend 
requires not just listening but asking questions, turning to face them with a suitable 
expression, resting an arm on their shoulder. So while Murdoch characterizes 
attention in terms of ‘looking’ at something, in the same way that Blattner used 
language of seeing, I think attention goes beyond this narrow range. This can be seen 
clearly if we imagine we were asked to attend, or ‘watch’ someone’s toddler whilst 
they were busy. This means not only focusing our mind’s gaze on them – it means 
running after them, taking away the pair of scissors they’ve inexplicably acquired, 
trying to comfort them if they are upset. Just as for Heidegger ‘seeing’ captures 
projecting into possibilities and not just gazing with one’s eyes (SZ 146), just as 
‘understanding’ too pertains to this projection and not an act of cognition, so too I 
think our own experiences of attending attest that to be attentive, to attend, also 
captures our practical comportment more broadly. 
                                                        
13 In her talk of attention, Iris Murdoch tends to focus on the devotion of our intellectual (if not 
necessarily reflective) energies, chiefly in order to make the point that the moral mind is not an 
extensionless point of pure reason or will. However I don’t think Murdoch says anything that 
precludes broadening attention to include our more general comportment. 
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Having looked to what it means to be attentive, to pay attention, we can begin 
to see how this model avoids the problems that we saw with other ways of thinking 
about Heideggerian understandings of being responsible that remained in the 
traditional model. As we saw, being attentive does not require that we ‘stand back’ 
and explicitly reflect or deliberate, as the model represented by Crowell suggested. 
From what we have seen, I think it is clear that being attentive avoids the picture of a 
kind of subject that is separable in some sense from the world, others, and das Man 
that we saw in positions represented by McManus and Withy. As Richard Moran puts 
it well, ‘Attention […] is in its very nature answerable to something outside oneself 
(Moran 2012 p187, emphasis mine). In attending to Russian or our friend we 
acknowledge that their existence is not subsumable to ours, and express this 
irreducible bond we have to that which is beyond us. In giving ourselves over to the 
object of our attention, in projecting on the basis of this object, we are receptive to 
this ‘beyond us’ in an exemplary way. And as the discussion of this attention in the 
light of the good (or true) suggests, this receptivity retains an eye to that beyond that 
we have called the good, the true, or the meaningful, that frames but is always beyond 
any particular possibility. To be attentive is not to be blindly fixated or ensnared to 
the particular object of attention, but to give oneself over to it in light of the good (or 
true) that is always beyond it. This is in contrast to Blattner’s picture where this 
enigmatic beyond was ignored. Relatedly, I think it is the idea of attention that we can 
see as that which is implicit in Blattner’s account that is expressive of the 
vulnerability of our commitments. As in the case of Blattner’s example, because a 
relationship of love is vulnerable we need to attend to it, to orient ourselves by it, 
rather than risk losing something important. 
While I have begun to show how the model of attention avoids some of the 
problems of the traditional accounts of responsibility, I will now show how this 
model of responsibility can also in fact help to explain the features of these traditional 
accounts. In doing so, the way my account avoids the problems with the traditional 
model will additionally be developed further. I shall begin by illustrating how the 
idea of attention can be seen to underlie the view that reflection is necessary for 
responsibility, before showing how this model can additionally explain the worry that 
led Han-Pile to go too far in the other direction and say that taking responsibility 
cannot be something that we are explicitly aware of. 
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Accounting for the Traditional Model 
 
 Reflection 
When thinking of attending to Russian or our friend’s troubles, we saw how it is 
possible that we do so without explicit reflective awareness. I think this can apply 
both to the fact that we are attending as such, and that to which we are attending: we 
might not be thinking of whether or how we are paying attention, and likewise we 
might not be explicitly reflecting on (deliberating about, judging etc.) the object of 
our attention, as might be the case when jumping to prevent a mishap to the toddler in 
our charge. 
 As we saw in particular with phrases such as ‘paying attention to’, attention is 
perhaps most commonly regarded as turning one’s mind’s eye to – giving something 
one’s conscious, explicit attention. And here this can help to explain why some kind 
of explicit reflection is thought to constitute taking responsibility. Given that paying 
attention (as we saw is also the case with attunement and understanding) is perhaps 
more readily associated with an explicit reflective act, we can see how taking 
responsibility might be thought to consist exclusively in this kind of explicit 
reflection. Perhaps, as in Crowell’s case, thinking about and judging, having and 
giving reasons, might be thought to be just the highest form of being attentive to the 
world, others, and the good. In contrast, we have seen that while this explicit form of 
attention is still attention, it is only part of the story, and not the most important part. 
As we saw in opposition to this picture, attention is often not explicit but pre-
reflective.  
But in contrast to Han-Pile, this everyday understanding of attention as 
something explicit and reflective is not wrong. In contrast to the way we cannot be 
reflectively aware of taking responsibility for Han-Pile, to think of responsibility in 
terms of being attentive allows us to see that in an important sense we can be aware 
of taking responsibility in a way that isn’t just after the fact. This seems to facilitate 
our everyday understanding, in keeping with Heidegger’s methodology.  
Additionally, if we see taking responsibility as becoming attentive, Han-Pile’s 
worry about being reflectively aware of taking responsibility can be understood and 
explained in a way that her account omitted. By analogy with listening, the worry 
might be put as follows: we might think that as soon as I think about listening, or 
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reflect on what I am listening to, I am no longer listening. In the example given 
earlier of comforting my friend, as soon as I reflect and think about my friend’s 
worries, or about my act of paying attention, I stop paying attention to the friend. 
Explicit reflection and judgement risk shifting the focus from the proper object of 
attention to the subject (perhaps the subject as the ‘ground of reasons’, as for 
Crowell), thus dissipating attention proper and responsibility with it. There is some 
credence to this worry, and perhaps there is indeed a tendency within reflection to 
drift away from the object of attention itself as we become engrossed in our own 
thoughts about the matter. I don’t think this necessarily holds in all cases though: a 
sentry on guard may be reflectively aware that they are listening attentively, that they 
are hearing every little sound, and they may reflect on exactly what those sounds are. 
Yet they may still be attentive, still give themselves over to what they are listening to 
by taking that as their point of orientation. Equally it seems possible to explicitly 
think about the need to be attentive, and possible to reflect on our friend’s worries, in 
a way that doesn’t take our attention away from them. While this account of attention 
can explain Han-Pile’s worry, I take it to also show how taking responsibility is 
possible in the kind of explicit way that is consistent with our everyday 
understanding. 
 
Choice 
The idea of attention can also help us make sense of how choice and decision arise in 
a way that avoids positing a kind of groundless leap that was shown to be problematic 
in accounts represented by Han-Pile’s. I will show, with the help of Murdoch, how 
attention is the important component underlying such choice. In doing so, given the 
way responsibility is so often linked with choice, some further support is given to the 
idea being attentive can be seen as an account of taking responsibility. 
As we saw in chapter three, in contrast to the idea of a kind of ‘groundless 
choosing’, we take up possibilities on the basis that we are attuned to them, that they 
matter to us. In arguing against philosophical conceptions of an extensionless willing, 
reasoning, or choosing, Iris Murdoch stresses this point as we saw: ‘I can only choose 
within the world I can see’ (2001 p35-36). Murdoch often uses this visual 
characterization, but her talk of ‘attachments’ suggests this is an aspect or metaphor 
for something broader, including that which we have characterized as attunement 
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For Murdoch, it is attention that is crucial in determining ‘the world we can 
see’, in determining our ‘attachments’ and the possibilities we take up. It is the first-
personal ‘work’ of attention that determines the strength with which possibilities 
show up and solicit me, and thus it is attention that can allow conflicting possibilities 
to appear, meaning a choice is to be made: 
If we ignore the prior work of attention and notice only the emptiness of the 
moment of choice we are likely to identify freedom with the outward movement 
since there is nothing else to identify it with. (2001 p36) 
For Murdoch, it is a failure to consider the work of attention that leads to pictures 
of choosing in a groundless way that was represented by Han-Pile earlier. 
Given that we take up possibilities on the basis of our attunement to them, what 
Murdoch calls our ‘attachment’ to them, this kind of attachment needs to ‘grow’ 
before we take them up. And this explains the way that we cannot just change at 
will. Here I will quote Murdoch at length, as I find her characterization 
perspicuous: 
It is small use telling oneself ‘Stop being in love, stop feeling resentment, be 
just.’ What is needed is a reorientation which will provide an energy of a 
different kind, from a different source. […] The neo-Kantian existentialist ‘will’ 
is a principle of pure movement. But how ill this describes what it is like for us 
to alter. Deliberately falling out of love is not a jump of the will, it is the 
acquiring of new objects of attention and thus of new energies as a result of 
refocusing. […]Human beings are naturally ‘attached’ and when an attachment 
seems painful or bad it is most readily displaced by another attachment, which 
an attempt at attention can encourage. (2001 p54-55) 
Here we can see that in Murdoch’s example, a commitment, an affective 
attachment, has appeared (in the light of the good in which the current attachment 
shows up as ‘bad’) to need to change. We may remember Blattner’s similar 
example here and note that in many cases attention may be required to recognize 
that a love is bad or painful. Once one has seen that an attachment is ‘bad’ (or, 
more often I think, contemporaneously with this), attention to other possibilities is 
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required to build an attachment, to become sufficiently deeply attuned, such that 
we are moved to take up a new possibility. Remembering our analysis of attention 
above, this paying attention to new possibilities is not limited to reflectively 
thinking about them, but can take the form of attending with our entire 
comportment, as a deepening of attunement (or creating a new attachment) can 
happen through engaging in activities and interactions with new people in 
multifaceted ways. 
We can surely only be attentive to that to which we’re already attuned in 
some sense. To varying degrees, a possibility must be on my radar in order for me 
to turn to it as an object of attention. Obviously we are 'aware’ in some sense of a 
wide range of possibilities in our society, just as we might be ‘aware’ of a wide 
range of people with whom we might form meaningful attachments. But we still 
need to ‘see’ such possibilities as possible goods for us; they still need to ‘touch’ 
in some way that which matters to us deeply. They need to connect to that deep 
attunement of our identity - which we might call our sense of the good - that is the 
condition of the possibility of more particular things that matter to us. Thus we 
cannot just pay attention to whatever we want if a change is to be made. Shifts in 
attention are generally only slight – to the periphery of, or to a new aspect of, that 
which already matters to us. Such change, says Murdoch: 
is slow; we are not free in the sense of being able suddenly to alter ourselves 
since we cannot suddenly alter what we can see and ergo what we desire and 
are compelled by. (2001 p38)  
As it is put elsewhere, we do not have the absolute ability to choose and change, 
but we rather have ‘some continual slight control over the direction and focus of 
[our] vision’ (2001 p39).  
I think this picture of ‘attention’ as the means by which we might choose 
and change is compelling, capturing the slow, piecemeal way that our efforts over 
time can affect those deepest aspects of our lives, can influence the way the world 
shows up to us. In contrast to an idea of big, bold leaps of groundless freedom, I 
think it offers a picture that captures what the experience of choosing is like in a 
way that is sensitive to the way that we have seen attunement constitute our being-
in-the-world. While at times the last step of such change can feel like a ‘leap’, 
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attention has already oriented us enough to see the landing, and has already moved 
us enough to make the approach. Crucially, this compelling account of ‘choice’ 
remains oriented to that which is beyond the subject, with its focus on our 
attachment to the world and others in the light of what grips us as true, good, or 
meaningful.  
Yet, following Murdoch, we can see why this ‘choice’ is not really the 
locus of responsibility, but an occasional eye-catching manifestation of the 
attentiveness that I am arguing is really constitutive of taking responsibility for our 
being-in-the-world. As we saw, attention can ‘build an attachment’, attune us more 
deeply, to a possibility such that a choice emerges in the first place, given that a 
choice can only emerge if at least two competing possibilities pull on us to a 
sufficient degree to both show up as options. But given that we generally do not 
find ourselves stranded like Buridan’s ass, typically we have a preference and take 
up one possibility over another.  
For Murdoch, it is the work of attention that attunes us to possibilities to 
varying degrees. Accordingly for Murdoch, the ‘work’ of choosing is generally 
made outside and in between the moments where choices show up to us. To 
identify the heart of the issue, which for us here is responsibility, with the moment 
of choice is thus a mistake:  
if we consider what the work of attention is like, how continuously it goes on, 
and how imperceptibly it builds up structures of value round about us, we shall 
not be surprised that at crucial moments of choice most of the business of 
choosing is already over. (2001 p36) 
As Murdoch goes on, this is not to say that such choice, or ‘freedom’, is illusory, 
but rather, as we have seen, freedom is a piecemeal business that goes on in 
between the moments of explicit choosing. In contrast to accounts that emphasize 
the moment of choice, represented by Han-Pile’s account, which make taking 
responsibility something that has to happen at discrete moments (‘we choose to 
choose ourselves in a discrete way’ - Han-Pile (2013 p308)), being attentive is 
something that one is called to be ‘all the time’ (Murdoch 2001 p42): 
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The task of attention goes on all the time and at apparently empty and everyday 
moments we are ‘looking’, making those little peering efforts of imagination 
which have such important cumulative results. (2001 p42) 
I take this constant call to be attentive, and so to take responsibility, to be in 
keeping with Heidegger’s thought.14 Note that Murdoch here is not saying that we 
do pay attention (and thus we are taking responsibility) all the time. As I shall 
show, Heidegger, Murdoch, and our own experience reveal that this is generally 
not the case for most of us – in fact we have a tendency to do the opposite, which I 
will argue is captured by ‘falling’ for Heidegger. However, as our ‘task’, it is 
possible to be attentive (and thus responsible) not just at discrete moments of 
choice but with more constancy.15  
With this acknowledgement that freedom and choice are not a matter of ‘a 
grandiose leaping about unimpeded at important moments’ (2001 p36) but rather a 
matter of shifting our attachments to that which is outside of us, of shifting the 
way we are attuned through shifts in attention, Murdoch goes further: ‘If I attend 
properly I will have no choices and this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at.’ 
(2001 p38) 
In rejecting the idea that the heart of the matter (for Murdoch virtue, for our 
purposes responsibility) lies in an unrestricted ability to choose, Murdoch moves 
to the idea that in fact what is to be sought is the opposite, an experience of ‘a kind 
of ‘necessity’’ (2001 p39). Moreover, while attention was linked to the very slight 
and gradual ability we have to change, if done ‘properly’, this attending is also 
linked to a situation in which no choice arises. I think here we can begin to see 
how the idea of attention can explain the idea of wholeheartedness that taking 
responsibility was linked to with Frankfurt, and represented by McManus’s 
account, earlier. 
 
                                                        
14 We can also think here in general of Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein’s being at issue for 
itself – this is not something that is the case at discrete moments, but is Dasein’s being as such, as 
long as it is. 
15 Here again we can see constancy in the sense of existential temporality: not in the sense of 
duration as subsisting over ‘clock time’, but as a modification of the way we project on the basis 
of attunement. 
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Wholeheartedness 
First, it is important to capture the kind of necessity that I think Murdoch is 
referring to. It is not the kind of necessity in which one feels an external constraint 
on oneself, a kind of coercion against some aspect of ourselves, as we might feel 
when being arrested or being confined to a bed through illness or injury. It is rather 
the kind of necessity we feel when the truth of something becomes clear – whether 
this is the right direction to go when trying to get somewhere, the answer to a 
logical puzzle, or the realization of the futility of a course of action. It is the kind 
of necessity by which a bystander might rush to someone else’s aid, which might 
be characterized afterwards by saying ‘I had to do something’. It is the kind of 
necessity that makes us stay with someone in need, which again might be 
expressed by saying ‘We can’t leave them here’. As Murdoch says, this is a kind 
of necessity in which no choices, no alternatives, even show up16. I take this to be 
the same phenomenon that Frankfurt wishes to capture with the idea of ‘volitional 
necessity’, and I think his description of this phenomenon is illuminating17: 
the feeling with which we [submit to volitional necessity] is by no means one of 
dispirited passivity or confinement. […] we are typically conscious of an 
invigorating release and expansion of ourselves. (2004 p64-65) 
As we saw with Frankfurt earlier, there is an association of this kind of necessity 
with responsibility. There’s a certain kind of conception in which responsibility 
(tellingly usually described as self-responsibility) is seen as a kind of unwavering 
fortitude in sticking to a commitment, as being immovable in the face of (easier) 
alternatives and possible negative consequences. Responsibility is seen as taking 
up a possibility with a kind of necessity, as perhaps best encapsulated in the 
philosophical imagination in Luther’s ‘Here I stand, I can do no other’.  
As Han-Pile’s work reveals, there is evidence to show that, just as Murdoch 
suggests with attention, Heidegger too saw a relation between choice and decision, 
                                                        
16 The expressions like ‘we can’t leave them here’ that reject the possibility are typically only 
uttered when another person has suggested that possibility in some way, not because it has 
shown up to the subject as a live option. 
17 Bernard Williams captures a similar idea with the notion of ‘practical necessity’. See Williams 
1981 p124ff. 
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and something like necessity, with the latter being a superior state of affairs. Here, 
Heidegger talks of both under the term ‘freedom’: 
In his study of Cartesian freedom in the Introduction to Phenomenological 
Research, Heidegger had made the following comment: “in order to be free, it 
is not required that I can move in both directions but rather: quo magis in unam 
propendeo eo liberius (the more I incline to the one, the freer I am). Here the 
Augustinian concept of freedom comes to the fore: the more primordially the 
propensio is for the bonum, the more authentic the freedom of acting . . . I am 
genuinely free if I go towards what I understand” (GA 17: 151) (Han Pile 2013 
p294-295) 
Additionally, as we saw represented by McManus, a specifically Heideggerian 
understanding of responsibility can be taken to consist of some kind relation of 
necessity to a particular commitment. This is how Heidegger’s talk of 
‘resoluteness’ is typically taken – as affirming a particular defining commitment 
with a kind of necessity, ‘come what may’.  
As we also saw however, this understanding of responsibility can be 
problematic in leading to a picture of a self-subsisting individual, stubbornly 
affirming themselves in the face of the world and others. By understanding 
responsibility through attention, and the kind of necessity this can give rise to, the 
appearance of responsibility as a kind of wholeheartedness can be explained. Yet 
in showing how this is not a kind of affirmation of self but rather a manifestation 
of attention, we can also see importantly how it differs from the kind of 
problematic picture we saw earlier.  
As we saw, attention is attention in the light of a ‘beyond us’, variously 
characterized as the true, good, or meaningful. And it is in this idea of the good or 
the true that I think this ‘necessity’ is to be found. A possibility taken up where it 
feels we have no choice, is taken up as the good or the true, the only ‘right’ thing 
to do. Typically this ‘beyond’ does not show itself as such because no alternatives 
show up. But I think, again, this may manifest more clearly in some kind of 
breakdown. We might think of such cases as when we are questioned by another, 
or when the only true or right thing to do is blocked off, frustrated by other 
powers. When questioned we might say ‘I had to do it, I couldn’t just leave them: 
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it was the right thing to do’, or we may simply describe the situation in such a way 
as to let its obvious truth or rightness become manifest to the questioner. Or if our 
course of action becomes blocked, as for example I am stopped from helping 
someone or waiting with them by some kind of bureaucracy, the rightness of that 
course of action and its meaningfulness will become stark, as an explicit 
judgement that ‘this is just wrong’ or perhaps as a feeling of indignation or guilt. 
And it is because attention contains within it an orientation to the good, the 
true, the beyond, that Murdoch can link attention with a kind of necessity, as 
Heidegger’s citing of Augustine and Descartes on this point suggests. While 
choices show up when there is a degree of uncertainty or shifting understanding 
about the good or ‘the best thing to do’, the thought is that if we are sufficiently 
attentive the good will show itself and solicit us with force akin to compulsion. 
Importantly, Murdoch rightly points out that it is a ‘kind of’ necessity. It is crucial 
to remember that the good is always beyond us – our disclosure, our interpretation 
of the good, our answer to the question of what it means to be is always partial and 
ongoing. So long as we are attuned in the light of this beyond, the good, there is 
always fallibility – there is vulnerability in any particular possibility taken up, as 
we saw. Perhaps it is reflective of this, as is the case with Socrates’ famous daimon 
whose semi-divine intervention is negative and stops him doing wrong, that this 
necessity is often characterized as knowing the wrongness or badness of the 
alternatives, rather than knowing with full certainty the goodness or truth of what 
is being done - the Luther quote, for example, states that he can do no other, 
referring to the wrongness of the other courses of action rather than to the 
rightness of his own.  
In contrast to this picture, we saw in Frankfurt’s account a failure of 
sensitivity to that which was ‘beyond’ us and the vulnerability that is bound up 
with this. Telling in this regard is the fact that Frankfurt sees agential necessity as 
‘volitional’- what we care about for Frankfurt is in fact a shape of our will. It 
comes ‘from within’ as it were, without being tied to that which is ‘beyond’ us.18. 
And it is this that can be seen to lead Frankfurt to the problematic model of ‘clarity 
and confidence’ we saw earlier. Murdoch’s diagnosis here is apposite: 
                                                        
18 For Murdoch instead: ‘Good, not will is transcendent. (2001 p68)  
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Without some more positive conception of the soul as a substantial and 
continually developing mechanism of attachments, […] ‘freedom’ is readily 
corrupted into self-assertion. (2001 p69) 
We don’t really just want to be ‘true to ourselves’ as these kinds of pictures of 
responsibility (and typically authenticity) might be characterized. We don’t want to 
be true to a bad self, but only to ourselves insofar as this self is good, as best we 
understand this. This ‘good’ is always beyond us, and never completely grasped by 
the self that aims at it. In opposition to the kind of self-assertion that we saw 
characterize certain conceptions of Heideggerian responsibility, we have seen 
(following Murdoch) that attention can help explain this appearance while actually 
being a model that doesn’t fall foul of the problems we saw earlier. If we were to 
follow Murdoch (who in turn follows Weil), this sort of necessity might better be 
called ‘obedience’ (2001 p39) than ‘resoluteness’, so long as obedience is understand 
as obedience to the enigmatic, open beyond - the good, the true, the meaningful.  
 
Independence from das Man 
As we saw in Chapter One, for Heidegger das Man can facilitate a way of existing 
that falls or flees from our being and as such is inauthentic, and one in which 
Dasein is deprived of its responsibility (SZ 127). This danger is what underlies 
accounts of taking responsibility characterized by a kind of distancing from das 
Man, as represented here by Withy’s account.  
Again, as with choice and wholeheartedness above, I think we can see how 
not being subsumed to das Man is a manifestation of responsibility as being 
attentive, and not constitutive in itself of taking responsibility. Here however, I 
will show this by arguing that the falling of Dasein into das Man can be 
characterized as an inattentive mode of being. In showing inauthenticity and a loss 
of responsibility to be characterized by attention’s opposite, this will strengthen 
the case for seeing attentiveness as constituting responsibility. Additionally, on top 
of the analysis of thrownness and attunement from which my reading derives, 
seeing Heidegger’s distinctive characterization of das Man in terms of attention 
will lend extra support for this as a specifically ‘Heideggerian’ account. 
190 
 
As we saw briefly when looking to Blattner’s account, part of falling into 
das Man can be characterized as a ‘levelling down’ (SZ 127) in which we become 
‘insensitive’ to differences of level and genuineness (ibid.). And as Blattner’s 
account suggested, this is in contrast to a perspective that is sensitive to the 
subtleties and nuance of a situation. I think it is no stretch to characterize such an 
insensitivity as a matter of attention. If we think to examples in our own lives in 
which we might have missed the finer points of an issue, in which we have glossed 
over a situation with a preformed, one-size-fits-all understanding, I think it is fair 
to characterize these as cases where we have been inattentive, and not oriented 
ourselves around, given ourselves over to, the matter at hand.19 We have failed to 
give ourselves over to the truth of what’s there. 
As well as this insensitivity that characterizes ‘levelling’ down, das Man is 
also described as having ‘stolen away’ whenever a decision is pressed for (SZ 
127). Here again, I think that we can characterize this in terms of inattention in 
light of the insight we gained from Iris Murdoch. Attention is a means of 
deepening one’s attachment to particular possibilities, drawing one more strongly 
to possibilities. As we saw, it is attention that in fact often means that most of the 
work of decision is ‘already over’, and that if we attend ‘properly’ no choice will 
present itself at all. The indecision that Heidegger characterizes as plaguing our 
being in das Man can be seen to lie in inattention – it is a failure to attend to 
particular possibilities that means one is not attuned to any of them enough to be 
drawn to take a particular possibility up.  
Further, with Heidegger’s talk of falling into das Man as characterized by 
‘curiosity’, we are given a description which we might think of as the antithesis of 
attention, namely falling as ‘distraction’. Curiosity: 
seeks restlessness and the excitement of continual novelty and changing 
encounters. In not tarrying, curiosity is concerned with the constant possibility 
of distraction. […] To be amazed to the point of not understanding is something 
in which it has no interest. (SZ 172) 
                                                        
19 Here McManus’s (2015b) account of ‘seeing as’ in Heidegger and Murdoch is particularly 
relevant in filling out this story. 
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I do not think it needs to be shown how this distraction and constant change are 
characteristic of attention’s opposite; I hope both are clear from a consideration of 
our own attempts to pay attention, and from the characterization of attention’s 
‘constancy’ above. Additionally, I think it is worth pointing to the final sentence in 
the quotation above, where this kind of inattention is linked with a failure to 
acknowledge that which is beyond one’s grasp. In contrast we have seen all 
attention properly speaking points to what is beyond one’s grasp, as it is a giving 
oneself over to that which is beyond the ‘I’ in the light of the true, the good, or the 
meaningful. 
We see that this failure to acknowledge that which is beyond one’s grasp is 
characteristic of das Man, a failure that I think it is fair to characterize in terms of 
a failure to be attentive in light of the enigmatic beyond. At times Heidegger 
characterizes this as ‘tranquilization’, a state we might think of as being inattentive 
to everything. Our falling into das Man for Heidegger brings with it the 
‘tranquilized supposition that it possesses everything, or that everything is within 
its reach.’ (SZ 178, emphasis mine). In contrast to the state of attentiveness which 
is expressive of that which is beyond our grasp, for our fallen state the opposite is 
the case. The point is reinforced even more strongly in the following: 
Idle talk and ambiguity, having seen everything, having understood everything, 
develop the supposition that Dasein’s disclosedness, which is so available and 
so prevalent, can guarantee to Dasein that all the possibilities of its Being will 
be secure, genuine, and full. (SZ 177)  
With the idea of ‘security’, in contrast to the vulnerability shown in anxiety that 
points us to the need for attentiveness, our irresponsible fallen being supposes its 
grasp to be genuine and full – that is, complete, without need, with nothing outside of 
it.  
I think that in addition to this textual justification, there is also some intuitive 
support to be found in understanding the Heideggerian idea of ‘falling’ through the 
lens of attention. This falling away from our being, which typically for Heidegger 
takes the form of falling into das Man, is an ‘essential tendency’ (SZ 167) of our 
being. I think that if we look to our own experience, the idea of falling away from 
attention as an ‘essential tendency’ has some plausibility. From the most minor acts 
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of attention, we can see that attending is difficult. I think I am not alone in feeling a 
certain draw away from that to which I should attend, as when writing, marking, or 
listening to a meeting, my thoughts and actions are drawn to almost anywhere other 
than where they should be. The vast folk-lore on marriage points to a similar fading 
of attention, often lost beneath ‘habit’, from that other to whom one is bound most 
deeply. The sudden loss of that other, as the limit situation of anxiety mirrors, can in 
many cases reveal that the attachment had not disappeared but was rather simply not 
attended to. I think such cases show such a tendency, or temptation to inattention. 
As I go on to flesh out this picture of responsibility as attentiveness, it will 
become clearer what it means to avoid this kind of falling into das Man. But for now, 
from the above, I think that it is plausible to see falling as characterized by Heidegger 
as a kind of inattention. We can therefore see how this model of responsibility as 
attention can underlie the kind of independence from das Man that is taken to be the 
locus of responsibility itself. 
Having begun to see in the phenomenology of attention how this mode of 
comportment avoids the problems with the traditional model of responsibility, I have 
argued that being attentive can in fact account for these understandings of 
responsibility on the traditional model. In arguing that the idea of attention lies at the 
heart of that which usually gets the name ‘taking responsibility’, more credence is 
giving to the suggestion that what it means to take responsibility for our being-in-the-
world on a Heideggerian reading is to be attentive. The question remains however, as 
to what exactly we are to be attentive to. The next section will address this question. 
 
The Enigma of Attention’s Object 
 
Provisionally, I would like to begin by suggesting we pay attention to that to which 
we’re attuned, that to which we’re ‘attached’ in Murdoch’s parlance. As we saw, 
attunement captures the ‘between’ that we are, the way our existence is properly 
conceived as ‘between’ subject and object. We might think then, that our attention 
should be to this ‘between’, and to neither ‘pole’ more than the other. Murdoch, 
however, is quite clear about attention on this point: ‘the direction of attention 
should properly be outward, away from self’ (2001 p58).  
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This might lead one to think that this is to the complete exclusion of the 
self in contrast to the picture of attunement given above. For Murdoch though, the 
self does not disappear either. As Antonaccio’s ‘reflexive realist’ reading 
emphasizes, the ‘good’ and ‘truth’ (and other ‘value concepts’) aren’t separable 
from the subject, but ‘they are stretched as it were between the truth-seeking mind 
and the world’ (Murdoch 2001 p88). Equally, to turn attention ‘outward, to place 
the accent on the ‘object’ pole, is not to completely disregard the ‘subject’ pole for 
Murdoch. While the direction of attention is most properly outward, at times a 
concentration on the subject is needed for this. In her famous example of a mother-
in-law (M) who holds an unfair and unjust view of her son’s wife (D), it is 
attention to the daughter-in-law that ‘remedies’ the situation. Yet some awareness 
of the self is necessary for this:  
M tells herself: “I am old-fashioned and conventional. I may be prejudiced and 
narrow-minded. I may be snobbish. I am certainly jealous. Let me look again.” 
(Murdoch 2001 p17) 
Just as with the tuning analogy, while the focus remains on the ‘object’, the tuning 
fork note, this might still require work on the ‘subject’, the instrument to be tuned, 
whether to bring it in line with the tuning fork’s note, or perhaps to temporarily 
silence it in order that the note be heard properly in the first place. 
But while Murdoch’s ontology here might seem compatible with the 
Heideggerian picture as I have described it, it might be argued that the reason for the 
focus ‘away from self’ in fact lies in an aspect of Murdoch’s view that is not shared 
by Heidegger. In Murdoch’s account, the reason for this focus ‘outward’ seems 
largely to be due to her Freudian conception of the self, the idea of the ‘fat relentless 
ego’ that is continually enveloping itself in a world of fantasy that covers over all 
else, leading her to conclude that ‘self is such a dazzling object that if one looks there 
one may see nothing else.’ (Murdoch 2001 p30)  
As well as not sharing this Freudian view, we might even think that 
Heidegger’s thought in fact runs in the opposite direction. At times it seems that for 
Heidegger being responsible might mean focusing on the self in some way in contrast 
to letting oneself lose oneself ‘outward’ into the crowd. Murdoch herself puts the 
point through the lens of the novel: 
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The nineteenth century novel succumbed to convention, the modern novel 
succumbs to neurosis. The nineteenth century novel is better than the twentieth 
century novel because convention is the less deadly of the two. (Murdoch 2001 
p217) 
In contrast to Murdoch, the general consensus on Heidegger would, I believe, 
place his existential analytic in the camp of the twentieth century novel given these 
two options, with a focus that moves from the crowd to the self. But while 
Heidegger does not share Murdoch’s Freudian conception of the self, and wants to 
avoid the dangers of ‘convention’ in the form of das Man in some sense, I still 
believe the characterization of attention (and so, responsibility) as finding its focus 
‘outward’, as accenting what we might call the ‘object’ pole, is fair for a number 
of reasons. 
We have already seen good reason to think that fallen Dasein is in fact 
characterized by inattention. But it is true that falling is often characterized in 
some way as losing the self in the world (SZ 222), fleeing ‘towards’ the world (SZ 
189), or falling into the world (SZ 175). And we might think that this could be 
seen to capture the kind of ‘giving oneself over to’ that characterizes attention. But 
as we have seen, attention proper is not a loss of self, in contrast to being 
mesmerized or transfixed. And it is this latter kind of loss of self that I think 
Heidegger is aiming at in describing Dasein’s fallen being as a losing itself in the 
world,  which is a kind of being ‘which is completely fascinated by the ‘world’ 
and by the Dasein-with of Others in das Man.’ (SZ 176) The word Heidegger uses 
for ‘fascinated’ here, benommen, is commonly used to mean dazed, stunned, 
numb. And I think these connotations are what Heidegger is trying to capture here 
in talking about inauthentic Dasein. Thus while there might be superficial 
similarities, the movement away from the self that characterizes falling should not 
be seen as the movement of attention.  
Further support is to be found in the way that at one point Heidegger 
actually characterizes our problematic relation to das Man as manifesting in a kind 
of focus on the self. Heidegger claims that the ‘alienation’ characteristic of falling 
‘drives [Dasein] into a kind of Being which borders on the most exaggerated ‘self-
dissection’’ (SZ 178). And this is congruous with what we already understand 
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about Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein. Importantly as we have seen, Heidegger 
seeks to move away from a Cartesian focus on the subject as an isolable entity. We 
saw, for example, the rejection of understanding attunement as ‘the reflective 
apprehending of something ‘within’’ (SZ 136). For authenticity (and thus 
responsibility) to return to a kind of Cartesian focus on the subject would seem to 
reject the very ontological foundation that Heidegger’s analytic seeks to uncover. 
Such wholesale rejection of Cartesianism seems to rule out responsibility 
consisting of attending to the ‘subject’ pole of our attunement.  
Yet the suggestion of attention as a focus on the ‘object’ pole does not 
mean a rejection of the existence of the ‘self’. As we saw earlier, as endorsed by 
Blattner, the self is constituted by the solicitations from the world and others. Its 
texture is constitutive of our identity - ask me who I am and I’ll tell you what I see, 
as it might be put. As Heidegger puts it, a proper relation to the self: 
is not a matter of perceptually tracking down and inspecting a point called the 
“Self”, but rather one of seizing upon the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-
world throughout all the constitutive items which are essential to it, and doing 
so with understanding. (SZ 146) 
So it seems that even if one interprets authenticity (and thus responsibility) as 
being attentive to the ‘self’ (and so as ‘self-responsibility’) it would be proper for 
the direction of our attention to be ‘outward’, at the ‘object’ pole, or at the world 
or others: 
one’s own Dasein becomes something that it can itself proximally ‘come 
across’ only when it looks away from ‘Experiences’ and the ‘centre of its 
actions’, or does not as yet ‘see’ them at all. Dasein finds ‘itself’ proximally in 
what it does, uses, expects, avoids – in those things […] with which it is 
proximally concerned. (SZ 119) 
As the musician Jim White describes in the film ‘Searching for the Wrong-Eyed 
Jesus’, when trying to keep his bike on the white line across a New York bridge he 
would always fail if he looked down at the bike and the line – only by looking 
straight ahead at the horizon could he keep to the white line. As we shall see, it is 
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not only the point of looking away from the self but the idea of the horizon too that 
is prophetic. 
Thus we can see that it is in keeping with Heidegger’s account to see the 
proper direction of attention to our attunement as being ‘outwards’, away from the 
subject pole. But accepting this, some more delineation is needed as to the proper 
object of attention. As the analysis of attunement demonstrated, we are attuned in a 
wide variety of ways to a wide variety of possibilities that grip us from without. It 
is surely not responsible to attend to whichever way we are affected, to give 
ourselves over and submit to the first possibility that solicits us.  
I would agree. Instead, on the basis of the kind of analysis we have seen so 
far, to be responsible for our being-in-the-world, I would suggest, is to be attentive 
to our attunement at the deepest level. As we have seen throughout, this idea of 
‘depth’ can be understood as being ‘the condition of the possibility of’. What is 
deep is ‘beneath’ what is shallow insofar as it is its ‘meaning and ground’ (SZ 35), 
being the necessary condition of the shallower, and that which can be seen within 
the shallower as giving it intelligibility. As we saw, at the foundation of the way 
that existence shows up as soliciting us in particular ways is the way that things 
matter to us more generally. This way that things matter to us, which emerges in a 
particular way in relation to the social, can be understood as our identity – those 
particular attunements that serve as ‘the indispensable horizon or foundation’ out 
of which we think and act, to borrow Charles Taylor’s words (1985 p35).  
This identity is manifest in a certain configuration of the way the world and 
others appear to us, the way they affect, solicit, and summon us. Thus, on the model 
of responsibility suggested above, it might seem that attending to that to which we’re 
attuned most deeply means giving ourselves over to that which matters most to us, 
that which is most important, in contrast to ignoring this in favour of other, 
‘shallower’ ways of being affected. To attend to our child or our job, to political 
movements that help with social issues we care about, to give ourselves over to these 
instead of submitting to the temptations to do other things or nothing at all, we might 
think, is to take responsibility, to be responsible.20  
                                                        
20 I think we perhaps also see more localized, specific ‘acts’ of taking responsibility through this 
kind of model in which responsibility is linked to whether one attends to or ignores that to which 
one is attuned. However in some cases the ‘depth’ or strength of our attachment is not the 
197 
 
This agrees with the picture given variously by Frankfurt and McManus. And 
there is some important truth to this, as we shall see. But I have argued that there are 
good reasons to think that taking responsibility is not affirming our identity, what 
matters to us, in this way. This is because these particular attachments, the particular 
way we’re attuned as Heidegger’s analysis shows, are themselves dependent upon the 
structure of Dasein that is revealed in such attunements. Our thrownness into a 
particular ‘who’ gains its meaning from our thrownness into a ‘who’ as such. 
Attending to our deepest attunements requires attending to our attunement as Dasein 
that stands as the meaning and ground of our particular identities. This means that in 
attending to the particular ways we are attuned, to the particular objects of our 
attunement, this must be done in such a way that our being-in-the-world, our being-
with-others is not closed off (to the degree that it can be) but is also attended to, 
remains a point of orientation.21 
But importantly as we saw, that which lies ‘beneath’ the structure of Dasein 
and gives it its meaning is an enigma. In accordance with the structure of thrownness, 
this enigma is that which we must continually strive towards, an enigma I think it 
makes sense in this context to say we strive towards under the name the ‘good’ or ‘the 
true’ or the meaningful. Here, as mentioned, I follow Crowell in connection with the 
idea of the ‘good’ with Heidegger. As I have argued throughout, it is our attunement 
to this enigma, our attachment to this, that is ‘deepest’ in the sense of being the 
meaning and ground of deepest particular attunements. Our identity is a provisional 
answer to the question of what it means to be, as aiming at a meaningful or good life. 
And the force of the grip of the world, others, and the particular manifestations of 
these, comes from this attunement to what is good, what is true, or what is 
meaningful that is always yet to be settled.  
                                                        
‘actual’ strength or depth but the kind of way we ‘should’ be attuned. Certain things ought to 
matter to us, and matter to us enough that we are moved by them to a certain minimal degree – 
we ‘should’ attend to them to a certain degree. Irresponsibility in this localized sense is when 
things that ‘should’ matter fail to move one.  
21 There lies here the possibility that being attentive to our being-with-others will involve not 
closing ourselves off from some particularly ethical kind of demand that grips us, and that human 
existence as such involves an ethical relation to others, as advocated by Levinas, Løgstrup, and 
others. Some might argue that, contra these thinkers, for Heidegger our affective ‘attachment’ to 
others is neutral and has no such ethical valence. I am sympathetic to readings of Heidegger that 
see such an ethical possibility in his thought as mentioned (e.g. McMullin 2013 Raffoul 2010), but 
I cannot defend such a position here myself. 
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As we saw, and as Taylor (1989) shows at length, our particular identities are 
bound up with a conception of what is good, what we are oriented and moved 
towards. And as we also saw, this good is always ‘beyond’. In Murdoch’s 
characterization of the good, it is ‘the magnetic centre’ (2001 p100) of our projects, 
relationships with others, engagements with the world, towards which we are 
solicited. It is this enigmatic beyond that is the ultimate for-the-sake-of-which. As we 
saw, this enigmatic beyond is never fixed or settled. We are continually drawn 
beyond each possibility we take up. It is a question, once open, that cannot be closed. 
I think that to be responsible, on a reading that finds its basis in Heidegger’s 
existential analytic and the possibility of authenticity as transparency with respect to 
our being, requires being attentive to our being as conceived above. It is to be 
attentive to the enigmatic good, the true, the beyond to which we are attuned.  
But how is this to work? As Murdoch herself questions sceptically about the 
good, ‘Can good itself be in any sense ‘an object of attention’?’ (2001 p67) As we 
saw, in contrast to certain views of Plato, the good is not a particular transcendent 
object that we can look at. It is not a tablet from which we can read off what to do. As 
Murdoch says: 
The Good itself is not visible. Plato pictured the good man as eventually able to 
look at the sun. I have never been sure what to make of this part of the myth. 
While it seems proper to represent the Good as a centre or focus of attention, 
yet it cannot quite be thought of as a ‘visible’ one in that it cannot be 
experienced or represented or defined. We can certainly know more or less 
where the sun is; it is not so easy to imagine what it would be like to look at it. 
(2001 p68) 
So if the good is not ‘visible’ in Murdoch’s sense, if this enigmatic beyond is not a 
particular object we can see, what could it mean to attend to it? I think that to attend 
to this enigmatic beyond does not require anything like turning to face this enigma in 
contrast to particular things. To return to our aural attunement analogy, this enigmatic 
beyond is more like silence than a noise competing with the particular note we are 
trying to tune to. The silence helps it become clearer, sharper, lets new aspects of its 
sound emerge. 
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As we saw, we always already find ourselves drawn towards a particular 
‘shape’ of the good, we are always already attuned to a particular interpretation of 
this enigma. We already find ourselves as particular answers to the question of the 
good or the true, in relation to our own lives, the world, and other people (in keeping 
with the structure of Dasein). To attend to the beyond, to the enigma of the good or 
the true, I think means attending to the direction from which it comes through the 
particulars that we take to be its instantiation, the best current answer to its question. 
It means giving ourselves over to our particular attachments but with a sense that 
these are not complete, not final. It means not covering over this enigmatic beyond. 
Again, Taylor’s description is helpful here, as he describes ‘trying to open myself, use 
all of my deepest, unstructured sense of things in order to come to a new clarity.’ 
(Taylor 1989 p41-42). Importantly, it is only through ‘my deepest’ sense of things 
that I can attend, and here the truth of accounts such as McManus’ can be seen.  
And here again we can see how Heidegger’s characterization of das Man can 
be captured by the idea of inattention. We are told that our own Dasein ‘dissolves’ 
(SZ 127) into das Man. I think we can now see this as a failure to attend: we always 
already find ourselves with a particular identity that aims at the good from a particular 
angle. To give oneself over, to attend, in contrast to dissolving in das Man, is to bring 
this particular shape of the self into relief as one gives oneself over to the possibilities 
that aim at the good. But crucially it is not affirming our identity in the face of the 
world and others. It is being attentive to way the world and others affect and move me 
(as Withy (2015) captures), to the particular shape this takes in my identity, all of 
which gain their hold from that enigmatic beyond of the good or true that grips me. It 
is following the path where we currently sense truth or the good to lie, being open to 
the way that it might take us in different directions, and to the way that a new and 
difficult path might emerge from it. It is giving oneself over to that ‘magnetic centre’ 
that pulls the subject from beyond it, through the world and others and the particular 
ways these show up to us. 
Being attentive to the enigmatic beyond that we can call the good does not 
mean turning away from particular possibilities. But as I have suggested in chapter 
four, our being – as possibility, being in the world, and being with others that is 
ultimately gripped by this enigmatic beyond – is made manifest more starkly as 
particular possibilities recede in a special way in limit situations like anxiety (but here 
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we might also think of other Heideggerian cases such as boredom, guilt, the silent call 
of conscience, and awe in later works, and perhaps many other contenders Heidegger 
does not mention like grief, birth, illness etc.). But as we saw with anxiety, this 
experience that shows us our orientation to the good, or the true, or the meaningful, 
does not tell us anything in particular. In keeping with a formal understanding of the 
enigma that draws us, there is no ‘content’ of the good, for example, that we can read 
off that might give us guidance, or solace or consolation. We can see nothing if we 
look directly into the sun. Silence ‘says’ nothing. Yet I think such experiences can 
make us pay attention – the threat of anxiety, for example, in the effective way that 
‘threats’ do, makes us pay attention – that we ‘face up to’ our being means we are 
forced to pay attention to it, at least momentarily. In seeing our vulnerability, in 
seeing our deepest attachments to ourselves, the world, and others collapse, we see 
the need to be attentive to them, and the need to do so in light of our being as Dasein.  
I have argued that to take responsibility on a Heideggerian account is be 
attentive, to attend to, the way we’re attuned most deeply. This means giving 
ourselves over to the solicitations of the world and others that grip us in light of the 
good, which means ultimately keeping ourselves open to the enigmatic beyond of the 
good, the true, or the meaningful that we are attuned to most deeply. I will now aim to 
flesh this out by looking to two examples that I think demonstrate this kind of 
attentiveness. In addition, these examples will lend support to the idea that 
attentiveness is how taking responsibility should be understood, as it captures the 
contours of what, on our everyday understanding, we would call taking responsibility 
and its opposite. As we have seen, while our everyday understanding is not 
necessarily authoritative, and is subject to being skewed through falling, it 
nonetheless contains important insight. Any account that purports to capture a 
phenomenon like taking responsibility from its ontological ground must able to give 
intelligibility to this everyday understanding.  
These examples will necessarily be underdetermined for two reasons. The first 
is that it’s not clear how we could determine with certainty whether someone had 
taken responsibility from the third person point of view, especially given that more 
visible types of comportment such as explicitly judging (and perhaps giving reasons 
to others), choosing, being wholehearted, or being independent from das Man were 
shown to not be where the locus of responsibility is found.  Secondly, any particular 
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example we give cannot, on its own, show that someone has taken responsibility or is 
responsible in the more general sense that a Heideggerian analysis points to. To put 
the point in Heideggerian terms, any example will be ontic, which may or may not be 
expressive of a way of relating to one’s own being as such that captures the type of 
responsibility we are looking at here. Notwithstanding this under-determination, I 
think it is important that the suggestion of ‘attention’ is able to capture what shows up 
to us as taking responsibility.  
 
Taking Responsibility as Attentiveness 
 
 Locke 
 
For my first example, I will consider the protagonist of the 2014 film Locke - 
construction manager Ivan Locke22. Ivan is presented as a meticulous, reliable 
individual. He excels at the job that he enjoys, and appears to be a loving father and 
husband. Yet the film follows Ivan as he drives from Birmingham to London to 
attend the premature birth of his child with a woman he once slept with around seven 
months prior, his sole act of marital infidelity. After taking the phone call that 
announces the unexpected impending birth of his child, Ivan drives to London to 
attend. The film consists of Ivan’s lone drive to London, and the story unfolds 
through phone calls with his family, colleagues, and the woman having his child. 
Through these calls, he explains to his children that he is missing their valuable 
family time watching football, tells his wife the devastating news of his betrayal, and 
attempts to deal with a monumental concrete pour he was due to be managing in the 
early hours of the morning. In the course of the journey, Ivan loses his job, his wife 
leaves him, and he encounters a variety of difficulties with the concrete pour that he 
attempts to orchestrate from his car, despite his already being sacked at that point. 
The film ends as he nears the hospital, and we do not learn of the fate of the concrete 
pour, the encounter with the new-born child and the mother who is a stranger to him, 
or whether his family life and marriage can be salvaged in any way. 
                                                        
22 I would like to thank Jakub Kowalewski for his insightful discussion of this example. 
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We are presented a picture of Ivan before the incident as what we might call a 
responsible man, as he is trusted deeply by his colleagues and spouse. Yet it is what 
we might call an ‘irresponsible’ act that sets the story up and drives the narrative.  
In reaction to this irresponsible act, which itself can be characterized as a failure to 
attend to the good of his family, I think Ivan clearly warrants the description of taking 
responsibility. Ivan makes sure that he (unlike, we learn, his own father), is present 
for the birth of the baby who was conceived on his one-night stand. While it might 
have been easy to ignore the affair and the child to varying degrees, Ivan takes it up to 
great cost (which is not to say he should be admired), losing his family and the career 
that he loved. Despite being sacked, with the help of his assistant Ivan aims to arrange 
the job for the next day so that the project and the building are not compromised by 
his absence. He declines the suggestion from his line manager that he should have 
just lied and said that illness was the reason for his absence, which would have 
allowed him to keep his job. After disappointing his children about their eagerly 
anticipated evening watching football together, he tells his wife about his betrayal and 
the baby. She is sickened, and leaves him. But Ivan ‘faces up’ to it all, as taking 
responsibility is often characterized. In his own words: 
I could just drive. Around the M25 and then to Dover. Or some fucking where. 
And not face it. […] But I’m going to drive straight to the worst place for me. 
The worst place on earth for me to be. (Knight, S., Ford, Jourdan, Squillante, 
Wright, J. 2014) 
In supporting this woman and the baby, in facing up to endless heart-wrenching 
and difficult conversations about his actions; in doing absolutely all he can do to 
ensure the completion of the project in spite of his sacking; in trying to reassure his 
children whilst promising them his honesty; and in doing all of the above in light 
of the knowledge that he is likely to lose his job, his home, and his family, I think 
we would say that Ivan is taking responsibility for his being-in-the-world, he is 
being responsible. 
It is perhaps possible to read this responsibility on each of the traditional 
ways mentioned above. There are things that might make us think that this 
responsibility consists in reflecting, judging, and being prepared to give reasons 
(which he is called upon to do in the countless phone-calls) as accounts 
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represented by Crowell suggest. After all, the story largely consists of him 
engaging in dialogue regarding his behavior, and we assume reflecting on this as 
he drives in the quiet moments between calls.  
There are things that might make us see this responsibility as being 
constituted by making decisions, by choosing. At the start of the journey we see 
Ivan pause at a junction, changing the direction of his indicator from his usual 
route home to head to London, perhaps supporting the picture of responsibility as 
choosing represented by Han-Pile. He is driving, he is in charge of his destination. 
He talks about taking things in his own hands. He attempts to still control the 
concrete pour from his journey on the M6, using his meticulous planning of it to 
aid his hapless assistant in its implementation.  
In many ways we could see Ivan as going against the crowd as accounts 
represented by Withy suggest, not being beholden to das Man. For example, we 
might see this in the way that he refuses to pull a sick-day, despite this being 
sanctioned by the way that ‘everyone does it.’  
We could perhaps see him affirming his identity, as Frankfurt suggests, and 
which the position represented by McManus seems to support, as he talks of 
previously not behaving ‘like himself’ (Knight et al. 2014) in getting into this 
mess, with responsibility perhaps meaning to be ‘true to himself’ once more. His 
commitment to doing the concrete pour in spite of his manager sacking him and 
banning him from the job can seem to be a wholehearted commitment in face of 
opposition from the world and others. We could see him affirming resolutely with 
the declaration at one point that all will be as he wishes, that the pour will be ok, 
that his wife will forgive him: ‘Katerina will be ok. In the morning she will be ok.’ 
(Knight et al. 2014)  
Yet immediately after this declaration, he qualifies this as how it can be, 
calling it his ‘prayer’ (Knight et al. 2014). We can see this as suggestive of the 
‘beyond’ to which attention is oriented. He follows his description of ‘not being 
himself’ with the words that he will ‘do the right thing’ (Knight et al. 2014) - this 
suggests that, in contrast to seeing the affirmation of one’s identity as important, 
his relation to himself is important insofar as it’s expressive of an orientation to the 
beyond of the ‘good’ or the true, as I suggested. And while the film suggests a 
moment of decision at the traffic lights, this is framed by seeing this scene through 
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his blurry eyes. As he (and the picture) focuses, attends, he gives himself over to 
the pull of his unborn child, shortly after stating to his assistant ‘I don’t have a 
choice’ (Knight et al. 2014). This suggests that attention underlies the choosing 
and resultant ‘necessary’ taking up of this possibility – his ‘attending properly’ 
means he doesn’t have a choice, as Murdoch put it. And finally, his lack of 
explanation of his reasons to his children on the phone, for example, suggests that 
it is not reason-giving that is important, but attending to them by reassuring them. 
While at times we see Ivan try and make decisions, to assert himself, and give 
reasons, I think it is here that he is less clearly taking responsibility, being 
responsible. His attempted giving of reasons to his wife to explain his infidelity, 
his threatening orders to his assistant, his pause at the traffic lights before he gains 
focus, are the moments when he appears most irresponsible, most irresponsive to 
the world and others, and most isolated in his car. 
The very fact of the baby, the fact that a number of complications arise 
with its birth, the various problems that arise with the planned concrete pour, all in 
fact emphasize Ivan’s lack of control regarding what matters to him. These aspects 
of Ivan’s life are beyond him in an important respect. Yet it is when he is attentive 
to these, when he projects on the basis of these in the ways explained above, that 
he is responsible. It is in listening to his assistant, to both of his children, his wife, 
and projecting on this basis, as well as projecting and orienting on the basis of his 
child-to-be, that he takes responsibility.  
One example of this is the way that Ivan listens to his children, both 
separately, as they phone to recount the football match they have watched. As the 
journey and the story progresses, one does so with a tone that shows that he is 
aware that something has arisen between his parents. Ivan picks up on this and 
comports himself on this ground. Here he asks how the child is, before sensing on 
the basis of this that it is best not to reveal the story to them now. Instead he 
listens, in spite of the dizzying array of complicated and weighty issues that press 
upon him, as the child gives a detailed account of the goal that Ivan has already 
heard from the first child earlier, but which apparently gives the child comfort to 
talk about. 
Ivan remains attentive. The incessant and irritating noise of his phone 
ringing, or of the voice telling him that he has a ‘call waiting’, makes the audience 
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feel the burden upon him. We feel anguish, as we know this unrelenting ring and 
the name on the screen brings with it a new and taxing conversation. It is 
exhausting. Yet still Ivan remains attentive, answering every single call, despite 
the huge temptation to cancel or ignore the call, shut off the claims that gnaw at 
him, and drive alone in silence. He listens, and for the most part acts and speaks on 
the basis of that to which he is deeply attuned, attached. 
These bonds that he is receptive to, attentive to, are constitutive of his 
identity. Part of the pull of being with the new-born baby arises from his own 
feelings at being abandoned by his father. Yet, as we saw, this is not just an 
affirmation of self. It was his intimation of what is ‘right’.  Ivan’s understanding of 
what is good is shaped by the particular person he is – someone whose father 
wasn’t around. But it is at the ‘good’ that Ivan is aiming, and not at an affirmation 
of his own self. In being so attentive, Ivan experiences a kind of necessity. As he 
imagines talking to his father, he asserts that he will not be like him. He will be 
there for the child. There is no choice for Ivan here.  
But in what sense he will be there, he does not know. He affirms several 
times that the mother is little more than a stranger to him. We hear nothing of what 
is going to happen, how he is going to ‘be there’ for the child in a way his father 
wasn’t, short of giving the child a surname. He desires to stay with his family, to 
live with them – his life’s vision had lain with them. Yet he feels he must go to this 
new baby. There is a sense of the enigmatic, the beyond, on the path that Ivan is 
ineluctably taking. He is attentive to the good that remains beyond his grasp. We 
are shown the name on the screen that accompanies every other call in the film, 
but as Ivan nears the hospital we see the phone ring and ‘Unknown’ emerges. Ivan 
pauses, before answering this unknown call. He is greeted by the mother and the 
sound of his new child. Thus in taking responsibility, Ivan is attentive to that 
enigmatic beyond on the path of the right. 
 
 Disgrace 
 
For my second example, I will look to the character of David Lurie in J.M. 
Coetzee’s novel Disgrace. In contrast to Locke, Lurie shows only glimmers of 
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being responsible, and so the model of taking responsibility as attention is shown 
more by its opposite in this case. Here we will see that this irresponsibility in fact 
shows features of the traditional account of responsibility, isolating attention as the 
locus of responsibility. This example will also bring out the important societal 
aspect of our thrownness that responsibility must relate to. 
Lurie is a professor specializing in romantic poetry in a Cape Town 
university. He might be characterized as a Kierkegaardian ‘aesthete’ whose chief 
pursuit seems to be seducing women. As the novel begins in a changing, post-
apartheid South Africa, we find Lurie pursuing various non-white women: after 
seeing a prostitute he regularly sleeps with out with her young family, Lurie 
pursues her when she stops seeing him, hassling her at home; he ‘seduces’ a 
colleague at work, before quickly abandoning her; he then pursues, and ultimately 
rapes, a student named Melanie from one of his classes. The student complains of 
harassment, and Lurie is brought before a disciplinary hearing at the university, 
ultimately leading to him to resign from his post, and capturing some part of the 
‘disgrace’ that the novel’s title refers to. We might fairly I think characterize the 
Lurie we find as ‘irresponsible’. As Melanie’s boyfriend puts it, the way Lurie acts 
as if he can ‘just walks into people’s lives and walk out again when it suits’ 
(Coetzee 1999 p30), causing untold damage before taking flight for the next 
pursuit, could fairly be characterized as irresponsible. 
I think this irresponsibility can be understood in terms of not being 
attentive: to others and the affective bonds he creates with them, to the changing 
societal situation, to his own sense of what is right or good, and ultimately to the 
enigmatic beyond of that which lies beyond his grasp. We are told early on that 
‘His sentiments are, he is aware, complacent, even uxorious. Nevertheless he does 
not cease to hold to them.’ (Coetzee 1999 p2) He fails to attend to that which he 
knows to be better. Again, when entering the disciplinary panel, we learn that ‘He 
is going into this in the wrong spirit. But he does not care.’ (Coetzee 1999 p47) 
Importantly, he does not want to listen to the hearing about his wrongdoings, does 
not want to let it affect him – he does not want to attend to it at all. While those on 
the hearing warn of his inattention to the ‘gravity’ of the situation, he declares: 
‘Pass sentence, and let us get on with our lives’ (Coetzee 1999 p48). This 
inattention, this ignoring, can be seen to apply to the bonds he creates to the 
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secretary he sleeps with, and increasingly more seriously to the demands that come 
from the prostitute ‘Soraya’ and from his student Melanie. In the latter, this 
culminates in his closing himself off to her protests as he forces himself upon her, 
as ‘nothing will stop him’ (Coetzee 1999 p25), and in the ‘profound wellbeing’ he 
wakes with after their first unwanted sexual encounter, unaffected, untouched by 
Melanie’s distress. 
Lurie seems to fit the profile of what I have been calling the mode of 
wholeheartedness, the ‘clarity and confidence’ espoused in Frankfurt. Lurie knows 
clearly who he is, and sticks firmly to this in the face of pressure from others to do 
otherwise. He will not renounce his conduct with his student, Melanie. He stands 
firm in what he calls his pursuit of ‘eros’, declaring to the public that he was 
‘enriched’ by the experience, in the face of the condemnation of all and against the 
advice of all those around him to change his course of action. Here too we might 
see Lurie as conforming to Withy’s account of taking responsibility, as he is 
receptive to his attunement to ‘eros’ in contrast to the demand from the masses to 
feel shame and repent which at times, in the novel, feels like merely a pressure to 
‘just say the right words’, to play the game, that seems to point to a falling into das 
Man. 
But as the novel shows, this clear and confident individual, not doing as 
‘they’ do, is not a picture of a responsible individual but the opposite. It is of 
someone who is rigid, stubborn: he declares himself that ‘His temperament is not 
going to change, he is too old for that’ (Coetzee 1999 p2). His temperament is 
fixed, set.  He is closed off to anything beyond his ego, and the possibility of 
change this might bring. As he remains impervious to being affected by his actions 
in the disciplinary hearing, he reacts angrily to the suggestion of counselling 
through which he might learn and change: ‘I am a grown man. I am not receptive 
to being counselled. I am beyond the reach of counselling.’ (Coetzee 1999 p49) 
The centre of Lurie’s life is squarely set in his narrow ‘I’, rigid and closed off from 
being affected by the world and others, yet happy to assert and impose itself upon 
them, as his actions described above are brought out clearly in the focus in his 
poetry class of the word ‘usurp’ – ‘usurp upon means to intrude or encroach upon. 
Usurp, to take over entirely’ (Coetzee 1999 p21). Here the focus on the subject of 
the traditional model is clearly shown to be responsibility’s opposite. The model 
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that we saw after Murdoch, in which one’s identity is made salient insofar as it 
aims at the good that is beyond it, is made salient in its rejection by Lurie in favour 
of this clarity and confidence: ‘I’ll do it. But only as long as I don’t have to 
become a better person. I am not prepared to be reformed. I want to go on being 
myself.’ (Coetzee 1999 p77) Despite satisfying the traditional model of 
responsibility as wholeheartedness or independence from das Man, Lurie remains 
irresponsible. Instead Lurie’s irresponsibility, as I have suggested above, can be 
characterized by a lack of attention to the world, to others, to what he knows to be 
good, and to what he sense to be ‘better’ as above. 
As Lurie leaves his job in disgrace, he stays with his daughter in her 
farmhouse in rural South Africa. There however, they are burgled. Alongside the 
robbery, he is assaulted and his daughter is raped by three men, in an attack whose 
meaning is permeated by the half-century of Apartheid prior. As a result of this 
ordeal, Lurie can be seen to attempt to become responsible, to take responsibility. 
In contrast to his previous irresponsibility with regard to his daughter, this moment 
seems to mark an attempt to take responsibility: ‘I let go of Lucy long ago. I have 
been the least protective of fathers. But the present situation is different. Lucy is 
objectively in danger.’ (Coetzee 1999 p140)  
In doing so, Lurie appears to resort to some kind of model of taking control 
through choosing and deciding. The idea of ‘choice’ is evoked in this attempt by 
Lurie to take responsibility, as he tries to impose this choice upon his daughter. 
But the ‘choices’ Lurie offers his daughter are clearly determined by his own 
orientation, on the basis of himself, to the exclusion of his daughter as a possible 
point of orientation: 
Lucy, it really is time for you to face up to your choices. Either you stay on in a 
house full of ugly memories and go on brooding on what happened to you, or 
you put the whole episode behind you and start a new chapter elsewhere. Those, 
as I see it, are the alternatives. (Coetzee 1999 p155) 
As the obvious weight of the options shows in accordance with Murdoch’s 
analysis, what matters in Lurie’s eyes means the choice is not really a choice at all. 
Here, the novel shows, how responsibility is not to be found in Lurie’s attempts to 
take control through choice, as his confused and fractious interactions attest. 
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Here still, Lurie’s irresponsibility in the wake of this ordeal can be 
characterized by inattention, a failure to orient himself by anything other than his 
ego. In trying to take responsibility, he replaces the distant inattention with which 
he related to his daughter with overwhelming inattention to her as he tries to 
impose his own view of the situation onto her. Throughout his stay his inattention 
to his daughter, to women and womanhood, to rural life, and to the changing social 
situation in South Africa in terms of race, class and gender, are all made manifest 
as he tries to take control of the unfamiliar by interrogating, challenging, and 
confronting all those around him. Most plainly, he fails to let Lucy be his point of 
orientation, to let her be that which moves him. She makes this clear to him, as she 
repeatedly tells him that he does not understand what has happened to her.  Her 
letter to him reads: 
Dear David, You have not been listening to me. I am not the person you 
know.[...] You do not see this [...] It is as if you have chosen deliberately to sit 
in a corner where the rays of the sun do not shine. I think of you as one of the 
three chimpanzees, the one with his paws over his eyes. (Coetzee 1999 p161)23 
His new behaviour after the rape continues to fail to attend to her, to take Lucy and 
what is good for her as his point of orientation. The letter continues: 
You behave as if everything I do is part of the story of your life. You are the 
main character, I am a minor character who doesn’t make an appearance until 
halfway through. […] I have a life of my own, just as import to me as yours is 
to you. (Coetzee 1999 p198) 
It is in Lurie’s failure to attend to Lucy here that his irresponsibility can be seen. 
More generally, it is in a failure to attend to the world and others, in ignoring the 
good as he understands it and the prospect of the good, the truth, the meaningful as 
he does not yet understand it, that Lurie’s irresponsibility are to be found. 
However there are signs in the novel that a change is possible, that he can 
become attentive and thus responsible. Such signs arise from the vulnerability he 
                                                        
23 Here we might see Lucy’s metaphor of the sun as representing Lurie’s inattention to that which 
is beyond, the good or the right. 
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experiences in the wake of the attack, thus chiming with my analysis of anxiety 
above. Lurie find himself peculiarly affected by the euthanasia of rural animals by 
his daughter’s friend. In spite of his own stance on animals (and on Lucy’s friend, 
whom he dislikes), Lurie finds himself becoming deeply involved in euthanizing 
animals with this friend. He becomes deeply attentive as he watches, and we are 
given a detailed description from his perspective of the way his daughter’s friend 
deals with the animals. He comes to be taken by the practice, and a care for 
animals arises within him, apparently from outside of his self as he understood it: 
‘He does not understand what is happening to him. Until now he has been more or 
less indifferent to animals.’ (Coetzee 1999 p143). This is a fact he himself is 
puzzled by, finding it ‘[c]urious that a man as selfish as he should be offering 
himself to the service of dead dogs.’ (Coetzee 1999 p146) 24  He gives himself over 
to this matter, as he proceeds to go far out of his way to ensure the dead dogs are 
not left to be incinerated in an undignified fashion. He collects the dogs and drives 
to the incinerator at the appropriate time each week, leaving at a less convenient 
time for himself in order that the dog corpses are not left waiting to be picked at by 
scavengers. Rejecting the uncaring services of the workers at the incinerator, the 
romantic poetry professor loads the dog corpses onto the belt and operates the 
machinery himself. He follows the corpses’ whole journey, and ensures a dignified 
end to their being. In his attentiveness to this cause, in giving himself over to the 
good of these animals, it can fairly be said that he takes responsibility for the end 
of these animals. 
This potential for Lurie to change is shown elsewhere too, where an 
analogous change is shown through the artistic sphere. As he stays with his 
daughter, he is simultaneously working on an opera about the poet Byron (in 
whose footsteps he himself appears to follow) and his affair with a young 
countess. The opera is going nowhere, until he gives up on the vision of the opera 
that captures his own life (via Byron). Instead, he attends to the countess Teresa, 
placing the accent on her. In so attending, when he ‘holds tight to Teresa’ (Coetzee 
1999 p183), to his astonishment ‘in dribs and drabs, the music comes [...] 
sometimes the shade of a melody, having hovered for days on the edge of hearing, 
                                                        
24 It is interesting that the animal world draws Lurie out of his own selfish rigidity, in the same 
way as the kestrel does in an example of Murdoch’s. See Murdoch 2001 p82 
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unfolds and blessedly reveals itself.’ (Coetzee 1999 p183). In attending to Teresa, 
the enigmatic musical possibilities for the opera that were beyond him suddenly 
reveal themselves. In letting go of his affirmation of his own self, his attention 
turns outwards to Teresa and ultimately beyond her, to that enigma which he 
cannot grasp but must be open and receptive to.  
With these two instances, he revisits his old understanding of himself as 
‘too old to learn a lesson’ and for a time he wonders ‘But perhaps that is not true, 
not always’ (Coetzee 1999 p172). 
Yet Lurie’s attentiveness does not go beyond these two isolated cases in 
the story we are given. His attentiveness to the dead dogs points beyond this 
isolated, particular act, as he describes doing it for sake of a particular vision of a 
good world (p143), for some conception of dignity. But he does not give himself 
over to this. He returns to his inattentive, irresponsible being. He returns to the city 
and stalks Melanie performing in a play, before picking up a very young prostitute. 
While he feels a sense of her need for protection, he ignores this and returns her to 
the same street-corner he found her on. He goes back to visit his daughter’s house 
and causes more trouble, striking one of the possible assailants, before reflecting 
once more that he is too old to change, too old to ‘bend to the tempest’  (Coetzee 
1999 p209). We are left with the impression that the accent of Lurie’s life will 
remain on the self he has nurtured for so long, inattentive to that which is beyond 
its reach, closed off to the enigmatic good that is beyond, in contrast to his 
daughter: 
‘I am determined to be a good mother David. A good mother and a good 
person. You should try to be a good person too.’ 
‘I suspect it is too late for me. I’m just an old lag serving out my sentence.’ 
(Coetzee 1999 p216) 
In the face of the prospect of a new society, the need for new ways of relating to 
family, to women, to race, it appears he will remain irresponsive and irresponsible. 
And I think we can see his failure to attend as lying at the heart of this, a diagnosis 
he himself perhaps glimpses as he looks back ruefully: 
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So much for the poets, so much for the dead masters. Who have not, he must 
say, guided him well. Aliter, to whom he has not listened well. (Coetzee 1999 
p179 
It is a failure to listen, a failure to attend to that to which we are attuned, that is 
significant, and that lies at the heart of his irresponsibility.  
As Dasein, Lurie is necessarily attuned in some way to the world, others, 
and some understanding of the good as the enigmatic beyond, and cannot 
completely close himself off from them. Time and again, we see how he hears 
their call, he feels their solicitations. He is aware of the prostitute Soraya’s wish 
for him not to try and contact her; he hears all of Melanie’s refusals against his 
advances, he feels her reluctance in every aspect of her body language; he senses 
his daughter’s unhappiness towards him; he shows awareness (with the help of his 
daughter) that being a woman doesn’t mean what he thinks it to mean; he knows 
that inequality and racial tension still prevail in South Africa; he senses that 
country life is different to city life; he feels that his sentiments are bad, that he is 
going into things in the ‘wrong spirit’. Yet he fails to attend to any of this, fails to 
act on the basis of this and let this move and orient him.  Most of all, he is aware 
of the grip of what is true, what is good, what is meaningful, that is beyond him – 
no-one (repeatedly) makes the excuse that they are too old to change unless they 
see some legitimacy in the call to do so. The very resistance is acknowledgement 
of some attunement to the good, the better, that he fails to be attentive and give 
himself over to.  
This, I believe, gives further support to the proposal that taking 
responsibility for our being-in-the-world should be understood in terms of 
attention and attentiveness. Both also show how difficult this task is. This brings 
me to my final point. 
In contrast to the worry with Han-Pile’s account where taking 
responsibility can only happen pre-reflectively, I think the model of attention 
allows us to accommodate the everyday insight that I suspect we would wish to 
hold on to: that in some sense it is possible to play a role in becoming responsible, 
in taking responsibility. If we return to our everyday examples, we can think about 
deciding to sit down and focus on our Russian homework, or the way we turn the 
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radio off and decide to listen to our friend. It seems that we can decide to be 
attentive, to pay attention. Yet this ability to choose is limited, and comes with 
certain qualifications (the kind of which Han-Pile (2013) herself in fact 
characterizes well with her talk of ‘medio-passivity’ in relation to conscience and 
authenticity more broadly). It must first be acknowledged that at times we become 
attentive, pay attention, without our choosing. We are grabbed by something, 
drawn to something without our choosing (which, as we saw in the analysis of 
attunement, can occur on the bases of pre-existing commitments or on the basis of 
being human as such, as in the cases of being grabbed to attend to others). Here, 
Lurie’s finding himself grabbed by the euthanasia of the animals is a case in point, 
from which he went on to attend further and deepen the way it mattered to him, 
which pointed beyond itself to a conception of a good world. Additionally, as also 
seen with Lurie, there are times where our attempts to be attentive, to pay 
attention, fail, as I’m sure we can all attest. As in the case of trying to bring about 
certain attunements discussed in chapter two, we may do all that we can – yet 
attention may not come. As well as our choice being partial in this way, the choice 
to attend must be of a certain kind. It must be one that acknowledges that the focus 
lies with the object of attention and not the one attending. The locus of attention, 
and so taking responsibility, is still to be found beyond the subject in an important 
sense. It must be a choice to give oneself over to the object of attention, to place 
the accent on that to which we’re attending. This is what Weil’s schoolchildren fail 
to do as – when called to attend, they focus on the furrowing of their brows and the 
narrowing of their eyes instead of on that to which they’re supposed to attend. 
Attending, being attentive is difficult, and not just for schoolchildren. We can 
see this as explaining Heidegger’s characterization of our falling into the inattention 
of das Man as a ‘tendency to take things easily and make them easy.’ (SZ 128) 
Attention is a relentless task that we have a tendency to fall away from. This 
difficulty can also be seen to explain the more ‘active’ fleeing (SZ 184) from our 
being, which I think can be seen as the more ‘active’ ways of failing to be attentive to 
something. We might prevent ourselves from being moved by an attunement, prevent 
giving ourselves over to something, by instead making excuses in a bid to deflect its 
pull – I am in the service of ‘eros’, her beauty is not her own, I am too old to change, 
as we hear from Lurie. We might bury ourselves in something else in a bid to forget, 
or run away from that to which we should attend – moving away from the scandal he 
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caused to the countryside as we see with Lurie.  Or as we have also seen with Lurie, 
perhaps more subtly, we can fail to attend by instead attempting to control or in other 
ways subsume that to which we should attend to our own existence, asserting 
ourselves in the face of all we come across. 
While our experience shows the difficulty of attending, I think experience 
also tells us that it is nonetheless something we have a ‘propensio in’ (SZ 188), as 
Heidegger characterizes authenticity. I believe that it is an expression of the being 
of Dasein to attend and be attentive. And it is in this idea of attention, I have 
argued, that taking responsibility for our being-in-the-world lies. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I have argued that Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s thrownness should 
make us rethink what it means to take responsibility for ourselves. Against the idea 
that taking responsibility lies in the power of the subject to find their basis for 
existence in themselves, to gain control or to determine themselves, I have argued 
that our thrownness points in a different direction. I have proposed that taking 
responsibility should instead be understood as being attentive to what we’re attuned 
to most deeply. In contrast to the traditional model that seeks to try and find a space 
within or outside of our thrownness from which to gain leverage against it, taking 
responsibility should be understood as being attentive to this movement in which we 
find ourselves, to be attentive to ensure we are moved in a way that is good, true, 
meaningful. 
In the first chapter, I argued that while the fact that ‘I am’ in some sense (the 
‘factical’) captures the particularities of our existence, the fact that ‘I am’ proper 
(‘facticity’) pertains to the enigma of human existence as projection into possibilities 
in relation to a world and others. I showed that with the idea of thrownness, 
Heidegger importantly adds to this the idea of movement, the idea that I am moved on 
the basis of what I am. I am submitted to possibilities. While this movement of 
thrownness captures the way I am moved by the particulars of who I am – my 
particular body, character, upbringing, social historical context – the movement gains 
its meaning, its weight and force, from the movement of my being Dasein. The way I 
am moved to take up particular possibilities as the particular person that I am in the 
particular world I find myself in gets its force from being moved by the enigma of 
what it means to be as an ‘I’ in relation to a world and others. Here, the pervasiveness 
and force of our thrownness is shown, as I am submitted to possibilities, moved and 
taken from the ground up. 
In the second chapter, I showed how our thrownness is experienced first-
personally in our attunement, which I argued captures the spectrum of our affective 
lives: from our explicit moods, feelings, and emotions, to the constant background 
way that existence matters on the basis of which we project into possibilities. Here 
the pervasive strength of the movement of thrownness was shown. Whilst this 
pervasive grip typically remains in the background, shaping existence pre-
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reflectively, the intense way we are gripped by feelings, moods, and emotions renders 
this explicit. I showed how our attunement, what matters, is shaped by the socio-
historical context we find ourselves in, before showing how what we might call our 
identity is constituted by the particular way we are attuned, a particular way that 
existence shows up as mattering to us that grips and moves us. I showed how this 
affective grip of identity gains its force from the grip that existence as such has on 
me. The world and others must matter to me; they necessarily move me in some way 
or another. As shown in the analysis of thrownness, the way I am gripped and moved 
gains its force from the grip of the question of what it means to be, which remains 
perpetually open. The grip of the enigma of what it means to be, as that which my 
projection ultimately aims towards, is experienced as the grip of the good, the true, or 
the meaningful, which is never settled and always beyond me. The particular way that 
existence grips me gains its force from its gripping me as true, good, or meaningful. 
Existence matters in the particular ways that it does ultimately on the basis that 
having a meaningful life, a good life, a true life, matter. It is ultimately this that I am 
drawn to and gripped by. And this grip is constant, since what is meaningful, what is 
true, what is good, is never settled but always beyond me. Here the pervasive power 
of the grip of thrownness is shown first-personally as the experience of perpetually 
being affected, gripped, and moved, by that enigma that is ultimately beyond our 
grasp or control. 
Having shown the power of the grip of thrownness as it is experienced in 
attunement, I then turned to the later work of Harry Frankfurt, particularly to his 
focus on ‘what we care about’. I showed that Frankfurt’s account maps on to several 
key features of Heidegger’s account of attunement. Frankfurt’s analysis was used to 
show how accounts of taking responsibility that attempt to find power and control 
over our lives through choice or rational deliberation are undermined. Choice and 
rational deliberation arise on the basis of the way that we are already attuned – they 
are not a space from which control over thrownness can arise, but are already bound 
up with our thrownness itself. I then turned to Frankfurt’s own suggestion in the face 
of this, in which he argues that the task is to gain ‘clarity and confidence’ with respect 
to what we care about. I showed that this account of wholeheartedness, which mirrors 
some interpretations of the idea of ‘resoluteness’ in Heidegger’s thought, in fact 
characterizes a stubborn, rigid individual that we would not wish to call responsible. I 
suggested that Frankfurt’s account is undermined by the experience of anxiety that in 
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fact lies as that account’s motivational basis. I argued that it is Heidegger’s distinctive 
ontology of human existence, as revealed in the experience of anxiety, that ultimately 
separates the two accounts and, if properly heeded, allows us to avoid Frankfurt’s 
problematic position. 
In chapter four, I went on to analyze Heidegger’s account of anxiety. I showed 
that an interpretation that remains faithful to the experience of anxiety reveals not 
only our being as possibility, but also our thrownness – for anxiety to be anxious my 
existence must not only be in the mode of possibility, but it must matter to me. It 
must grip, touch, and affect me. I argued that the notion of ‘threat’ that Heidegger 
uses to introduce anxiety, and the vulnerability associated with this, is crucial to 
understanding anxiety. This additionally allowed me to connect Heidegger’s account 
of anxiety with our everyday understanding, amending this problem that I argued 
exists in Heidegger’s own exposition of anxiety. Through this idea of threat, I argued 
that anxiety does not reveal a kind of ‘space’ from or within the movement of 
thrownness in which the traditional model of responsibility can regain a foothold. On 
the contrary, I argued that in anxiety our thrownness into a particular identity (in a 
particular world) is revealed. More than this, we are importantly brought face to face 
with our thrownness into Dasein as an ‘I’ that must project into possibilities in 
relation to the world and others; and thrown into the enigma of what it means to be, 
whereby what is meaningful, true, and good matters to us, yet always remains out of 
reach. 
In the fifth chapter, having completed my analysis of thrownness and its first-
personal manifestation in attunement (including the fundamental attunement of 
anxiety), I looked to several Heideggerian accounts of taking responsibility. I took 
these accounts to be representative of some version of the traditional model of 
responsibility, but which attempt to incorporate aspects of our thrownness. To this 
end, I looked at Heideggerian accounts that see responsibility to lie in reflective 
judgement (represented by Crowell), choice (Han-Pile), wholeheartedness 
(McManus), and independence from das Man (Withy). As reflected in the final 
chapter, each account raises important facets of a Heideggerian account of taking 
responsibility (Crowell’s orientation to the Good; Han-Pile’s limits on our ability to 
take responsibility and to be aware of this; McManus’ emphasis on the importance of 
remaining attuned to our identity; Withy’s advocacy of a kind of receptivity). Yet I 
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argued that each account falls short in some way in virtue of their attempts to focus 
on the power or self-determination of the subject. I then looked to Blattner’s account, 
which begins to move away from the traditional model by seeing responsibility in 
terms of ‘responsiveness’. While I argued that this points away from the traditional 
account and its problems in a way that my account would develop, I also argued that 
Blattner misses the important enigmatic beyond that lies at the heart of our 
thrownness and constitutes the meaning and ground of our existence. 
In light of the previous analysis, in the final chapter I proposed that taking 
responsibility should be understood in terms of becoming attentive to the way we are 
attuned most deeply. I showed the important points of convergence between 
Heidegger’s account and the work of Iris Murdoch, thus justifying using Murdoch’s 
model of attention as a guide. In conjunction with Murdoch’s work, I presented a 
phenomenology of attention that shows how it is a kind of comportment that avoids 
the problems I raised with the Heideggerian accounts in the previous chapter: 
attention was shown to be a mode of comportment (and not just a mode of mental or 
visual activity) that can be reflective or pre-reflective, that is sensitive to the way that 
possibilities show up on the basis of our attunement, that is by its nature answerable 
to something outside of the ‘I’ - the world, others, and the enigmatic beyond in the 
light of which these show up and solicit the ‘I’ - and that does not involve any kind of 
problematic separation from das Man. I showed that this idea of attention can in fact 
explain and account for the other pictures of taking responsibility previously 
analyzed, thus lending support for seeing attention as a comportment of 
‘responsibility’ specifically. I then went on to isolate attentiveness as the heart of 
taking responsibility through the use of two examples, Locke and Disgrace, by 
showing how the protagonists’ taking responsibility or not aligns with their 
attentiveness and not with the reflection, choosing, wholeheartedness, and 
independence from das Man that the examples also display. 
Thus, I have argued that to take responsibility for our being-in-the-world is to 
be attentive. Our thrownness is pervasive. We find ourselves already as a particular 
person, with a particular identity, in a particular social context, all of which are 
beyond our power. We find ourselves already always moving in the midst of all this, 
already gripped and taken by particular possibilities, already with a particular stance 
on what is true, what is good, on what it means to be. This thrownness shapes the way 
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we think, feel, and act, and moves us along a particular path for the most part behind 
the backs of our explicit awareness. There is no space apart from this movement from 
which we can gain power or control, or the ability to determine ourselves in 
opposition or separation from its weight and force. Fundamentally, we find ourselves 
thrown into human existence, into Dasein. We find ourselves as an ‘I’ moved in 
possible ways of being in a world with others, for whom what it means to be in such a 
way is never settled. We are ultimately moved by this being in question, gripped 
(beyond our control) by the question of what it means to be, how to live. We are 
moved fundamentally by the aim of being in a world with others that is true, in a way 
that is meaningful or good. To take responsibility is to be attentive to this. While what 
grips us as true, meaningful, and good is only accessible through the lens of the 
particular identity and society we find ourselves in, it is never exhausted by this. 
There are always further adumbrations to be revealed to unsettle our current answer 
of what it means to be. To be responsible is to give oneself over to the good, the 
meaningful, the true as manifest in our society and through our identities, but in such 
a way that remains open and receptive to that which is beyond their scope, as yet to 
be revealed to us. We cannot take power over our thrownness, but we can navigate 
this movement that we didn’t engender and cannot stop, to attempt to travel in the 
right direction insofar as this is revealed to us. Crucially, in contrast to the traditional 
model of responsibility, such navigation finds its focus on that which is beyond the 
navigator, as being attentive to the path ahead that they did not create, cannot control, 
yet can do their best to follow. Any capacity we have to exert influence on our lives is 
ultimately on the basis of being gripped by an attunement to that which is beyond us. 
I have proposed that this reading of responsibility is Heideggerian, building 
from Heidegger’s ontology of human existence as an expression of what it means to 
be Dasein. I have done this primarily on the basis of an analysis of thrownness and its 
first-personal manifestation in attunement, as well as showing how Heidegger’s 
characterization of falling away from our being can be understood through the lens of 
attention. 
Many questions and issues remain, of course. My analysis was based on the 
accounts of thrownness and attunement given in Division I of Being and Time. 
However, I think that the way is open to fruitfully reconsider Division II in light of 
the analysis I have developed here in terms of attentiveness. Though the heroic tenor 
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of Division II may seem at odds with my account, giving oneself over to the 
attunement to what is good can be every bit as difficult, as much as a burden, and 
requiring as much courage as Heidegger’s language suggests.1 Further analysis of 
Division II would show how resoluteness requires a receptivity to the situation, a lack 
of closing oneself off2 that is well-captured with the idea of attention. The idea of 
‘repetition’ (SZ 339) that Heidegger follows Kierkegaard in using is also amenable to 
being interpreted in terms of attentiveness insofar as attentiveness works against 
repetition’s enemy: rigid habit. It is not a struggle to imagine how the ‘moment of 
vision’ (SZ 339), in which all is the same yet transformed, perhaps sharpened in some 
way, can be interpreted in the way that a situation is transformed, comes alive, when 
one gives it attention anew.3 And while I did not examine death in detail, we can also 
understand attentiveness as a comportment to that which is beyond us, and beyond us 
essentially, that is expressive of our essential finitude. While limitations of space 
preclude developing such a reading here, I take it that further work could show that 
being-towards-death, and the rest of Heidegger’s analysis of authenticity, is 
consonant with the comportment of attentiveness. 
Considering Heidegger’s work as a whole, I think seeing authenticity through 
this lens of attention and attentiveness offers a way of connecting the existential 
analytic with Heidegger’s later work in contrast to disjunctive readings of 
Heidegger’s thought. Against the model of reading responsibility-taking or 
authenticity as residing in the power or self-determination of the subject, seeing them 
in terms of attentiveness sits more easily with Heidegger’s later characterization of an 
appropriate relationship to being as shepherding, listening, paying heed to – of 
particular note is The Event in which Heidegger advocates a heedfulness or an 
‘attentiveness to beyng’ (TE p147)4. 
                                                        
1 Here again I take Murdoch to be helpful in such analyses, that could lead us to ‘come to 
distinguish a self-assertive ferocity from the kind of courage which would enable a man coolly to 
choose the labour camp rather than the easy compromise with the tyrant.’ (Murdoch 2001 p93) 
2 See Blattner (2013) and Kompridis (2011). 
3 In the words of American poet Philip Levine, ‘pay attention. Let your eyes transform what 
appears ordinary, commonplace, into what it is, a moment in time, an observed fragment of 
eternity.’ 
4 See also his description as attentiveness to ‘the event’ as ‘the disposedness to the courage of 
steadfastness’ (TE p39) 
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Finally, given the intuitive (and textual5) link between attention and the work 
of looking to the ‘things themselves’ in our own experience, an understanding of 
authenticity as attentiveness offers a route to understanding an isomorphism between 
authenticity and philosophy (which, for Heidegger, was phenomenology) that many 
have suggested Heidegger advocates. 6 
Such work remains beyond the bounds of this thesis however, which has 
argued that taking responsibility on a Heideggerian account should be understood as 
becoming attentive to our attunement at the deepest level, the level of the being of 
Dasein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 E.g. ‘Through this prior [phenomenological] reduction it first became possible to focus attention 
on the phenomenological field and the apprehending of its data.’ (Husserl 2012 p117) 
6 See Staehler 2007, Mulhall 1996, Ratcliffe 2013, Guignon 2000 etc., who seems to be picking up 
on Heidegger’s own comments such as those in FCM. p7. 
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